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As the twentieth century comes to a close, the National Labor Relations Board
has come 180 degrees from its origins in the New Deal era The Congress that
created the Board in 1935 envisioned a body made up wholly of "impartial
Government members, " and consistent with this spirit, early Board appointees
were drawn from government or other neutral backgrounds. President
Eisenhower, however, the first Republican President since the passage of the
Labor Act, quickly broke with this tradition and appointed individuals from the
management side to the Board Although such partisan appointments were
originally a source of controversy, over the last half-century they have gradually
become not only accepted, but the norm. Indeed, the two most recent Boards
have consisted of two management and two union lawyers flanking a neutral as
chair and swing vote-the very tripartite model of the agency that had been
explicitly considered and decisively rejected by the Congress that brought the
Board into being.
In this article, Professor Flynn traces the evolution in NLRB appointment
norms and practices from 1935 to today, assesses the impact of the increased
prevalence ofpartisan Board members on NLRB decision-making and attempts
to explain why the partisan appointees of the last ffleen years have, according to
the empirical data; been so much more one-sided in their voting than were their
predecessors from similar backgrounds. She concludes that this marked increase
in partisan voting which has been particularly pronounced during the Clinton
years, is a product of a shif toward greater senatorial control over the
appointments process at the expense of the President. She further concludes that
this shift in the norms governing the NLRB appointments process, which is
reflected most starkly in the rise of "'packaged" appointments, is part of a more
general shift in presidential appointment norms. Thus, this article places
contemporary NLRB appointment practices not only in sharp juxtaposition to the
practices that held sway in the Act's early years, but in the context of larger
trends in the political process.
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You cannot make a man an impartial judge in his own case. ... [T]he
president of the American Federation ofLabor... could not possibly sit there in
an impartial manner.... [I]fyou want/] to create an impartial tribunal, it will
not be composed of[the representatives of] employers and employees.1
James Emery, General Counsel, National
Association of Manufacturers-Hearings
on proposed Labor Disputes Act, 1934
I say, gentlemen that... when you clothe the board with any such powers as
these the individuals composing it should be selected to represent one interest
and one interest alone, and that is the public interest.2
Nathan L. Miller, General Counsel, United
States Steel Corporation-Hearings on
proposed Labor Disputes Act, 1934
Let us recognize reality. Labor low is a dichotomous world Labor lawyers
represent either management or labor, and they tend to share the sentiments of
their clients on labor-management issues.... If the Board is to be filled with
individuals who have expertise in the labor laws, there is no avoiding the
necessity to draw from pools of individuals who have views on the law which can
generally be classified[as]pro-labor or pro-management.
The current system ignores this reality[;]... it pretends to seek candidates
who are "acceptable to all sides. "...
A healthier approach may be to acknowledge that Board members can only
be drawn from the two camps and let each camp suggest its own
candidate ... [W7ith a Democrat in the White House, the labor camp will get
three picks and, with [a] Republican [president], management gets three.3
Daniel Yager, Labor Policy
Association-Oversight Hearings on
National Labor Relations Board, 1996
1 A Bill to Equalize the Bargaining Power of Employers and Employees, To Encourage
the Amicable Settlement of Disputes Between Employers and Employees, To Create a National
Labor Board, andfor Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 73rd Cong. 340, 383 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2926], reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 374,417
(commemorative reprint 1985) [hereinafter 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA] (testimony of James
Emery, General Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers).
2 Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 1, at 883, 889, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA,
supra note 1, at 921, 927 (testimony of Nathan L. Miller, General Counsel, United States Steel
Corporation).
3 Examining the Activities and Progress of the National Labor Relations Board: Oversight
Hearing Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 91 (1996), reprinted
in THmNLRB: AN AGENCY IN CRISIS, STATEMENT OF THE LABOR POICY ASSOCIATION BEFORE
THE SENATE LABOR AND HumtAN RsouRcEs CoaffrrrE, OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 50 (1996) [hereinafter AGENCY IN CRISIS].
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INTRODUCTION
When the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) was founded in
1935, Congress envisioned the Board as a "strictly nonpartisan" body 4 The
forerunner of the NLRB, the National Labor Board (NLB),5 had been set up on a
tripartite basis, with an equal number of industry and labor representatives
flanking a chair who represented the public interest.6 Senator Wagner's original
bill had retained this tripartite structure, providing for a board composed of two
members "designated as representatives of employers, two as representatives of
employees, and three as representatives of the general public."7 Once it was
determined, however, that the new agency-unlike the NLB8 and the board
originally envisioned by Senator Wagner9 -would be an adjudicatory rather than
a mediation or arbitral body, "a consensus [emerged] that only the public should
be represented."' 0 The final legislation thus deleted any reference to partisan
4 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON OF
S. 2926 (739 CONGRESS) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONGRESS) § 3 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in
1 LEG. HIST. OFTHENLRA, supra note 1, at 1319, 1320.
5 This board was created by executive order in 1933. JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW
15 & n.31 (1974) [hereinafter GROSS, MAKINGOFTHENLRB]; IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT
YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERiCAN WORKER 1933-41, at 173 (1970). In mid-1934, a
subsequent executive order transferred its functions to a newly created body called the National
Labor Relations Board. GROSS, MAKING OF TE NLRB, supra, at 72. This "old National Labor
Relations Board" or pre-Wagner Act Board, which was authorized to conduct investigations,
hold hearings, and make findings of fact, but had no decision-maling authority, see id, was of
course supplanted by the new board created by the National Labor Relations Act, discussed
infranotes 10-12 and accompanying text.
6 GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 5, at 16, 25. The chair was Senator Wagner.
Id at 16.
7 See S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 201 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra
note 1, at 4; see also H.R. 8423, 73d Cong. § 201, at 7-8 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF
THENLRA, supra note 1, at 1131-32 (indicating that original House bill also provided for four
partisan members and three representatives of the public interest).
8 See GROSS, MAKING OF THENLRB, supra note 5, at 20 (noting that NLB's objective was
to prevent or settle strikes that might interfere with the economic recovery effort).
9 When introducing his original bill, Senator Wagner stated:
The... Board, under [this] legislation, is not designed to act chiefly as a policeman or ajudge.
Its chief function will be to mediate and conciliate industrial disputes, and to offer its services as
an arbitrator whenever the parties so desire.
78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THENLRA, supra note 1, at 17.
10 A Bill to Promote Equality of Bargaining Power Between Employers and Employees,
To Diminish the Causes of Labor Disputes, To Create a National Labor Boar and for Other
Purposes: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 291
(1935) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1958], reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT OF 1935 at 1617, 1677 (commemorative reprint 1985)
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representation,' 1 and it was fully understood that the new NLRB was to be staffed
solely by "three impartial Government members." 12
Consistent with this spirit, in the early years of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or Act),13 the notion of appointing someone from the management or
union side to the Labor Board was considered completely verboten; it was
generally agreed that such a person could not possibly be fair to both sides,14
much less be perceived as such, and most Board members were drawn from
[hereinafter 2 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA] (statement of Sen. Wagner); see, e.g., Hearings on
S. 2926, supra note 1, at 236, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at 266
(William Leiserson, chair of National Mediation Board) (stating that since the Board's primary
function would be to enforce the law, "the suggestion that the board have partisan
representation on it, from the point of view of half labor and half capital, is essentially wrong
from an administrative point of view. If the law is to be enforced, the person has to represent the
Government only."); id at 220, 230, reprinted in I LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at
250, 260 (Otto Beyer, director of labor relations for Federal Coordinator of Transportation)
(stating that the Board should act as a "labor judiciary;" instead of a tripartite arrangement, the
Board members should be "absolutely nonpartisan."); id at 611, 612-13, reprinted in 1 LEG.
HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at 645, 646-47 (Walter Carroll of the New Orleans
Chamber of Commerce) (stating that because it is ajudicial board, the NLRB should not be one
in which "some of the members directly represent one of the parties litigant and owe a duty to
them.... it would be better to have the board constituted of members who owe a duty to no
one, just like the Federal courts").
11 See Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 10, at 291, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HIST. OF
THENLRA, supra note 10, at 1617, 1677 (Sen. Wagner) (explaining that, in light of consensus
that only the public should be represented, the bill does not provide for representatives of
industry and labor on the Board); see also National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49
Stat. 449,451 (1935) (codified as amended at29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)), reprinted in 2 LEG.
IsT. OF THE NLRA, supra note 10, at 3270, 3272 (Section 3(a) of Act states only that the
Board "shall be composed ofthree members.").
12 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARIsON OF S. 2926
(73D CONGRESS) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONGRESS) § 3 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEG.
HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at 1319, 1320. This comparison explained that whereas the
previous bill had provided for government members, employer members and "worker"
members, "by now labor and management agree with the Government experts in believing that
a[n] impartial board is better than a board with [members] representing respectively workers
and employers." The Board was subsequently expanded to five members by the Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947. See Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 121, § 3(a), 61 Stat.
136, 139 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994)).
13 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
14 See supra text accompanying note 1 (setting forth testimony of James Emery, General
Counsel, National Association of Manufacturers); Hearings on S. 2926, supra note 1, at 611,
612-13, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at 645, 646-47 (reporting
testimony of Walter Carroll, New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, rejecting notion of Board in
which "some of the members directly represent one of the parties litigant and owe a duty to
them.... [W]e must always remember that these labor representatives owe a duty.., to the
people whom they represent .... ).
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government or academia-never from industry or labor.15 Beginning in the
Eisenhower years, however, both attitudes and appointing practices began to
shift,16 and since 1970 a majority of the Board members appointed have come
from management or union-side rather than neutral backgrounds.' 7 In recent
years, moreover, the Board has been split between two management lawyers on
the one hand and two union lawyers on the other, flanking first an academic 18 and
now a career Board employee as the chair and swing vote. 19 In short, the once
unimaginable has now become the norm, and the modem-day NLRB looks like
nothing so much as the tripartite model for the agency that was explicitly
considered and decisively rejected by the Wagner Act Congress.
This article attempts to explain just how this fundamental transformation in
the nature of the National Labor Relations Board took place, and to assess its
impact on the administration of the NLRA. Part I traces the evolution in Labor
Board appointments over the sixty-five year history of the Act. It describes how
the original taboo on appointing management or union-side personnel to the
Board was broken, and how, once broken, the initial controversy over such
15 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 29-30, 57-58 and accompanying text; infra note 66.
17 See infra Appendix, p. 1454 (listing all NLRB members and their backgrounds).
18 See A Sharply-Divided NLRB Faces the Future with a Nev Chairman, EMPLOYMENT
LAW ALERT (Nixon Hargrave Devans & Doyle LLP), May 1999 [hereinafter May 1999
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT] (newsletter on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (reporting that
in 1997-98, Stanford law professor William Gould presided over a Board "split down the
middle" between ex-management lawyers . Robert Brame and Peter Hurtgen and former union
attorneys Sarah Fox and Wilma Liebman); The Voting Records of the Members of the NLRB,
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon Hargrave Devans & Doyle LLP), Apr. 1998 [hereinafter
April 1998 EMPLOYMENT LAw ALERT] (newsletter on file with the Ohio State Lav Journal)
(noting that Chairman Gould is bound to be deciding vote, given sharp split between other four
Board members); see also infra Table 2, p. 1408; Figure 2, p. 1409 (indicating that Gould's
voting record falls between the extremely pro-management records of Hurtgen and Brame and
the extremely pro-union records of Fox and Liebman).
19 See Voting Along Party Lines Continues at NLRB, EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon
Peabody LLP), Dec. 1999 [hereinafter December 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT] (newsletter
on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (reporting that career Board employee John Truesdale,
who has replaced Stanford law professor Gould as Board chair, presides over a 'Tractured
agency" that is "split down the middle on partisan lines" between ex-management lawyers
Hurtgen and Brame on the one hand and ex-union lawyers Fox and Liebman on the other);
MAY 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (noting that Truesdale will be "pivotal
swing vote" on Board). As this article goes to press, the term of ex-management lawyer
. Robert Brame had recently expired, and the recess appointment of former union lawyer Sarah
Fox, which followed the expiration of her term, was set to expire shortly. See Former Member
Brame Joins Lmv Firm, Gives Up Attempt at Serving Second Term, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 190, at A-8 (Sept. 29, 2000). Thus, absent quick action, careerist John Truesdale
may shortly be acting as the chair and swing vote on a three-member Board split between a
single ex-management lawyer and a single ex-union lawyer.
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appointments gradually died down, to the point where the almost unrelievedly
partisan character of President Clinton's Board appointments has drawn almost
no notice whatsoever.
Part I assesses the impact of the increasing prevalence of Board members
drawn from partisan backgrounds on NLRB decision-making. More specifically,
it explores the question of whether Board members who come to the agency from
the management or union side are more biased in their decision-making than are
their counterparts from government or other "neutral" backgrounds. Rather
surprisingly, perhaps, Part II concludes that the answer to this question is
extremely time-dependent. While the Board members from partisan backgrounds
who served prior to 1980 certainly tended to favor their "side of origin" in
deciding cases, as a general matter their voting records were not significantly
more one-sided than were those of many members drawn from government
service.20 During the last decade and a half, in contrast,21 the management and
union-side lawyers on the NLRB have voted in a decidedly more one-sided
fashion than their colleagues from nonpartisan backgrounds.2 2 The most recent
appointees from the management and union sides, moreover, have compiled
particularly lop-sided voting records, in which "votes for the 'other' side's
position are.., few and far between. '23
Part III explores the reasons for this temporal difference, and concludes that it
is the product of a change in norms in both the NLRB appointments process and
the presidential appointments process generally-and in particular, of a shift to
greater senatorial control of the process at the expense of the President. It begins
by describing the manner in which NLRB appointments were made up through
the late 1970s, and explains why the nominees that emerged from this
presidentially-driven process, even those from partisan backgrounds, tended to be
relatively moderate in their decision-making. It then traces the shift in
appointment practices that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with attention
to both the selection and confirmation phases of the process. After analyzing the
differing incentives of the President and individual senators and the internal
structure and rules of the Senate, Part H determines that it is the Senate's
assertion of significant control over the selection of NLRB nominees-which it
has asserted in large part by insisting that the President acquiesce to certain of its
choices as the price of getting any of his nominees confirmed-that is most
responsible for the extreme nominees of recent years. And because the changes in
20 See infra Table 1, p. 1405; Figure 1, p. 1406.
21 This article draws on two major studies of Board member voting patterns. One covers
the period 1955-79, and the other began in 1985 and is still ongoing. See infra notes 178-82,
185-86 and accompanying text (describing these two studies). There is no data available on
Board member voting for the period 1980-1984.
22 See infra Table 2, p. 1408; Figure 2, p. 1409.
23 December 1999 EMPLoYMENr LAW ALERT, supra note 19; see also infra text
accompanying notes 189-94.
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the NLRB appointments process over the last decade and a half-such as the shift
in the balance of power in favor of the Senate and the concomitant rise of
"packaged" appointments-largely mirror those that have affected appointments
to other agencies and even the federal judiciary, Part III concludes that the
likelihood of a return to prior norms and to an era of less blatantly biased NLRB
nominees is dependent primarily on larger political trends-and hence, nearly
impossible to predict.
I. THE QUIET REVOLUTION
A. The Era ofNonpartisanship: 1935-1952
From the Wagner Act's beginnings in 1935 through the 1940s, appointees to
the Labor Board were drawn nearly exclusively from non-partisan backgrounds.
Admittedly, there were as yet no "management" or "union-side" lawyers to even
consider appointing, there being no such animals until the Act had been up and
running for some years.24 There was, however, a significant pool of in-house
industrial relations specialists and union officials to call upon, but Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman, in keeping with the spirit of the Act2 5 drew most26 of
24 Terry M. Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory: The Politics of the
NLRB, in 2 STUDIEs IN AMERICAN POLiCAL DEVELoPMENT 260 (1987):
[l]here really was no such thing as "labor law" until the board and the courts created it, and
there was no labor bar within the legal profession to handle the new demand [created by the
passage of the NLRA. However,] during the 1940s and 1950s, law schools adapted their
curricula, practitioners began specializing in labor law, and the supply of attorneys rose to meet
the regulation-induced demand.
Id.
2 5 See supra text accompanying notes 4-12.
2 6 The sole nominee from either labor or management during these years was Copeland
Gray, nominated by President Truman in 1947. Gray had been the industrial relations director
of an engineering company and then an industrial relations consultant to employers. See
Confirmation of Nominees for National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 23-25 (1947) [hereinafter
DenhamlMurdocklGray Hearings]. The issue of possible bias in favor of industry was raised at
Gray's confirmation hearing by Senator Watkins, see id at 35-37, but the primary source of
concern about him was, rather, his undistinguished background and almost complete ignorance
of the Act See id. at 27 (indicating that when asked about the recent Taft-Hartley amendments
to the NLRA, Gray stated that he had "read [the law] twice," but 'i do not yet completely
understand it); JAMES GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLIcY, 1947-1994, at 24 (1995) [here&iafter GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE] (reporting that three
of twelve members of the Senate Labor Committee, "unimpressed with his experience," voted
against Gray). Indeed, some thought that Truman had purposely nominated a man who was
"'not... big enough for the job.' in order to thwart effective enforcement of Taft-Hartley. See
id.
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their appointees from government service,27 with the occasional academic thrown
in2 8
B. The Tide Begins to Turn: The Eisenhower Board
The tide began to turn with President Eisenhower's election in 1952.
Eisenhower, the first Republican President since the passage of the NLRA,
The only lawyer from the private sector to serve during these years was Donald Wakefield
Smith, appointed in 1936. See GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 5, at 155 & n.24.
Smith apparently practiced immigration law and labor law of an unspecified type. See id Little
is known of him except that he was thinly qualified and appointed at the request of a senator to
whom he was related by marriage. Id
2 7 Ten of their fourteen appointees (and hence, ten of the first fourteen NLRB members)
came from government. They were: Edwin Smith (1935-41), John Carmody (1935-36),
William Leiserson (1939-43), Gerard Reilly (1941-46), John Houston (1943-53), Paul Herzog
(1945-53), James Reynolds (1946-51), Abe Murdock (1947-57), Paul Styles (1950-53), and
Ivar Peterson (1952-56). See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 60TH ANNIVERSARY
COMMTrrEE, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, 1935-1995, at 56 (1995) [hereinafter FIRST SIXTY YEARS] (listing all Board members
from 1935 to 1995 and terms of service).
Six of those ten came from other federal or state labor agencies or departments, and one
from the NLRB itself. See GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 5, at 74-75 (reporting
that Smith had been the commissioner of labor and industries in Massachusetts and had also
served on the pre-Wagner Act NLRB); id at 154-55 (indicating that Carmody was member of
National Mediation Board (NMB)); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSrION 1937-47, at 89 (1981)
[hereinafter GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE NLRB] (indicating that Leiserson was chair of NMB);
id at 239-40 (indicating that Reilly was solicitor of Department of Labor); id at 246
(indicating that Herzog had served on state labor board and came to the NLRB from a position
as the Navy's liaison to the Board); id at 359-60 n.35 (indicating that Reynolds was Special
Advisor to the Secretary of the Navy on labor problems); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
26, at 64 (reporting that Styles was Regional Director of Board's Atlanta office). Of the
remaining three, two were members of Congress, and the other was a congressional aide. See
GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE NLRB, supra, at 245 (reporting that Houston was a four-term
Congressman); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 24 (reporting that Murdock had
served four terms in the House and one in the Senate); id at 72 (indicating that Peterson was
aide to Senator Wayne Morse).
28 The first chair of the NLRB, Warren Madden, was a professor of property and torts at
the University of Pittsburgh. See GROSS, MAKING OF THE NLRB, supra note 5, at 150. The
second, Harry Millis, was an economics professor and arbitrator from the University of Chicago
who had also served on the pre-Wagner Act NLRB. See id at 75; GROSS, RESHAPING OF THE
NLRB, supra note 27, at 226; see also supra note 5 (discussing pre-Wagner Act board). In
addition, William Leiserson, who came to the NLRB in 1939 from the position of chair of the
National Mediation Board, see supra note 27, also had a substantial background in academia.
See J. MICHAEL EISNER, WILLIAM MORRIS LEISERSON 12-14 (1967) (indicating that Leiserson
had taught economics at Toledo University for a few years and at Antioch College for several
years).
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appointed management attorney Guy Farmer as Board chair in 1953.29 Several
months later, he selected Albert Beeson, a non-lawyer who had been industrial
relations director for two different companies, to fill another open Board seat.
30
Despite the fact that Farmer's nomination marked a complete break with the
tradition of non-partisan appointments, the issue of his management-side
background, and potential bias resulting therefrom, was not even mentioned at his
brief confirmation hearing.3' The Beeson nomination, however, was another
story. Whereas Farmer had sailed through the confirmation process without
opposition,32 organized labor weighed in with full force against Beeson,
complaining that as a long-time member of management he would be hopelessly
biased. 33
29 See Nomination of Guy Farmer to be a Member of the National Labor Relations
Board: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Cong. 1-4
(1953) [hereinafter Farmer Hearings]; FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note 27, at56 (indicating that
Farmer had chaired the Board). Farmer had spent the eight years prior to his nomination as a
management lawyer at Steptoe & Johnson. See Farmer Hearings, supra at 1-2; see also
Nomination ofAlbert Cummins Beeson to be a Member of the National Labor Relations Board:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 83rd Cong. 26-27 (1954)
[hereinafter Beeson Hearings] (indicating that Farmer was the chief labor lawyer for Steptoe &
Johnson). Like many a Board member to follow, Farmer had begun his career with the NLRB.
See Farmer Hearings, supra, at 2 (indicating that Farmer had spent seven years with NLRB).
The President chooses the Board chair from among the members; no separate confirmation to
the position of chair is required. See NLRA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994).
30 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 1 (setting forth Beeson's biography).
31 See Farmer Hearings, supra note 29, at 1-4 (indicating that there were no questions
regarding bias in twenty-five minute hearing). Farmer had a distinguished record; he was a
former Rhodes Scholar, and during his tenure at the Board had risen to the position of Associate
General Counsel, the second highest rankingjob in the legal division. Id at 1-2.
32 See 100 CONG. REC. S1985 (1954) (reporting Sen. Kennedy's statement that the
committee had quickly and unanimously confirmed Farmer); see also 99 CoNG. REc. S8481
(1953) (indicating that Farmer was confirmed without debate, and apparently unanimously).
No union sought to testify against Farmer's nomination or registered any opposition with
the Senate Labor Committee, see Farmer Hearings, supra note 29, and I have found no
indication that any union expressed public opposition to Farmer. See also GROSS, BROKEN
PROMISE, supra note 26, at 99 (reporting "little organized opposition" to Fanner appointment).
3 3 The CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations), in the person of Secretary-Treasurer
James Carey, offered extensive testimony against Beeson:
The crucial question is whether or not Mr. Beeson, by reason of his years of training and
experience representing management, has been rendered incapable of being fair and
impartial .... In our view, that question must be answered in the affirmative, and his nomination
must, therefore, be rejected.
See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 49. See also id at 55-56 (characterizing Beeson as "a
representative of the employer point of view"); id at 51-52 (recounting further testimony of
Carey). CIO President Walter Reuther sent a telegram denouncing the administration's "attempt
to pack this quasi-judicial Board with representatives of industry."Id at 36.
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Testifying before the Senate Labor Committee, CIO official James Carey
pointed out that no one from the union side had ever been appointed to the
Board,34 and argued that the Republican majority would "consider it an outrage"
if the President named someone with experience comparable to Beeson's on the
union side of the table to the NLRB.35 Carey argued that all such partisan
appointments should be verboten, and noted that he hardly thought that he could
be impartial after twenty-one years as a union official.3 6
Senate Democrats also raised concerns about Beeson's background, 37 and
The AFL (American Federation of Labor) and the Teamsters also registered their
opposition. See 100 CONG. REC. S1988 (1954). George Meany of the AFL sent a telegram
expressing his opposition on the ground that Beeson's background would result in a pro-
management bias. Id Similarly, Teamsters President Dave Beck sent a telegram indicating that
his union was opposed to Beeson because Beeson "comes directly from the payroll of
management and is clearly employer minded." Id at S1989. Meany's telegram of opposition
also cited Beeson's contradictory statements at the hearings, discussed infra. See id at S1988;
infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text
34 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 64 (quoting Carey's testimony: "When did we
ever have any advocates of labor on the National Labor Relations Board? Not in the history of
this country."). As was noted at the hearing, Board member Paul Styles had been a union
official early in his career, but had been employed by the Board itself for twelve or thirteen
years prior to his appointment. See id at 53-54.
35 Id at 57. Senator Murray concurred in this assessment: 'I believe the country would be
shocked if we named a man like [Mine Workers President] John L. Lewis, or [CIO President
Walter] Reuther, or some other gentleman from the ranks of labor." Id. at 97. In a similar vein,
Murray said to Beeson, "[Y]ou have devoted your life to the side of management Would you
recommend [CIO President] Walter Reuther for a place on the board?" Id
36 Id at 57 ("f I [were] asked ... ifI could be a fair-minded member of [the Board] with
twenty-one years experience as a national officer of a labor union, my answer must of necessity
be 'No."). Beeson had spent nineteen years on the management side. Id at 54. In what was
perhaps the rhetorical high point (or low point) of the hearings, Carey went on to state, "I, for
one, find it difficult to believe that a man can moult his opinions and his prejudices and emerge
in the glistening, new raimant [sic] of a public servant as easily as a caterpillar may transform
itself into a butterfly." Id at 57. To the same effect were the comments of Teamsters President
Dave Beck, who stated in a letter to the Senate:
The fundamental question is whether a man whose total professional experience.., has
been as representative of one side of the other... can reasonably be expected to adopt an
attitude of impartiality when suddenly called upon to administer the national labor law in the
interest of no one except the public. I believe that is too much to ask of any man.
I would not ask it of Walter Reuther, [AFL President] George Meany, or John Lewis-I
would not want it asked of me.
100 CONG. REC. S1989 (1954).
37 Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 97 (statement of Sen. Murray) (noting that "your
whole life has been [spent] on the side of management," and stating that "we should not... put
men on the board who have fixed views, and fixed opinions upon these labor questions and
expect them to set them aside when called upon to act on controversies"); see also id at 3-4
(questioning by Senator Murray); id at 6 (Sen. Lehman); id at 9-11 (Sen. John Kennedy).
1370 [Vol. 61:1361
QUIETREVOLUTIONAT THE LABOR BOARD
further pointed out that Beeson'sfuture, as well as his past, was a potential source
of bias. Senator Murray, for instance, argued that anyone who "intends, hopes or
expects to be reappointed to his managerial position" after serving on the Board
will necessarily be influenced by the fact that "[his] chances of being reemployed
by management to represent management may be conditioned on whether or not
the decisions he makes have favored... management."38
The reason for the Democrats' and organized labor's sudden and rather
belated39 concern with the issue of partisan appointments was fairly clear, as
3 8 Id at 76. Senator Murray's point was tied to Beeson's comment to a reporter that he
would be serving a "1-year term" on the Board and would then return to his company. Id at 75;
see also id at 119-20 (reporting Senator Lehman's statement that Beeson had a conflict of
interest if he planned on returning to his old job). However, the implications of Murray's
comment are obviously much broader. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74, 159-71
(discussing problem of bias arising from likelihood of future re-employment on the side that the
nominee previously represented).
The full term of an NLRB member is five years, but an individual chosen to fill a vacancy
is appointed only for the remainder of his predecessor's unexpired term. NLRA § 3(a),
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994). Beeson was appointed to fill out the term of Paul Styles, who had
resigned. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 99.
39 At the Beeson hearings, the senators seemed to either ignore the Farmer appointment
completely or to suggest that someone from a non-legal industry-side background would
somehow be more biased than a lawyer who had represented management As to the former,
see Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 119 (statement of Sen. Lehman) ("[I]n the entire history
of the Board... there has been nobody appointed to the Board who represents labor or industry
or whose almost exclusive experience has been in labor or industry."). As to the latter, see id. at
11, reporting Senator John Kennedy's comment that:
[E]very other member of the Board has come from a more neutral background... than you do.
You were a member of management's side of the table, ... while every other member of the
Board has either been a lawyer, who presumably serves either side, or has been a member of a
public body which is concerned with representing the public interest in labor-management
relations.
Moreover, Senator Kennedy had previously stated that:
In looking over the background of the previous members of the Board, I find that 10 of them are
lawyers and 8 of them came from various public bodies... concerned with labor-management
relations. This is the first time in the history of the Board that a member has been appointed
from either labor or management direct This is a precedent which we should be vitally
concerned with, do you not agree?
Idat 10.
In fact, it could readily be argued that an in-house industrial relations specialist who
negotiates contracts and deals with day-to-day problems at the plant is likely to have a more
conciliatory attitude toward labor than one whose stock in trade is litigating against unions-
i.e., than a management lawyer like Farmer. Indeed, Beeson attempted to make this point, albeit
rather obliquely. See id at 3, 5, 11 (setting forth Beeson's attempts to point out that his job
required him to consider labor's position as well as management's).
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Eisenhower's third appoiritment to the five-member Board,40 Beeson would be in
a position to cast the deciding vote on the many hotly contested issues then
awaiting Board decision,4' as well as those arising in the future. In this respect,
then, Beeson was an administrative forerunner of Robert Bork, with Farmer
playing Antonin Scalia to Beeson's Bork.42
In response to the accusations of bias, Beeson and his supporters raised what
were to become the standard arguments in defense of nominees from partisan
backgrounds. The first was expertise; they claimed that Beeson's background was
an asset rather than a liability because of the insight it gave him into day-to-day
labor relations. 43 The second was that of personal integrity; Beeson insisted that
40 The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act expanded the Board from three to five members. See supra
note 12.
41 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 9 (reporting Senator Kennedy's statement that:
"As you are going to be the third member appointed by this administration,... the balance of
power will shift .... This is of fundamental importance to this committee."); id at 11
(reporting Kennedy's reaffirmation, after questioning Beeson regarding potential bias, that "I
think it is of special concem since you will be the third member to go on the Board in the last 12
months. Therefore, we are particularly concerned, as this may change the whole attitude of the
Board on some of these questions.") At the time of Beeson's nomination, the Board was made
up of two Democratic holdovers appointed by President Truman plus Eisenhower's first two
appointees, both Republicans, and was deadlocked on twenty to thirty key cases. See GRoss,
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 100; see also NLRB: Key to Coming T-H Debate, Bus.
WK., Jan. 16, 1954, at 162.
By custom, no more than three members of the Board may belong to the same political
party. See Mid-Life Crisis: The NLRB at Fijfty, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 106, at E-1
(June 3, 1985). Thus, the Board, when fully staffed, typically consists of three members from
the President's party and two from the opposing party.
42 That is, Bork, as the fifth vote to overrule Roe v. Wade, underwent intense scrutiny only
a year after Scalia, who held very similar views on Roe and other issues, had been confrmed
without opposition. See Gordon J. Humphrey, Bork as Seen from Two Angles, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 13, 1987, at A-17 (reporting Republican senator's observation that the Senate had
confirmed Scalia, who is more conservative than Bork, only a year ago, but that liberals were
now claiming "it's different" because Bork would be the decisive vote on issues such as
abortion and affirmative action); David A. Kaplan, Scalia Was 'Worse' Than Bork N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987, at A-23 (asking "how a majority of Senators opposes [Bork] but not one
of them... voted against Antonin Scalia's confirmation'... ," and noting that the Senate's
"new activism" may be explained by the fact that Bork would have been the swing vote on the
Court). Bork, of course, not only underwent intense scrutiny, but was defeated. See Linda
Greenhouse, Bork's Nomination is Rejected, 58-42; Reagan "Saddened, " N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
1987, at A-1.
43 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 10 (Beeson testimony):
I think perhaps it is important [to have] someone on the Board with practical, day-to-day plant
experience; who knows something... of the effect of decisions, on what happens to the
employees in a plant and what happens to the plant manager, the ability to get out the
work....
1372 [Vol. 61:1361
QUIETREVOLUTIONAT THE LABOR BOARD
he could be fair,44 and his supporters affirmed their confidence in Beeson's
character. 45 Third was the "two hats" defense;46 Beeson's defenders maintained
that whatever Beeson's prior role had been, he was certainly capable of
discarding that role and assuming the new role of representative of the public
interest following his appointment47 -much, they said, as federal judges are
called upon to do.48 Fourth and finally was what might be called the necessity
See also 100 CONG. REC. S1975 (1954) (Chairman Smith) (stating that Beeson's hands-on
experience "will be of inestimable value to the Board as a whole"); Beeson Hearings, supra
note 29, at 53 (Chairman Smith) (stating that he does not consider Beeson's management-side
background problematic because "I think we get benefit by having men who have had
experience").
CIO official Carey did not dispute that such experience was valuable, but argued that the
bias resulting from Beeson's one-sided background outweighed the benefits of any such
expertise:
I would not say that personal knowledge of the day-to-day problems of labor-management
relations would not be an asset to a member of the Board. But where that knowledge is obtained
as an advocate, and always on the same side, it would go contrary to all our knowledge of
human nature to assume that its possessor could cast off the habits of thought which all those
years have developed.
Id at52.
44 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 9, 11, 133-34.
45 See id at 45 (Chairman Smith) (stating that it is not fair to imply that Beeson will be
biased as a result of his background, and that Beeson impressed him as "most frank and candid
and ... as the type of man that ought to be put on this Board"). Smith's comments regarding
Beeson's "candor" turned out to be somewhat ironic in light of later developments. See infra
text accompanying notes 53-54.
46 See Michael H. Gottesman & Michael R. Seidl, A Tale of Two Discourses: William
Gould's Journeyfirom the Academy to the World of Politics, 47 STAN. L. REv. 749, 759 (1995)
(book review). Gottesman and Seidl use the term in reference to the efforts of nominees from
academia to distance themselves from their academic writings by asserting that they are capable
of differentiating between the roles of academic proponent and judicial agent and of "switching
roles at will." The term seems equally apt, however, as applied to those appointed to a quasi-
judicial agency from a partisan background.
47 See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 66 (Sen. Griswold) ("I think it is ... not only
possible but very often the case, that men when they accept new roles proceed to live up to
those roles and [the] responsibility that is given to them.").
4 8 As evidence that Beeson could readily throw off his prior role once on the Board,
Beeson's supporters pointed specifically to the career of Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes.
See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 66 (Sen. Griswold) (indicating that many senators who
had opposed Hughes's appointment on the ground that he could not be fair given his
background as an advocate for big business subsequently acknowledged that Hughes had been
completely impartial once on the bench); see also 100 CONG. REC. S1974 (1954) (indicating
that Chairman Smith offered the same argument). Hughes's nomination as Chief Justice had
aroused substantial opposition because of his extensive representation of large corporations, but
Hughes had shown great independence once on the Court. Id; see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
JuSnTCES AND PRESIDENTS: A PoLrrCAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT
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defense; Senator Smith, for one, suggested that it would be "exceedingly difficult
to find anyone for service on a quasi-judicial board who was entirely free from a
background which might allegedly prejudice him."49
There was some recognition during the debate over Beeson that the
nomination marked a turning point in the conception of the Board itself.50 The
Minority Report signed by the Labor Committee's six Democrats noted that
"[c]entral to an understanding of the controversy surrounding Mr. Beeson's
nomination is the nature of the National Labor Relations Board."51 It pointed out
that the Board was not conceived of as a tripartite body in which members were
appointed to represent the interests of labor or management but rather as a quasi-
judicial agency, each member of which was supposed to be impartial.52
Midway through the hearings, the focus of the debate shifted. Allegations
arose that Beeson had lied in testifying that he had severed all ties with his former
company and in denying that he had made certain comments attributed to him by
199 (2d ed. 1985) (describing opposition to Hughes from Midwestern senators concerned about
"the erstwhile corporate law specialist's affinity for America's business and financial elite"); id
at 196 (describing Hughes as "a Chief Justice with few peers"). Of course, as Senator Lehman
pointed out in rebuttal, Hughes had spent the four years prior to his appointment as a public
official-as Governor of New York. See Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 66; see also
ABRAHAM, supra, at 166. More importantly, however, as discussed infra text accompanying
notes 162-67, the analogy to federal judicial appointments is wholly inapt given that federal
judges are appointed for life, whereas Labor Board members are likely to be back in their pre-
Board roles within a few years of their appointment
4 9 See 100 CONG. REC. S1974 (1954) (statement of Chairman Smith).
5 0 Teamsters President Dave Beck, for one, stated that the nomination marked "a fork in
the road where the NLRB might well be converted into a partisan agency." 100 CONG. REC.
S1989 (1954). Of course, it was actually Farmer's nomination that marked the turning point.
See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 31.
51 SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, NOMINATION OF ALBERT C. BEESON
TO BE A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, MiNoRrrY VIRvs, S. ExEc.
REP. No. 83-2, at 3 (1954).
52 Id at 3-4. This same point was made by a number of individual senators. See 100
CONG. REC. S2004 (1954) (statement of Sen. John Kennedy) (pointing out that the Board "is
not a tripartite body, to which representatives of labor and management should be appointed,"
but rather a quasi-judicial body whose members must exhibit strict impartiality); Beeson
Hearings, supra note 29, at 10 (Sen. Kennedy) (stating that because the Board is a quasi-
judicial rather than an arbitral body, it is inappropriate to appoint individuals whose sole
identification is with one side or the other); id at 119 (Sen. Lehman) (similar); id at 98 (Sen.
Murray) ("[I]t seems to me that the only way we can handle this thing is to have men of entire
impartiality on these boards, and I do not think it would look right to have 2 or 3 big labor
leaders, and 2 or 3 big labor relations men from the corporations sitting on the Board.... I do
not see how anyone could approve of that kind of board."); see also 100 CONG. REC. S1989
(1954) (letter from Teamsters President Dave Beck to Senate) (expressing belief that Beeson's
appointment "would undermine the public character of the NLRB" and is contrary to
Congress's intent that NLRB members represent only the public interest).
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the press,53 and the Democrats shifted the brunt of their attack to Beeson's
veracity and integrity.54 At the end of the day, however, Beeson was confimned;
his nomination cleared the Senate Labor Committee on a party-line vote,55 and
5 3 SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, NOMINATON OF ALBERT C. BEEsON
TO BE A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR REATIONS BOARD, SUPPLavENTAL MINORrrY
VIvs, S. EXEC. REP. No. 83-2, pt. 2, at 1-3 (1954) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL MINORriY
REPORT ON BEESON] (alleging that Beeson had lied in testifying that he had resigned his
position and given up his pension rights, and in denying that he had told newspaper that his
nomination was for a "l-year tem" and that he expected to return to his company upon
completion of that term); see also 100 CONG. REC. S1976 (1954) (outlining the minority's
allegations). The Democrats maintained that Beeson had in fact taken a leave of absence from
his company so that he could both retain his pension rights and return to his prior position after
serving out his term on the Board. See SUPPLEMENTAL MINORITY REPORT ON BEESON, supra, at
1-3; see, e.g., 100 CONG. REC. S1990 (1954) (statement of Sen. Hill).
A third issue that received some attention was Beeson's relationship with NLRB chair and
fellow Eisenhower appointee Guy Farmer. See 100 CONG. REC. S1973 (1954). Farmer had
represented Beeson's company on some labor matters, the two men had become good friends in
the course of their professional dealings, and Farmer had recommended Beeson's appointment
to President Eisenhower. See MINOrY REPORT ON BEESON, supra note 51, at 5; see also
Beeson Hearings, supra note 29, at 27-28. The minority raised the possibility that Beeson
might feel a sense of obligation to Farmer or might, especially because he was a non-lawyer,
rely excessively on Farmer's judgment in deciding cases. See MINORrnY REPORT ON BEESON,
supra note 51, at 6; 100 CONG. REC. S2003 (1954) (statement of Sen. Douglas); see also 100
CONG. REC. S2004 (1954) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (citing Beeson's relationship with
Farmer as among the reasons for rejecting nomination).
54 See 100 CONG. REC. S1978 (1954) (statement of Sen. Morse) ("It is not a question of
this man's background, so far as I am concemed"; the problem is Beeson's veracity, integrity,
and reliability.); id at S1998 (statement of Sen. Fullbright) (I have never been impressed by
the argument that Mr. Beeson could not be an impartial member of the Board"; opposes
nomination rather because he believes that Beeson lied in testimony to committee.).
Neither Senator Morse nor Senator Fullbright, quoted above, was on the Labor
Committee. The predominant reason cited by committee members for opposing the nomination
was also Beeson's lack of veracity, however. See id at S1989, S1995-96 (statement of Sen.
Hill) (opposing nomination because of Beeson's evasiveness and deceit); id at S1994
(statement of Sen. Neely) (accusing Beeson of lying, and stating opposition to nomination on
that basis); idi at S1981 (statement of-Sen. Douglas) (stating that main grounds of minority's
opposition are Beeson's contradictory statements, but declining to accede to suggestion that the
allegations of bias have been reduced to a "minor detail"); id at S1985 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (stating that minority "made up our minds" to oppose Beeson only when his lack of
candor became apparent); id at S2004 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that committee
minority might under other circumstances overlook the fact that Beeson is the first person
appointed directly from the ranks of management or labor and his relationship with Farmer, but
that "we cannot overlook the lack of candor and honesty which characterized Mr. Beeson's
deceptive and misleading testimony").
55 MINORITY REPORT ON BEESON, supra note 51, at 3 (indicating that committee vote was
7-6 to report nomination and that all six Democrats opposed nomination).
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was approved 45-42 by the full Senate.56
Undeterred by the controversy over Beeson's background, the following year
President Eisenhower nominated the first ever management lawyer, Theophil
Kanmholz, 57 to the even more sensitive position of Board General Counsel.58
The Kammholz hearings were in some respects a more muted replay of
Beeson's; 59 many of the same arguments60 and counter-arguments 6' regarding
56 100 CONG. REc. S2005 (1954).
57 See Nomination of Theophil Carl Kammholz, of Illinois, to be General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 84th Cong. 1-3 (1955) [hereinafter Kammholz Hearings] (indicating that prior to his
appointment in 1955, Kammholz had spent nine and a half years with Pope & Ballard and three
years with Vedder Price Kaufman & Kamniholz, of which he was a founding partner).
58 The General Counsel is responsible for the issuance and prosecution of all unfair labor
practice complaints, and supervises the Board's regional offices. See 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 3
(1997). The General Counsel's discretion to issue or decline to issue a complaint is completely
unreviewable, see NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 114
(1987), and many consider the General Counsel's position the single most important position at
the agency. See Bush Administration Gathers Prospects for Post of Labor Board General
Counsel, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at A-9 (Mar. 8, 1989); Bitterness of Debate
Surrounding NLRB Threatens Functioning of Agency, Lubbers Says, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 43, at A-1 (Mar. 5, 1984).
59 This was so even to the extent that allegations of unethical conduct on the nominee's
part arose at one point. Union representatives Nicholas DiPietro and Lawrence Gruber testified
that they spoke to Kammhol, who was Regional Attorney for the War Labor Board, on a
Friday concerning possible improper conduct by a printing company, only to arrive at a related
NLRB hearing on the following Monday to find Kammholz there representing that very
company on behalf of a law firm. See Kammholz Hearings, supra note 57, at 21-23. As at the
Beeson hearings, the senators who were interested in pursuing these allegations were precisely
those who had already expressed concern about Kammholz's management-side background.
See id at 40-41 (Sen. Murray) (noting that union witnesses had very clear recollections of
meeting with Kammholz and pressing Kammholz for a response); see also id at 26-27
(Sen. Douglas) (questioning union witnesses regarding meeting with Kamnholz and sequence
of events); infra text accompanying notes 60 and 62 (demonstrating that Senators Murray and
Douglas, along with Senator Lehman, were the senators most concerned about Kammholz's
background).
60 See Kammholz Hearings, supra note 57, at 41-42 (Sen. Murray) (questioning whether
former management attorney can either act impartially or give the appearance of impartiality);
id at 44 (Sen. Lehman) (expressing concern over the administration's tendency to select men
who "may wish to be impartial, but are rendered possibly less than impartial by reason of their
continuing affiliations with just one group and interest over a long period of years"); 101 CONG.
REC. S2520, S2522 (1955) (views of Senators Douglas and McNamara in opposition to
Kammholz nomination) (stating that "hue and cry" would have resulted had any administration
nominated someone '"resh from the ranks of labor or labor's legal advocates" to the Board).
61 Kammholz's defenders raised the "necessity" defense, for instance. See Kammholz
Hearings, supra note 57, at 52 (Sen. Ives) (stating that the General Counsel should be a lawyer
and that "it is very difficult to get any lawyer... who knows anything about this field, who has
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potential bias were raised 62 but the opposition to Kanunholz appeared rather
half-hearted. After hearings in which none of the big guns of organized labor
came out against the nomination, 63 Kammiholz was confirmed by a voice vote. 64
not represented one side or the other in it"); id at 46 (Sen. Allott) ("If you have to have
experience, you have to have it in this field on one side or the other.").
The judicial analogy was also raised, although this time around, the names invoked were
Hugo Black and John Harlan. See id at I 1 (Sen. Bender) (noting that although many had feared
Black would exhibit prejudice against Blacks, he was quite fair-minded during his tenure on the
Court); see also id at 45 (Sen. Bender) (similar); 101 CoNG. REC. S2523-24 (1955) (statement
of Sen. Dirksen) (alluding to a number of federal judges whose backgrounds had raised concern
in some quarters but who had quickly become well-respectedjudges---Justices Hugo Black and
John Harlan, a well-known corporate lawyer prior to his appointment, among them). Finally,
Senator Dirksen argued that Kammholz's good character was a sufficient buttress against bias.
See 101 CONG. REC. S2523 (1955).
62 The Democrats did make two points or arguments that they had not made during the
Beeson hearings. First, they challenged the Republicans' contention that it is impossible to find
people with both the requisite expertise and a non-partisan background. See 101 CONG. REC.
S2522 (1955) (views of Senators McNamara and Douglas in opposition to the nomination)
("We cannot believe that from State labor relations agencies, other offices of the Federal
Govemment, the academic world or arbitration groups, someone with more impartial
experience and training than Mr. Kammholz has had could not have been found."); Kammholz
Hearings, supra note 57, at 44 (Sen. Lehman) (There must be... a great many people in this
country who have either had long experience in impartial work, or long experience in public
service where they served the public rather than one particular group."); id at 52 (Sen. Murray)
(denying the implication that it is necessary to pick people who have worked on one side or the
other and pointing, as evidence, to non-partisans he had appointed to the New York State labor
relations board during his tenure as governor); id at 15 (Sen. Douglas) ("I can conceive of
people with a great deal of practice experience who would still be eligible."); see also id at 19
(Henry Coco, Chicago Allied Trades Council) ("There is no dearth of able men available to fill
the position .... There is no need to place the administration of [the] law in the hands of a one-
sided administrator.").
Second, Senators McNamara and Douglas, at least, argued that anyone who had worked
on the union or management side should at a minimum have undergone a "decontamination"
period in public service or some other neutral capacity prior to being appointed to Board office.
See 101 CONG. REC. S2522 (1955) ("Service to management or labor is not a disqualification
for public office generally. But long-continued advocacy for one side, without an intervening
period of public service, is a disqualification for General Counsel of the NLRB . . .)
(emphasis added); see also Kammholz Hearings, supra note 57, at 15-16 (Sen. Douglas) ("I
would say that if a person had represented employers or unions, and had then had a period of
public service in the field of labor relations before he was appointed, that there would be a
decontamination period, so to speak, ... which could be adjudged to eliminate the possibility of
bias.").
63 See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 126 ("The anticipated heavy
opposition... from organized labor never materialized.'); 101 CoNG. REC. 52520 (1955)
(statement of Sen. Smith) (indicating that neither the AFL-CIO nor any of the major unions
such as the United Auto Workers or the Steelworkers opposed the Kammholz nomination).
Instead, the Chicago Allied Printing Trades Council (Council) was left to carry the ball against
Kammholz. See Kammholz Hearings, supra note 57, at 16-20 (setting forth testimony of
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C. The Turning Point. The Miller Nomination
The real turning point in the perceived acceptability of appointing partisans
to the NLRB came with the nomination of Edward B. Miller in 1970. In keeping
with Democratic tradition,65 neither Presidents Kennedy nor Johnson had named
any union or management-side representatives to either the Board or the General
Counsel's position.66 President Nixon's first appointment and his choice for
Council Secretary Henry Coco in opposition to the nomination); see especially id at 18
(complaining that the administration had "single[d] out for this delicate and impartial office not
someone recruited from the ranks of available impartial persons, but rather someone recruited
from the most deeply partisan ranks"); id at 19 (noting that Kammholz would likely return to
management practice, giving rise to problematic "'lure of past and future employment"')
(emphasis added) (quoting PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHCS IN GOVERNMENT 49 (1952)).
64 See 101 CONG. REC. S2524 (1955); NL.RB. Aide Approved N.Y. TM, Mar. 9,
1955, at 30. Moreover, only two Democrats on the Senate Labor Committee ultimately opposed
the nomination. 101 CONG. REC. S2520-2522 (1955) (setting forth views of Senators Douglas
and McNamara, who oppose Kammholz's nomination because of his management-side
background).
6 5 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (describing appointees of Presidents
Roosevelt and Truman).
6 6 See infra text accompanying note 78 (setting forth testimony at the Miller hearings to
this effect). In contrast, President Eisenhower made five such appointments. Kammholz's
successor as General Counsel, Jerome Fenton, had been in government service for three years
at the time of his appointment, but prior to that had spent a dozen years with Pan Am Airways,
where he was in charge of labor relations. See Hearing on Joseph A. Jenkins to be a Member of
the National Labor Relations Boarg Jerome D. Fenton to be General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Boar Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 85th Cong. 4-5 (1957)
[hereinafter Jenkins/Fenton Hearings]. Moreover, in addition to Farmer and Beeson, in 1957
Eisenhower had named management attorney Joseph Jenkins to the Board. See Former NLRB
TrialAttorney Is Named to Fill Board Vacancy, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 1957, at 169 (indicating that
Jenkins had been a partner in a management-side law fimn for the last few years);
Jenkins/Fenton Hearings, supra, at 1-3 (indicating that Jenkins had spent approximately five
years in government, including three with the NLRB, before entering management-side
practice, and had been a management lawyer for four years prior to his appointment). Neither of
these appointments appear to have raised any controversy. See Jenkins/Fenton Hearings, supra
(indicating that Jenkins and Fenton each received exceedingly brief pro forma hearing); GROSS,
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 152 (discussing the Fenton nomination, and giving no
indication of any controversy over the appointment). Eisenhower had also, it should be noted,
named five individuals from non-partisan backgrounds to the Board. See GROSS, BROKEN
PROMISE, supra note 26, at 98, 125, 129, 151-52, and 343 n.8 (describing the backgrounds of
Philip Ray Rodgers, Boyd Leedom, Stephen Bean, John Fanning, and Arthur Kimball,
respectively). Moreover, his third appointee to the General Counsel's position, Stuart Rothman,
was a career government employee. See id at 153.
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Board chair,67 in contrast, was a lawyer who had spent nearly his entire twenty-
three year career with a management-side law firm. 68
The AFL-CIO adamantly opposed Miller's nomination because of his
background.69 In extensive testimony before the Senate Labor Committee, AFL
President George Meany emphasized the importance of the appearance of, as well
as actual, impartiality.70 Meany also pointed out the "revolving door" problem
that arises with such appointments.71 He expressed concern that Miller-like
Farmer and Kammholz before him72-would return to management practice after
a quick tour of duty at the Board,73 and that the likely prospect of such a return
would only further accentuate the nominee's probable "predisposition to the
employer viewpoint." 74 On top of urging the committee to reject the appointment
67 See FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note 27, at 56 (indicating that Miller served as chair).
6 8 See Hearings on Nomination of Edward B. Miller, of flinois, to be a Member of the
National Labor Relations Board Senate Comm on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 2
(1970) [hereinafter Miller Hearings] (indicating that Miller had been associated with
management firm of Pope & Ballard since graduating from law school in 1947, with exception
of one year spent with Regional Wage Stabilization Board). Theophil Kammholz had worked
at this same finn. See Kammholz Hearings, supra note 57, at 1.
69 See Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 34-37 (testimony of AFL-CIO President George
Meany in opposition to the nomination); see, e.g., id at 34 ("Our sole and simple reason for
opposing this nomination is that Mr. Miller, throughout his professional career, has been an
employer lawyer."). But see infra note 95 (questioning whether organized labor truly opposed
Miller).
70 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 35.
7 1 1 d at36.
72 Meany noted that both Farmer and Kammholz had served "abbreviated tenns" of two
years apiece, and then returned to an "augmented" management-side practice. Id Farmer
reportedly turned down reappointment on the ground that he could not get by on a government
salary. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 128. Beeson, too, served an abbreviated
term, declining reappointment to a full five-year term at the end of his initial one-year term on
the Board. See id. at 124.
73 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 36. Miller did not, as it turned out, serve an
"abbreviated" term; he served for four and a half years, resigning just ten days before his term
officially expired. See FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note 27, at 56 (setting forth dates of term);
116 CONG. REC. S16548 (1970) (indicating that Miller was appointed to a term that was to
expire on December 16, 1974); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 231 (indicating
Miller's resignation on December 6, 1974). He did, however, as Meany had projected, certainly
parlay his Board service into an "augmented" management-side practice following his term. At
the time of his appointment, Miller was "'virtually unknown outside the Chicago bar."' Miller
Hearings, supra note 68, at 3 (quoting a New York Times article). Following his service as
Board chair, Miller became, and has remained ever since, one of the most high-profile
management lawyers in the country. See, e.g., Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the
National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 539 (1994) (referring to "former
NLRB Chairman and distinguished management attorney Edward B. Miller").
74 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 36.
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of Miller or any other partisan advocate,75 Meany further recommended that
Congress consider banning former Members and General Counsels from
practicing before the Board for a substantial period of time after their departure
from the agency.76
In his testimony, Meany also underlined the historical double standard
regarding the appointment of management and union-side representatives to the
Board. He noted that organized labor had never sought the appointment of a
union-side lawyer or union official to the Board,77 and that all twenty-one Board
members and the three General Counsels appointed by Democratic Presidents had
come from neutral backgrounds.78 Republican Presidents, he noted in contrast,
had drawn rather freely from the management side; of the Republicans' twelve
appointments, five had come directly from a management-side law practice or
business position.79
Meany argued that partisan appointments should be verboten on both sides,
stating that "[w]e believe.., that no one should be appointed to the Board from
the ranks of labor or management, and that includes union lawyers and employer
lawyers." 8° Such appointments, Meany argued, were antithetical to the intended
nature of the Board itself:
It would, of course, be both possible and proper to have a tripartite Labor Board, with
members designated as representing the public, labor, and management81 ....
However, the National Labor Relations Board in this country is not set up on that
basis.... [I]ts members are all supposed to represent the general public, and not the
75 Id
76 Id (suggesting a period of five years).
77 Id at 35-36.
7 8 Id Meany categorized the backgrounds of the twenty-one Board appointees as follows:
two members of Congress, three legislative aides to senators, eight "Federal officials" (a
category that included career Board employees), two state officials, two law professors, one
arbitrator, two lawyers from general private practice, and one appointee from the Navy. Id at
36. The three General Counsels, he noted, had all been career Board employees.Id at 35.
79 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 36. Those five were Farmer, Beeson, Kanmholz,
Board Member Joseph Jenkins, and now Miller. Id at 36. As noted supra note 66, Jenkins had
been appointed by President Eisenhower in 1957.
Miller attempted to dispute the notion that appointing individuals from a partisan
background was an "essentially Republican" phenomenon, but the effort was unconvincing. See
id at 24 (pointing to Truman appointee who worked for a union after serving on the Board, and
to FDR appointee to the pre-Wagner Act NLRB, see supra note 5, who had represented
management clients).
80 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 35.
81 Here, Meany noted that the War Labor Board established during World War II and the
Wage Stabilization Board established during the Korean War were both set up in this fashion.
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special viewpoints of labor or management. 82
In response to Meany's arguments, Miller and his supporters invoked
Miller's personal integrity8 3 and the judicial analogy that had been raised in
defense of Beeson and Kammholz. 84 Miller also laid claim to the related "two
hats" defense,85 stating:
I think any of us who understand the function of advocacy recognize that in the
private sector any of us who are attorneys are in the course of our practice speaking
for one side or the other.
I think the man who has some basic sense of fairness and some personal integrity
approaches a public position with a totally different point of view. He is no longer an
advocate. He is now a decision-maker and there is a substantial difference. 86
Perhaps most significantly, however, Miller and his defenders-again
borrowing from the Beeson playbook,87 but refining and amplifying the
argument-turned the issue of his background completely around. Hands-on
private sector experience, they asserted, yields superior practical expertise.88
Since anyone with such experience must come from one side or the other, the
argument continued, 89 Miller's management-side background was not a minus
82 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 35.
83 See id at 19, 25 (setting forth Miller's testimony regarding his determination to be fair).
84 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the Beeson hearings); supra note
61 (discussing the Kammholz hearings). The Supreme Court Justice de jour at the Miller
hearings was Arthur Goldberg. See Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 26 (Sen. Eagleton)
(noting that no one had opposed Goldberg's appointment to the Supreme Court on the basis that
he had served as general counsel to a union). See also id at 25 (Miller testimony) (stating that
the appointment ofjudges who have had experience in representing one particular segment of
society, such as in the criminal law area, is common, and that we do not, as a society, appear to
be concerned about such appointments).
85 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
86 Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 19 (Miller testimony).
87 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
88 See id at 19 (Miller testimony) (stating that his experience representing management
"would add some practical knowledge and experience").
89 "If you are going to get someone who has had direct practical experience in the field,"
Miller testified, "he is going to have worked I think, for one side or the other." Id. at 25; see also
id. at 31 (noting that although a few attorneys represent both management and labor, firms
generally represent one side or the other); id at 5 (Sen. Percy) (stating that when labor-
management experts are selected for key government positions, they necessarily will have
worked on either the union or management side).
Ironically, Miller's replacement as NLRB chair-Betty Murphy-had in fact spent most
of her career with that admittedly rare bird: a law firm that represents both sides. See
Nomination of Betty Southard Murphy, of Virginia, to Be a Member of the National Labor
Relations Board: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong.
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but a plus9 0-and the real source of concern was not the appointment of
management lawyers like Miller, but the prevalence of Board members who
came from government rather than from private practiceY1
The Miller appointment marked the Democrats' complete acquiescence to
the appointment of management partisans to the Labor Board. The Labor
Committee that vetted the Miller nomination-unlike the committee and the
Senate that had approved Eisenhower's management-side appointees-was
dominated by Democrats,92 and numbered among its members such staunch
allies of labor as Edward Kennedy and Walter Mondale.93 Nonetheless, the
committee's reaction to Meany's forceful testimony and striking historical data
was one of profound indifference, 94 and Miller's nomination did not, so far as it
3, 15-16 (1975) [hereinafter Murphy Hearings] (indicating that Murphy had spent fifteen years
with a firm that represented several international unions as well as numerous management
clients). Murphy had also undergone at least a brief "decontamination" period prior to her
appointment when named to the Board, she had been serving as the Administrator ofthe Wage
& Hour Division of the Department of Labor for a year and a half. See Murphy Hearings,
supra, at 3, 16.
90 See Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 26, 27 (Sen. Eagleton) (stating that he does not
think people should be barred from holding office due to prior experience in the field; rather, he
thinks that people knowledgeable in their fields should be appointed to specialized agencies,
and views Miller's experience as a plus).
9 1 See id at 25 (Miller testimony) ("I am concerned, and I think the administration is
concerned, that the present Board has had a deficiency by not having anyone on it who has had
direct practical experience in the field."). For a discussion of the relative expertise of ex-
management (or union-side) lawyers versus that of NLRB members from government
backgrounds, see Joan Flynn, "Expertness for What? ": The Gould Years at the NLRB and the
Irrepressible Myth of the "Independent"Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 471-80 (2000). This
article acknowledges that ex-management and union lawyers have an edge in practical expertise
in certain areas over Board members with no private sector experience, but argues that neither
the Board nor the public really reaps the benefit of this expertise because these members'
partisan ties will trump their expertise every time. That is, ex-management lawyers, for
example, will not draw on their expertise to advance arguments that are contrary to the interests
of the management community, nor are they likely to vote for policies disfavored by "their"
side regardless of what their expertise tells them about the practical implications, wisdom, or
fairness of such policies.
92 The Democrats held ten of the seventeen seats on the committee, and a fifty-six to forty-
two majority (with two independents) in the Senate. See Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at ii
(listing members); STEPHEN G. CHRISTIANSON, FACTS ABOUrTTHE CONGRESS 460 (1996).
9 3 See Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at ii (listing members); Aaron Bernstein, Hoiv
Business is Winning its War with the NLRB, BUS. WK., Oct. 27, 1997, at 59 [hereinafter
Bernstein, How Business is Winning Its War with the NLRB] (describing Kennedy as "labor's
point man in the Senate"); Carey W. English, Why Unions are Running Scareg U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Sept. 10, 1984, at 62 (reporting that Mondale has "long [been] regarded as a
sympathetic ally" of labor).
94 See, e.g., Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 36 (Chairman Yarborough) (blandly
thanking Meany for his "very interesting historical summary"). Senator Pell of Rhode Island
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appears, draw a single "no" vote either in committee or on the floor of the
Democratic Senate 5
D. The Reagan Board: "The Old Rules are Off'
Throughout the remainder of the Nixon administration and those of
Presidents Ford and Carter, Labor Board appointments followed the pattern first
established in the Eisenhower years: Republicans Nixon and Ford drew some but
not all of their appointees from the management ranks,96 while Democrat Carter
did not appoint any union or management-side representatives. 9 7
was the only senator to show any interest at all in the bias issue. See id. at 24-25 (questioning
how someone who has represented only one side could avoid developing sympathy for that
viewpoint, and stating that Miller's background would result in bias no matter how objective he
wished to be).
95 See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 220. On this basis, some concluded
that organized labor did not "really" oppose Miller's nomination, Meany's testimony
notwithstanding. See id (recounting Board Member Frank McCulloch's statement that: "'[Y]ou
didn't hear any votes against [Miller's] confirmation. If labor had really opposed him, you
would have."). This lack of "true" opposition was attributed to the likely alternatives under the
Nixon administration. See id (Gross characterizes Miller as "the least objectionable choice for
organized labor of the names put forward for this vacancy"); Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at
39 (Warren Woods, General Counsel, United Paperworkers Union) (expressing support for
Miller, stating, inter alia, that he "doubt[s] if we could expect the present administration to
submit a better nomination").
96 Nixon's remaining two Board appointments after Miller, Ralph Kennedy and John
("Doc") Penello, were both career Board employees. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
26, at 221-22. His choice for General Counsel, however, Peter Nash, had spent several years in
management-side practice before becoming a Department of Labor official two years prior to
his NLRB appointment. See Peter G. Nash ofNew Yorlk to be General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d
Cong. 2 (1971) [hereinafter Nash Hearings]; Rosemary Collyer, of Colorado, to be General
Counsel, National Labor Relations Board: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong. 126 (1984) [hereinafter Collyer Hearings] (Nash testimony)
(indicating that Nash had spent one year as law clerk to ajudge, six years in management-side
practice, and two years at the Department of Labor before being appointed General Counsel).
Ford appointed the category-defying Betty Murphy to the Board, see supra note 89,
followed by management lawyer Peter Walther. See Nomination of Peter D. Walther to Be a
Member of the National Labor Relations Board and John S. Irving, Jr., to be General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board. Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 94th Cong. 2, 13 (1975) [hereinafter Walther/Irving Hearings] (indicating that after
beginning career with NLRB, Walther had spent last twelve years representing management at
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius).
97 Both Carter appointees, John Truesdale and Don Zimmerman, came from government
backgrounds. Truesdale had spent the vast majority of his career with the NLRB. See GROSS,
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 243, 378 n.5 (reporting that Truesdale had spent all but six
years of his career with NLRB, and was Board's Executive Secretary at time of appointment).
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As he did in so many other areas, however, Ronald Reagan broke with
mainstream Republican tradition in his NLRB appointments. Whereas his
predecessors had appointed management lawyers from well-known law firms98-
solid members of the labor-management "club" 99-Reagan went wholly outside
the mainstream labor relations community in his early appointments.' 00 His first
choice for Board chair, John Van de Water, was not a management lawyer at
all-but rather a management consultant who specialized in defeating union
campaigns. 10 1 Van de Water's successor as chair also came from well outside the
mainstream; Donald Dotson, a corporate labor counsel turned Reagan
administration official, 102 was the proverbial fox in the chicken coop 103 -a
Zimmerman had been an aide to Senator Jacob Javits of New York on the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee. Id at 245.
9 8 As noted previously, Farmer came from Steptoe & Johnson, Miller from Pope &
Ballard (currently Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle), Kammholz from Vedder, Price, Kaufman
& Kammholz, and Walther from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius-all well-known and well-
respected law firms. See supra notes 28,57,68 and 96.
99 See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 259 (describing
norm of "professional" appointments to NLRB, whereby each side is looking for "[a]n
experienced attorney who is well known, widely respected and firmly anchored in the labor-
management community"-in addition to being partial to that side's interests).
100 See id. at 267 (noting that Reagan departed from traditional norms by emphasizing
ideology and involvement in Reagan campaign and by failing to make serious effort to locate
"experienced, well-respected members of the labor bar who also happened to be conservative").
10 1 See Reagan's NLRB Tips Toward Management, Bus. WK., July 6, 1981, at 27-28
(indicating that Van de Water is not a practicing labor lawyer, but rather "advises companies
that want to resist union organizing campaigns"). Advising clients on how to defeat a union
campaign without overstepping legal limits is of course an important part of a management-side
law practice. However, management lawyers also spend considerable time on more
constructive matters such as contract negotiation and grievance adjustment-activities that
involve dealing with, as opposed to merely attacking or defeating, the union.
102 Dotson had served as an attorney for Westinghouse, Western Electric, and Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel before being appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor by President Reagan. See
Dotson Nomination to NLRB Gains Approval of Senate Labor Committee, 1983 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at A-8 (Feb. 16, 1983).
A major study of presidential appointments to both the executive branch and independent
agencies classified appointees by both their "career" or "primary occupation," defined as "the
occupations in which they had spent more of their recent working lives than any other," and
their "prior occupation," or occupations in the period immediately preceding their appointment.
See Linda L. Fisher, Fijfty Years of Presidential Appointments, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS:
PREsIDENTIAL APPoiNTES AND TRANSIENT GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON (G. Calvin
Mackenzie, ed., 1987) (analysis of 1985 study conducted by the National Academy of Public
Administration). I place more emphasis on NLRB nominees' "primary occupation" or "career"
as opposed to their prior occupation. That is, Dotson's background as an in-house labor attorney
seems more significant than the fact that he had served in the administration for a year or two
prior to his NLRB appointment
103 Dotson was hardly the only such appointee during the early Reagan years. See Dom
Bonafede, The White House Personnel Office from Roosevelt to Reagan [hereinafter Bonafede,
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protege of North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms and a "staunchly
antiunion ... crusader for the Reagan cause."104 Finally, Robert Hunter, another
of Reagan's initial appointments, was an aide to another arch-conservative
senator 05 and "labor bugbear,"10 6 Utah's Orrin Hatch,107 and had ties to the
Heritage Foundation,10 8 Reagan's favorite think tank.109
The White House Personnel Office], in THE IN-AND-OUTERS, supra note 102, at 30, 50 (listing
"several [Reagan appointees] whose backgrounds and philosophy were inimical to their
agency's mission," including Anne Gorsuch, head of the Environmental Protection Agency,
who as a state legislator had been a frequent critic of the EPA and had opposed legislation to
control toxic waste and to impose auto emission standards); see also Robert Shogan, The
Confirmation Wars: How Politicians, Interest Groups, and the Press Shape the Presidential
Appointment Process, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 87, 122-23 (1996) (describing how
after first attempting to abolish the Legal Services Corporation, Reagan attempted to nominate
three members to its board who appeared dedicated to restricting the corporation's activities).
104 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 268; see also infra
note 191 (characterizing Dotson as "legendary" for his conservatism and elaborating on his
anti-union attitude). Especially in his first term, Reagan attached great importance to the
ideological purity of his appointees generally. See Bonafede, The White House Personnel
Office, supra note 103, at 48; Fisher, supra note 102, at 13; James P. Pflffner, Nine Enemies
and One Ingrate: Political Appointments during Presidential Transitions 60, 72-73, in THE IN-
AND-OUTERS, supra note 102 (noting the heavy emphasis placed on appointees' loyalty to
President and ideological values).
105 See Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World ofJudicial Confirmations in the Era of
Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REv. 247,294 (1999) (referring to Hatch as "[o]ne of the Senate's
most conservative members"). As of 1999, Hatch had a lifetime American Conservative Union
rating of ninety-two. Id at 294 n.143. Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, in
comparison, had a rating ofninety. Id
106 Bill Saporito, Unions Fight the Corporate Sell-Off, FORTUNE, July 11, 1983, at 145
(characterizing Hatch as such in a discussion of the Hunter appointment).
107 See Robert P. Hunter, of Virginia to be a Member of the National Labor Relations
Board: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong. 1
(1981) [hereinafter Hunter Hearings].
108 Hunter produced the chapter on labor issues for the Heritage book MANDATE FOR
LEADERSHIP: POLICY MANAGEMENT IN A CONSERVATIVE ADMINISTRATION (C. Heatherly ed.
1981). See Hunter Hearings, supra note 107, at 453; GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26,
at 247-48. Although the book clearly identified him as the author of the chapter, Hunter
attempted to distance himself from its recommendations at his confirmation hearing, claiming
that he had only "coordinated" the project. See Hunter Hearings, supra note 107, at 6-7, 9-12;
see id at 10-11 (setting forth Hunter's testimony that he did not write the chapter and "was not
aware" of its recommendation that section 14(b) of the Act; which permits union-security
agreements in states that do not choose to outlaw them, be repealed). Ironically, Hunter's
chapter criticized the prevalence of "government bureaucrats" on the Carter Board and
recommended that only those with substantial private sector collective bargaining experience be
appointed to the NLRB. See MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP, supra, at 494. Hunter himself had
little or no such experience. See Hunter Hearings, supra note 107, at 20 (Hunter resume)
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The appointment of Van de Water-creator of numerous "how-to-defeat-the-
union" pamphlets" 10 and videos111 and proud victor in 125 of 130 anti-union
campaignsl 1 ---drew vociferous union opposition, 113 and after a hearing in which
the usual arguments regarding bias were madel 14 and the standard defenses
(indicating that Hunter had spent all but seven months of fifteen-year legal career in
government).
109 See GRoss, BROKEN PROMIsE, supra note 26, at 248 (characterizing Heritage
Foundation as such).
I"0 See, e.g., Nomination of John P, Van de Water of Calyfornia to be Chairman of the
National Labor Relations Board Hearings of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 97th Cong. 83 (1981) [hereinafter Van de Water Hearings] (containing Van de
Water-designed letter to employees that raises the specter that unionization will lead to "an
epidemic of bombings and sabotage," citing a recent strike that, according to the letter, "resulted
in murder, house burnings, [and] brutal beatings by imported 'goon squads").
111 See Reagan's NLRB Tips Toward Management, supra note 101, at 28.
112 See Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at 56 (containing copy of a Van de Water
speech touting his record).
113 See id at 69-71 (testimony of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO)
(arguing that the appointment of a management consultant who had devoted a substantial part
of his career to putting together anti-union campaigns was even more objectionable than the
appointment of management-side lawyers, which the AFL-CIO also opposes).
114 Testifying in opposition to the nomination, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Thomas
Donahue reiterated the AFL's position that no one should be appointed to the Board from the
ranks of either management or labor. Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at 68, 79. He also
repeated George Meany's earlier complaints about the historical double standard. See supra text
accompanying notes 77-79 (recounting Meany testimony at Miller hearings). That is, he noted
that while the union side had never pressed for the appointment of a union lawyer or official to
the Board and none had been appointed, a number of management lawyers had been appointed
to the Board or to the General Counsel's position. Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at
69. Appointing a management consultant was even worse, Donahue stated, and he queried
rhetorically whether the management community and the public would acquiesce in the
appointment of the AFL's director of organizing to the position of Board chair. Id at 70.
Donahue also pointed to the problem of the "lure of... fiture employment," see supra
note 63, noting that for former Board Chair Edward Miller, Member Peter Waither and General
Counsel Peter Nash, Board service had been but a brief hiatus in their careers as management
attorneys. See Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at 69 (citing them as "men who have
interrupted careers as employer lawyers for a short stint at the NLRB"); see also FIRST SIXTY
YEARS, supra note 27, at 56-57 (indicating that Miller and Nash served terms of approximately
four years before returning to private practice, while Waither served less than two years).
Finally, Donahue argued that the appointment of individuals from a partisan background to the
Board transformed the agency into something it was not intended to be: a tripartite board in
which most members represent either labor or management rather than the public interest as a
whole. Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at 79 ("You should not make of the Board... a
group in which the Chairman or some member of it, becomes a swing member, by putting two
union advocates and two company advocates on it"); see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text (indicating that the same point was raised at the Beeson hearings).
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invoked,115 the nomination was actually blocked,1 16 although Van de Water
served for a year and a half as a recess appointee. 1 7 The refusal to confirm Van
de Water, however, hardly signaled a senatorial sea change in attitude regarding
the propriety of management representatives serving as NLRB members. Dotson
sailed through the nomination process with easeI 18 as did Patricia Diaz Dennis,
another in-house management lawyer 1 9 appointed by Reagan.'
20
Donahue did point to one additional problem with the appointment of partisans that had
not hitherto been raised: the phenomenon of former Board Members and General Counsels
"trading on their Board credentials" in lobbying Congress on behalf of positions favored by
their management clients. See id at 69 ("The spectacle [of] Mr. Miller and Mr. Nash trading on
their Board credentials as they lobbied on behalf of their management clients against the labor
law reform bill [of 1977-78] is perhaps the clearest example of how this practice of using
Board appointments to further management's private advantage undermines the Board's
integrity.").
115 The defense was led by Senator Hatch, Chair of the Labor Committee. Hatch first
invoked the nominee's personal integrity, citing Van de Water's testimony that he would be
objective and unbiased. See Van de Water Hearings, supra note 110, at 78, 80. Second, he
attempted to convert Van de Water's background into a plus rather than a minus. See id at 80
("maybe... what is wrong with the Board [is] [t]hey do not have people who really have been
in the frey [sic]"). Third and finally, he invoked the judicial analogy. Id ("I am not so sure that
because a man has been a management lawyer or a union lawyer... he or she should be
foreclosed from being on the Board. I would hate to think that we would apply that in judicial
nominations .... ").
116By a tie vote, the Senate Labor Committee failed to approve the nomination. See
GRoss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 249. President Reagan resubmitted the nomination
during the next Congressional session, but additional opposition then emerged from an
unexpected quarter-the National Right to Work Committee-and the nomination was never
approved. See id at 250; see also Right to Work Committee Asks President to Withdrav Van de
Water Nomination to NLRB, 1982 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-3 (Sept 1, 1982).
117 See GRoss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 249-50. President Reagan had given
Van de Water a recess appointment in August 1981, a month before his confirmation hearings.
See id at 249. Officials appointed during a Congressional recess are permitted to serve without
Senate approval until the end of the legislative session following that recess. See Michael A.
Carrier, Note, When is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointment Clause?,
92 MIcH. L. REV. 2204,2205 (1994).
118 See Dotson Nomination to NLRB Gains Approval of Senate Labor Committee, supra
note 102 (reporting that the Senate Labor Committee approved nomination by 15-1); Senate
Confirms Nomination ofDonaldDotson to Head NLRB, 1983 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34,
at A-5 (Feb. 17, 1983) (reporting that Dotson was confirmed by the Senate without objection).
119 After three years at a law firm, Dennis had spent the seven years prior to her
appointment as in-house labor counsel with the Pacific Lighting Company and then the
American Broadcasting Company. See Nomination ofEdward A. Knapp, of New Mexico, to be
Director, National Science Foundation, and Patricia Diaz Dennis, of Cal jorniag to Be a
Member of the National Labor Relations Board Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong. 32 (1983) [hereinafter Dennis Hearings]; see also Hatch and Kennedy
Agree to Poll Committee on Nomination of Patricia Dennis to NLRB, 1983 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 72, at A-9 (Apr. 13, 1983).
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While organized labor apparently viewed it as futile to attempt to block the
Dotson, 121 Dennis, and Hunter nominations,122 these appointments so piqued the
AFL-CIO as to move it to foreswear its traditional refusal to seek the appointment
of union-side officials or attorneys to the Board. In a letter to Senator Hatch, chair
of the Senate Labor Committee, AFL President Lane Kirkland complained of the
nomination of "three individuals whose appointment is owing to their having
been good and faithful agents of management, and to no other cause, ' 123 and
declared that in view of such partisan appointments, the old rules were off:
12 0 See Hatch and Kennedy Agree to Poll Committee on Nomination ofPatricia Dennis to
NLRB, supra note 119 (reporting that Dennis nomination had received 'Joint praise" of
Senators Hatch and Kennedy and appears headed for routine confirmation); Former Right-to-
Work Foundation Attorney Named Legal Advisor to Five-Member NLRB, 1983 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 79, at A-3 (Apr. 22, 1983) (noting Dennis's confirmation).
12 1 The AFL-CIO had initially planned an all-out campaign against the Dotson
nomination, see Senate Confirms Nomination of Donald Dotson to Head NLRB, supra note
118, but ultimately backed down. See Dotson Nomination to NLRB Gains Approval of Senate
Labor Committee, supra note 102 (reporting that AFL President Lane Kirkland had declined
the opportunity to testify before the Senate Labor Committee, stating that the AFL had 'grave
reservations as to Mr. Dotson's fitness,"' but had decided that it lacked "sufficient
documentation 'to meet our standards for actively opposing a nominee'). Dotson had two
factors running strongly in his favor. First, he had earlier been confirmed by the very same
senators to a Department of Labor position. See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive
Theory, supra note 24, at 268-69 (noting that Dotson was "eminently confirmable" given
earlier confirmation to less sensitive position). Second, organized labor had used up a great deal
of its political capital in fighting Van de Water's nomination, and "had little left with which to
fight [Dotson]." Id Ironically, while Van de Water did not compile a notably conservative
record for a Republican appointee, Dotson remains legendary for his lopsidedly pro-employer
voting record. See Harry Bernstein, Overtime Differences May Snag New Wage Plan, LA.
TIES, Mar. 20, 1985, at pt. 4, p. 1 (observing that labor's "successful effort to block... Van de
Water, a moderate management-oriented attorney, [backfired]; [t]hey got the far more
conservative Dotson instead."); Saporito, supra note 106 (noting that given Dotson's record as
Board chair, "some in labor's quarter are now pining for Van de Water"); The Voting Records
of the Members of the NLRB, EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon Hargrave Devans & Doyle
LLP) Jan. 1999 [hereinafter January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT] (newsletter on file with
the Ohio State Law Journal) (referring to "the legendary Donald Dotson" and noting that
Dotson voted for union position in only 6 of 218 disputed cases).
122 In addition to his conservative ideology, Hunter had earned labor's enmity as
coordinator of the successful filibuster against Democratic-sponsored labor law reform in
1977-78. See GRoss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 247; Letterfrom AFL-CIO President
Kirkland to Sen. Hatch (R-Utah), 1983 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at E-1 (Feb. 1, 1983).
Given the "old-boy" network in the Senate, however, Hunter had a huge leg up on the
nomination process; he had worked for the Senate Labor Committee, which oversees Labor
Board nominations, for the eight years preceding his appointment. See Hunter Hearings, supra
note 107, at 1 (indicating that Hunter had spent the last four years as labor counsel to Senator
Hatch, most recently as chief counsel to the committee, and for four years before that had been
counsel to committee member Robert Taft).
123 See Letterfrom AFL-CIO President Kirkland to Sen. Hatch (R-Utah), supra note 122.
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In the past... we sought [the] appointment of individuals who.., had not been the
agents of management or labor. It has been our considered position that this degree of
forbearance is necessary in the interest of assuring both justice and the appearance of
justice in a highly adversary field ....
These nominations... are the final evidence that ... there will be no reciprocal
restraint. I wish, therefore, to state that as a matter of practical self-protection we
hereby renounce our prior position in this regard. Like our management counterparts,
we will no longer bind ourselves with any limitations and we will act on the premise
of this Administration-that appointees to the Board need not have a significant
record in the field but only need be ideological supporters of the tendency in
power. 124
Kirkland reiterated this position in a press conference a few months later,
stating that:
For the first time, appointments to the NLRB have been of a character that represents
the perversion of that board into an instrument of anti-union employers. And I think
that serves notice [that] all the old rules are off.... I would regard us as privileged to
follow the same practice and to put forth partisans of that temper, if we again come
into a position where we might be able to have some persuasive influence over an
Administration such as these rightwing businessmen seem to have with this
Administration. 12 5
President Reagan did not appear to be terribly cowed by the prospect of
future retaliation on the part of the AFL. 126 To the contrary, his next choice for
high Board office, Rosemary Collyer as General Counsel, was, like Diaz
Dennis, 127 a young and relatively inexperienced (and unknown) management
lawyer,12 8 as were two of his remaining Board appointees, 129 Marshall Babson1 3
0
124 Id
125 House Subcommittee Plans Oversight Hearing on Changes at Enforcement Division
ofNLRB, 1983 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-10 (June 7, 1983).
12 6 It is true that the "Reagan Board I1' appointees were not as conservative as their
predecessors. See PAUL WELER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 24 (1990). However, as
explained infra in text, President Reagan certainly did not hesitate to continue to appoint
management lawyers to the Board and General Counsel's position following the AFL's threats
of retribution.
12 7 Diaz Dennis was only thirty-six, and ten years out of law school, at the time of her
appointment See Dennis Hearings, supra note 119, at 31; see also Mid-Life Crisis: The NLRB
at Fijfty supra note 41, at E-2 (setting forth union lawyers' criticism of Dennis as a "relatively
inexperienced labor attomey").
128 Collyer was only seven years out of law school at the time of her appointment, and had
spent only four and a half years working partially on NLRA matters for a management-side law
firm before being appointed chair of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
in 1981. See White House Search for NLRB General Counsel Centers on Mine Safe*y
Commission Chairman, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-9 (Jan. 20, 1984). Female
presidential appointees have long been younger, on average, than their male counterparts. See
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and Mary Miller Cracrafr 131 The AFL132 and its Democratic allies133 mounted a
vigorous anti-Collyer campaign and were able to block her confirmation for
Fisher, supra note 102, at 7 (noting that from 1964 to 1984, median age of female appointees
was forty-one, compared to forty-seven for males).
129 Reagan also appointed two Board members who came from government backgrounds.
See infra note 130.
130 The thirty-nine-year-old Babson had had ten years' experience as a lawyer, all of it, it
appears, practicing management-side labor law. See White House Names Johansen and Babson
to Fill Two Vacancies at Labor Board, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at A-6 (Mar. 12,
1985); see also Statement of NLRB Nominees Johansen and Babson Before Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee, May 8, 1985, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at F-1 (May
9, 1985) [hereinafter Babson and Johansen Statements].
Babson's nomination was paired with that of a career Board employee, Wilford ("Bud")
Johansen. White House Names Johansen and Babson to Fill Two Vacancies at Labor Board
supra (reporting that Johansen has been with Board for twenty-six years and is head of Board's
Los Angeles office). In between the Babson-Johansen appointments and the Cracraft
nomination, President Reagan appointed James Stephens, counsel to Senator Hatch's Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, to the Board. See Stephens and Semerad
Confirmed by Senate in Routine Proceeding, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-5
(Oct. 18, 1985).
131 Cracraft, like Babson, was only thirty-nine at the time of her nomination, and had been
a practicing lawyer for only a decade. See White House Selects Mary Cracraft to Serve Term of
Five Years on NLRB, 1986 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 138, at A-9 (July 18, 1986). After four
years at an NLRB regional office, she had practiced management-side labor law for five years.
See id; White House Reappoints Cracraft to Five-Year Term on Labor Board, 1991 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 142, at A-5 (July 24, 1991). Like Rosemary Collyer, Cracraft was not even a
partner at her law firm at the time of her appointment. See White House Selects Mary Cracraft
to Serve Term of Five Years on NLRB, supra (indicating that Cracraft is an associate at the
firm). Cracraft was, however, well-connected politically; although a registered Democrat, she
was a supporter of, and well-known to, Republican Senator Kit Bond, a partner at her law finn.
See Newest NLRB Member Says She Plans to Approach Cases as More than Just Transcripts
andBriefs, 1986 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 248, at A-2 (Dec. 29, 1986).
132 See, e.g., Vote on NLRB General Counsel Nominee Delayed Amid Increasing Labor
Opposition to Collyer, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-5, A-6 (May 10, 1984)
(reporting AFL President Lane Kirkland's comment that Collyer "has 'no visible qualifications
in the field of labor law,"' and lament of AFL's Executive Council regarding the appointment
of 'yet another employer lawyer' to high Board office, and further reporting Council's
assertion that Collyer possessed the same 'single-minded attention to the needs and desires of
employers' as Reagan's appointments to the Board and differed from those appointees only in
that she 'is far less experienced and expert"'); Collyer Hearings, supra note 96, at 126 (setting
forth statement of AFL-CIO's Thomas Donahue in opposition to Collyer nomination and
indicating that AFL objected to Collyer based on her lack of experience in labor-management
relations, the fact that what little experience she had was all on the employer side, and her pro-
employer voting record as chair of the Mine Safety Commission).
133 See Senate Labor [sic] Fails to Act on Collyer or Civil Rights Bill, 1984 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 127, at A-4 (July 2, 1984) (reporting that both committee Democrats and
organized labor opposed the nomination on the ground that Collyer lacked the requisite
experience and because of her alleged pro-employer bias).
1390 [Vol. 61:1361
QUIETREVOLUTIONAT THE LABOR BOARD
almost a year,134 but even this temporary success was made possible only by
Collyer's unprecedentedly thin qualifications for the critically important General
Counsel's position.13 5 By the time of the Babson and Cracraft nominations
organized labor seemed to recognize that it was fighting a losing battle in
opposing Board appointees based on their management-side backgrounds; it
raised only a pro forma objection to Babson's nomination, 13 6 and apparently
chose not to oppose Cracraft at all. 137
134 The appointment was held up in committee for some months, at which point President
Reagan granted Collyer a recess appointment See AFL-CIO Will Oppose Collyer Nomination
as Board Counsel, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-13 (May 9, 1984) (reporting that
Collyer was nominated on April 5, 1984); Collyer Named NLRB Counsel, CONG. Q., Oct. 20,
1984, at 2761 (reporting that with the nomination still bottled up in committee by Democrats,
President had granted Collyer recess appointment). Some months later the AFL reluctantly
gave up its attempt to block the nomination, and Collyer's nomination to a full term was then
approved with little difficulty-almost exactly one year after she had been nominated. Senate
Approves Collyer Nominationfor NLRB General Counsel by Voice Vote, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 66, at A-12 (Apr. 5, 1985) (reporting that after the AFL informed the Senate Labor
Committee that it would no longer attempt to block Collyer despite its continued opposition to
her appointment, the nomination was approved 15-1 by the committee, and by voice vote in the
Senate).
135 At the hearings, Collyer's lack of experience was the primary focus of the Democrats.
See Collyer Hearings, supra note 96, at 27-29, 34-36, 132-37 (indicating that Collyer was
subjected to aggressive questioning regarding her degree of experience with NLRA issues).
Collyer, as noted supra note 128, had been in practice for only four and a half years before
being appointed to the Mine Safety Commission, and there was some question as to the
proportion of time that she had spent on NLRA matters as opposed to other labor issues.
Collyer Hearings, supra note 96, at 27-29. In contrast, outgoing General Counsel William
Lubbers had had twenty-seven years' experience with the NLRB before assuming that position;
his predecessor, John Irving, ten years of prior NLRB experience; and Arnold Ordman, General
Counsel from 1963 to 1971, seventeen years of prior Board experience. See Statement of Rep.
Barney Frank Before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on Nomination of
Rosemary Collyer as NLRB General Counsel, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 101, at D-1
(May 24, 1984). Even Pete Nash, who was only thirty-four when appointed General Counsel,
had considerably more labor law experience than Collyer before assuming the position. See
Collyer Hearings, supra note 96, at 151 (Nash testimony) (testifying that he had spent six years
as management-side labor lawyer and had then served first as Associate Solicitor and then as
Solicitor of Department of Labor for total of two years before being appointed General Counsel
at age thirty-four); see also Nash Hearings, supra note 96, at 2 (indicating that Nash had taught
labor law at college level for a number of years prior to appointment). As noted previously, the
General Counsel's position is often regarded as the single most important post at the agency.
See supra note 58.
136 The AFL elected not to testify against Babson. See Senate Labor Committee Holds
Hearing on Nominations ofJohansen and Babson, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-
12 (May 9, 1985). Instead, it simply filed a letter of opposition with the committee reiterating its
long-held position that neither management nor union advocates or representatives should be
appointed to the Board, but acknowledging that both the committee and the full Senate had on
several recent occasions rejected that position and confined management attorneys for Board
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E. The Bush and Clinton Years: The Routinization and Acceleration of
Partisan Appointments
The trend toward the routinization of the appointment of management
lawyers by Republican administrations continued during the Bush years.
President Bush's appointments to the Board included two more management
attorneys,138 Clifford Oviatt139 and John Raudabaugh, 140 and his choice for
General Counsel, Jerry Hunter, also had a substantial management-side
background. 141 By now apparently accepting total defeat on the issue of the
positions. See Senate Labor Committee Clears Nominations ofJohansen and Babson to Vacant
NLRB Seats, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-11 (May 23, 1985). Babson was
confirmed in a routine fashion. See id. (reporting that Babson and Johansen nominations were
approved by telephone poll of Senate Labor Committee); Senate Approves Johansen, Babson
Nominations by Routine Voice Vote, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 102, at A-3 (May 28,
1985) (reporting approval of nominations by voice vote in the full Senate).
137 The BNA Daily Labor Report, which reports extensively on all NLRB nominations,
contains no mention of the AFL's position on Cracrafi; and the nomination sailed through the
Senate. See 132 CONG. REC. S17333, S17382 (1986) (reporting unanimous approval of
nomination by both the Senate Labor Committee and the full Senate).
138 Bush also drew two appointees from government backgrounds; he reappointed former
Hatch aide James Stephens to a second term, and also appointed Dennis Devaney, who had
served as General Counsel to the Federal Labor Relations Authority and as a member of the
Merit Systems Protection Board. See President Taps Raudabaugh for NLRB Seat; Chairman
Stephens Nominatedfor Second Term, 1990 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-17 (June 22,
1990) (Stephens); Senate Labor Panel Clears NLRB, DOL Nominees, Approves Increased
Pension and OSHA Penalties, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 192, at A-5 (Oct. 5, 1989)
[hereinafter Senate Labor Panel Clears NLRB Nominees] (Devaney).
139 Oviatt was a partner with the management-side firm of McGuire, Woods, Battle &
Boothe, and had spent his entire career in private practice. See Bush Names Oviatt andRodgers
to Fill Two Vacancies at NLRB, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 139, at A-7 (July 21, 1989);
see also Senate Labor Panel Clears NLRB Nominees, supra note 138.
140 See President Taps Raudabaugh for NLRB Seat; Chairman Stephens Nominated for
Second Term, supra note 138 (noting that Raudabaugh is a partner with the management firm
of Constangy, Brooks & Smith).
141 Hunter had done a five-year stint as in-house labor counsel at a hard-line corporation
in between two stretches in government. See Jerry M Hunter of Missouri Nominated to be
General Counsel ofLabor Boara 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-1 (May 16, 1989)
(reporting that Hunter began his career with two-year stints at both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the NLRB, served as labor counsel for the Kellwood
Company for five years, and at the time of his appointment had been director of the Missouri
State Department of Labor and Industrial Relations for three years). When Hunter had been
under consideration for a Board seat while working at the Kellwood Corporation, there were
objections from the labor side based on what some called the company's "pre-Louis XIV" labor
relations. See Reagan Administration Continues Search for Replacement to Fill Jenkins Seat at
NLRB, 1983 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at A-8 (Dec. 2, 1983) (noting union officials'
comments that the company has a collective bargaining agreement at only one of its plants,
which is slated to close down, and that organizing efforts at other plants are resisted vigorously).
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propriety of appointing management representatives to the Board or General
Counsel's position, the AFL did not oppose any of these nominations. 142
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Bush years, however, was that
President Bush was the first President to at least attempt to appoint an individual
with a substantial union-side background to the Board. Bush nominated Donald
Rodgers, a Labor Department official who had spent over twenty years with the
Operating Engineers and the Teamsters in addition to serving in three different
Republican administrations. 143 Rodgers's appointment was opposed by the
National Right to Work Committee, 144 but appeared headed for approval145 until
142 See Bush Administration Expected to Name Diane Burldey to Seat on Labor Boarag
1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 81, at A-9 to A-10 (Apr. 28, 1989) (reporting that neither
Hunter nor Oviatt drew strong negative reactions from organized labor); see also Senate
Confirms New Heads of OSHA and MSHA; Late Vote on Two DOL, Four NLRB Posts
Possible, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 194, at A-4 (Oct. 10, 1989) (reporting that NLRB
appointees including Oviatt and Hunter were approved in a voice vote by the Senate Labor
Committee, and giving no indication of opposition to the appointments); Senate Approves
Nominees to NLRB, NMB, Inspector General at Labor, 1990 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152,
at A-7 (Aug. 7, 1990) (reporting that Oviatt and Raudabaugh, among others, had been
confirmed, and reporting no opposition to either of these nominations).
143 See Bush Names Oviatt and Rodgers to Fill Two Vacancies at NLRB, supra note 139.
Rodgers had worked for the International Union of Operating Engineers from 1952 until
becoming a White House aide and later a Department of Labor official during the Nixon
administration. Id. He next worked as a Teamsters lobbyist for seven years, then returned to
government during the Reagan administration, serving in several White House and Department
of Labor posts. Id
The Rodgers appointment was also notable in that Rodgers was the first non-lawyer
nominated since the mid-1960s. See id (reporting that Rodgers graduated from Cornell's
School of Industrial and Labor Relations but does not have a law degree); White House
Considers Naming Pamela Talkin to Labor Board Seat Held by Mary Cracraf, 1991 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 63, at A-2 (Apr. 2, 1991) (noting that the last non-lawyer to serve on the
Board was Sam Zagoria, appointed by President Johnson in 1965).144 The Committee argued that Rodgers would use his position to further the interests of
his 'Teamsters-boss patrons,"' and that "'the nomination of... a former top official of the
violent, organized-crime-infiltrated Teamsters-union, is an insult to America's working men
and women."' Senate Labor Panel Clears NLRB Nominees, supra note 138 (quoting letter from
National Right to Work Committee President Reed Larson to Senate Labor Committee).
Rodgers was hardly the first Board nomination opposed by the Right to Work Committee-nor
the last. See supra note 116 (noting that the Committee had dealt the decisive blow to President
Reagan's attempted nomination of John Van de Water); infra text accompanying notes 243-46
and infra note 248 (describing how the Committee and its Senatorial allies blocked the 1988
nomination of John Higgins and the 1991 renomination of Mary Miller Cracraft).
145 Rodgers's nomination was part of a "package" of appointments that received the
approval of the Senate Labor Committee. See Senate Confirms New Heads of OSHA and
MSHA; Late Vote on Two DOL, Four NLRB Posts Possible, supra note 142 (reporting that the
nominations of Devaney, Oviatt, and Rodgers to the NLRB and Jerry Hunter to the General
Counsel's position, plus two Department of Labor appointments, were approved as a group by
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allegations surfaced that Rodgers had pressed the NLRB to settle a pending case
against the Teamsters while serving as a White House aide.
146
The appointment of partisans to the Labor Board has only accelerated under
President Clinton, to the point where the appointment of both management and
union-side lawyers has now become routine. Whereas no Democratic President
before Clinton had appointed even a single management lawyer to the Board,
147
Clinton appointed three; 148 indeed, he filled every Republican seat with a
management lawyer.' 49 Moreover, whereas no union-side lawyer had ever served
on the Board or as General Counsel, Clinton appointed one member whose entire
career had been spent in union-side practice, 150 and two others who had worked
voice vote of the Senate Labor Committee). The practice of packaging is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 257-66.
146 Copies of a 1973 New York Times article by Seymour Hersh detailing these allegations
rather mysteriously turned up in the mail of various senators. See NLRB Nominations Placed in
Limbo Due to Questions About Donald Rodgers, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at A-
11 (Oct. 20, 1989). The Senate then delayed consideration of the nomination pending an inquiry
by the FBI, and President Bush ultimately named John Raudabaugh to the Board in place of
Rodgers. See President Grants Recess Appointments to Dennis Devaney and Clifford Oviatt,
1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at A-8 (Dec. 18, 1989) (reporting delay pending FBI
inquiry); President Taps Raudabaugh for NLRB Seat; Chairman Stephens Nominated for
Second Term, supra note 138 (reporting replacement of Rodgers by Raudabaugh).
147 The management lawyers who had served had been appointed by Republicans
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. See supra notes 29, 66-68, 96-97 and accompanying text; see
also supra text accompanying note 30 (noting that management-side industrial relations
specialist Albert Beeson was an Eisenhower appointee). Democrat Harry Truman had, it is true,
appointed a non-lawyer with an industry-side background to the Board in 1947--Copeland
Gray. See supra note 26. Gray, however, unlike the management lawyers appointed by
President Clinton, was not considered a particularly strong voice for management. Compare
supra note 26 (noting that Gray was largely ignorant of the Act, and that some viewed his
appointment as an attempt to thwart effective enforcement of the new Taft-Hartley
amendments), and GRoss, BROKEN PROMIsE, supra note 26, at 24 (discussing Senator Taft's
vote against the Gray nomination), with infra text accompanying notes 189-94 (discussing the
voting records of the management lawyers appointed by President Clinton).
148 The three were Charles Cohen, Peter Hurtgen, and J. Robert Brame. Cohen began his
career with an eight-year stretch at the NLRB, but had been a management lawyer for the
fifteen years prior to his appointment. See White House Appointment of Cohen to NLRB Is
Expected to Bring Board to Full Strength, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at A-i (Feb. 4,
1994). Hurtgen and Brame had both spent their entire careers as management lawyers. White
House Names Liebman, Hurtgen Brame to Serve on Board 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 209, at A-14 (Oct. 29, 1997). Brame had also represented the Republican party. See
Bernstein, How Business is Winning its War with the NLRB, supra note 93, at 59.
149 Here I do not include recess appointees. President Clinton gave Republican John
Higgins, a career Board employee, a recess appointment in 1996. See White House Selects John
E. Higgins to Fill NLRB Vacancy as Recess Appointee, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 171,
at A-9 (Sept. 4, 1996).
150 See Philadelphia Lawyer is Named Member of NLRB, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 159, at A-i (Aug. 19, 1993) (reporting that after a year clerking for a federal judge,
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long stretches on the union side before entering government service.151 In
addition, he nominated two different union-side lawyers to be General
Counsel,152 one of whom ultimately served as a recess appointee, at least.153
Margaret Browning became a founding member of a union-side law firm, where she remained
until her Board appointment).
151 These two appointees were Wilma Liebman and Sarah Fox. Liebman began her career
with the NLRB, and at the time of her appointment had been with the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service for four years. See White House Names Liebman, Hurtge, Brame to Serve
on Boar supra note 148. In between those tours of duty, however, she had worked for the
Teamsters and the Bricklayers unions for over a dozen years. See id Sarah Fox had spent eight
years as counsel to the Bricklayers union before becoming chief counsel (and later minority
counsel) to Senator Kennedy and the Senate Labor Committee in 1990. See White House
Announces Intention to Nominate Sarah Fox to Labor Boara, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 243, at A-8 (Dec. 19, 1995); White House Gives Sarah Fox Recess Appointment to Labor
Boara 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at A-11 (Jan. 22, 1996).
152 See Clinton Nominates Union Attorney as Next Board General Counsel, 1998 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 78, at d7 (Apr. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Clinton Nominates Union Attorney]
(reporting that nominee Laurence Cohen is a partner at a union-side firm and general counsel to
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the AFL-CIO Building and
Construction Trades Department, and has spent thirty-five years of his forty-year career
representing unions); Clinton Nominates UAW Attorney as Next General Counsel of NLRB,
1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at AA-1 (Feb. 12, 1999) (reporting that nominee Leonard
Page is associate general counsel of the United Auto Workers and has been with the Auto
Workers' legal department for almost thirty years).
It is admittedly questionable whether Clinton ever expected either Cohen or Page to be
confirmed; as explained below, there is some suggestion that these appointments were part of a
scheme to keep General Counsel Fred Feinstein, whose reappointment had been effectively
blocked by Senate Republicans, in office for awhile longer. See Clinton Nominates Union
Attorney, supra (reporting comments of Daniel Yager of the Labor Policy Association that the
Cohen nomination is 'a sham' because 'they know there's no way the Senate will confirm
him,"' and that action is intended to "'keep Feinstein firmly entrenched until the end of the
year").
During his four-year term as General Counsel, Feinstein had earned the enmity of the
management community, primarily because of his stepped-up use of the General Counsel's
authority to seek injunctive relief under NLRA section 10(j). See Clinton Grants Feinstein
Acting Status as Four-Year General Counsel Term Expires, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 42, at A-15 (Mar. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Clinton Grants Feinstein Acting Status] (reporting
that the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) are
strongly opposed to renomination of Feinstein, and that NAM's letter of opposition to Senate
Labor Committee cited Feinstein's use of section 100)). Therefore, confirmation to a second
term appeared unlikely, and Feinstein withdrew his name from consideration. See Acting NLRB
General Counsel Feinstein Withdravs His Name from Consideration, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 44, at A-12 (Mar. 6, 1998) (reporting that the chair of the Senate Labor Committee
had informed the White House that confirmation was unlikely, and that Feinstein had
withdrawn due to Senate opposition).
Within hours of the expiration of Feinstein's term, President Clinton appointed him Acting
General Counsel. See Clinton Grants Feinstein Acting Status, supra. An acting General
Counsel may serve for no more than forty days if Congress is in session, unless a nomination to
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Although President Clinton's efforts to place a union-side lawyer in the
General Counsel's position drew a certain amount of attention-and
opposition, 154 the profoundly partisan character of his appointments to the Board
the post has been submitted to the Senate. See id; see also NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1994). However, once a nomination has been submitted, an acting General Counsel may
continue in office until either the nomination is confirmed or until the end of the current session
of Congress, whichever occurs first See Clinton Grants Feinstein Acting Status, supra.
President Clinton first nominated then-retired ex-Board member John Truesdale in order to
meet the forty-day deadline. See Veteran Board Official Keeping Spot Open for Coming 'Real'
General Counsel Nominee, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 67, at d20 (Apr. 8, 1998). This
move was followed by the Cohen nomination, which drew strong opposition from the outset.
See Clinton Nominates Union Attorney, supra. After six months of inaction on Cohen, during
which Feinstein remained in office, the Senate adjourned and Clinton gave Feinstein a recess
appointment, thus permitting him to serve without confirmation until the end of the 1999
Congressional session or until the confirmation of a successor. See Feinstein Continues as
General Counsel as Clinton Makes Recess Appointment, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 205,
at AA-1 (Oct. 23, 1998). Cohen then withdrew, citing Republican opposition, and the White
House nominated Page. See Clinton Nominates UAW Attorney as Next General Counsel of
NLRB, supra. The Senate Labor Committee took no action on that nomination before
adjourning its 1999 session. See Clinton Names Page General Counsel to Succeed Feinstein in
Recess Appointment, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 229, at A-2 (Nov. 30, 1999). Feinstein,
who had originally indicated that he would continue to serve until a successor was confirmed,
then informed the President that he would not be available to serve in any capacity upon the
expiration of his recess appointment and Clinton gave Page a recess appointment See id;
General Counsel Feinstein Notifies Clinton He Will Step Down When Appointment Ends, 1999
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 216, at A-10 (Nov. 9, 1999).
153 See supra note 152 (recounting how both the Cohen and Page nominations were
blocked by Senate inaction, but Page ultimately received a recess appointment). Rather
ironically, Laurence Cohen, the first union attorney nominated by President Clinton, had once
called for a ban on all partisan appointments to the NLRB. See Remarks of Attorney Laurence
J Cohen on NLRB Before 31st Annual Institute on Labor Lav Sponsored by Southnvestern
Legal Foundation, 1984 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 205, at E-4 (Oct 23, 1984) (protesting
President Reagan's appointments to the Board and asserting that "a ban on the appointment of
partisan union or management representatives would be a great step forward").
154 See Feinstein Reflects on Five Years in Office, Describes Improvements, Emerging
Issues, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-4 (May 12, 1999) (reporting a comment
made at a bar association meeting to the effect that the President should appoint someone from
a more neutral background rather than UAW General Counsel Leonard Page to the General
Counsel's position); see also Clinton Nominates Union Attorney, supra note 152 (reporting
high-profile management attorney and former Board General Counsel John Irving's
pronouncement that the strategy of nominating a union attorney is "'questionable').
When the nomination of union attorney Laurence Cohen was blocked, supra note 152,
AFL-CIO General Counsel Jonathan Hiatt commented that Senate Republicans had apparently
considered Cohen's union-side background to be a disqualifying factor, despite the fact that the
last two Republican-appointed General Counsels had come from the management side. See
Feinstein Continues as General Counsel as Clinton Makes Recess Appointment, supra note 152
(alluding to the appointments of Rosemary Collyer and Jerry Hunter); supra text accompanying
notes 127-28 and 141. The Republicans and industry representatives in fact tended to couch
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itself did not. The historic appointment of Margaret Browning, the first ever
union-side attorney to serve, went almost completely unremarked upon,155 and
their opposition to Cohen in more specific terms. See Nickles Declares Opposition to
Nomination of Cohen to be General Counsel of NLRB, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at
A-4 (Apr. 29, 1998) (reporting Assistant Senate Majority Leader Don Nickles's statement that
he is opposed to Cohen based on Cohen's harsh criticism of Senate Republicans in a 1986
speech); Clinton Nominates Union Attorney, supra note 152 (reporting that the Chamber of
Commerce and the Associated Builders and Contractors had voiced opposition to Cohen
because of his strong support of"salting"-i.e., an organizing tactic in which union organizers
seek jobs with non-union companies with the intent of organizing their workforce). But see
Clinton Nominates Union Attorney, supra note 152 (reporting contention of the National
Association of Manufacturers that Cohen "does not fit the standard of 'someone fair and
impartial who would administer the statute consistently,"' and management attorney and former
General Counsel John Irving's questioning of the administration's wisdom in nominating a
union attorney to the position). However, it is highly questionable whether any union-side
attorney would have been acceptable to the Republicans and to industry representatives, and
there is some perception that Cohen's union-side background was fatal to his nomination. See
id (reporting that management attorneys had expressed a high level of respect for Cohen); see
also Senate Votes to Confirm Nominees for Posts at EEOC, Labor Department, 1998 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 204, at AA-1 (Oct. 22, 1998) (reporting that the Cohen nomination was
stalled in committee due to opposition of Republican leaders who objected to his background as
union lawyer).
155 BNA's Daily Labor Report, which reports extensively on NLRB nominations, carried
a single article months before Browning's nomination noting that the AFL-CIO, in a break with
tradition, had sanctioned the efforts of various union attorneys to gain appointment to the
Board. See Union Lmvyers Seek Posts at NLRB, but No Quick Fix Seen at White House, 1993
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at AA-2 (Feb. 22, 1993). That is almost the sole mention of the
historic nature of the appointment of a union attorney. See also Raudabaugh Faults Critics of
Gould Nomination, NLRB Speeg Effectiveness, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-8
(Nov. 1, 1993) (reporting that outgoing Board member and once and fiture management
attorney John Raudabaugh supports Browning nomination, and states that "he has complained
for several years that no union attorneys were represented on the Board").
The AFL, of course, had revoked its long-standing opposition to the appointment of union
as well as management representatives to the Board a full decade earlier. See supra text
accompanying notes 124-25 (reporting AFL President Lane Kirkland's declaration that "the
old rles are off' in light of the Reagan administration's highly partisan appointments). The
AFL's will was not truly put to the test, however, until the election of a Democratic President.
See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 253 (stating that the
AFL's role in the appointments process under Republican administrations is generally limited
to some ad hoc consultation and potential veto power over "particularly obnoxious candidates,"
while in Democratic administrations, labor--"[with] the AFL-CIO at the center"-is "the
initiator responsible for coming up with good candidates").
Rather paradoxically, Browning was unanimously confirmed, whereas President Clinton's
nomination of Stanford law professor William Gould drew vociferous opposition and thirty-
eight "no" votes in the Senate. See Gottesman & Seidl, supra note 46, at 751 ("Apparently,
thirty-eight republican senators believed that Gould, the career academic, could not be trusted to
implement faithfiilly the NLRA's provisions mediating the rights of employers and unions, but
that Browning, the career union lawyer, could.").
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the unprecedented appointment of management lawyers by a Democratic
President received no notice whatsoever.156 Obviously a sea change has taken
place.
HI. THE REVOLUTION'S IMPACT
Part I of this article traced the history of appointments to the NLRB, focusing
on the evolution over time in both attitudes toward and the practice concerning
the appointment of individuals from a partisan background-i.e., from the
management or union side-to the Labor Board. It described how the
appointment of management and union-side representatives, once considered
completely verboten, has become increasingly common over the last thirty years,
to the point where it has now become the norm. This part, in contrast, assesses the
impact of these partisan appointments on the NLRB. More specifically, it
explores the problem of bias: are Board members who come from the
management or union side more one-sided in their decision-making than their
colleagues from government or other "impartial" backgrounds?
There are several reasons why one would expect the answer to be "yes." The
first is their past; labor lawyers invariably represent one side or the other 57-not
both-and it is difficult to see how someone who has made a career out of
representing either unions or management can render an "unbiased" opinion on
issues of national labor policy.' 58
The second is their future.159 While the supporters of partisan nominees have
continually maintained that Board appointees are no less capable of throwing off
their past associations and assuming a neutral mindset once in office than are
federal judges who have been prosecutors, 60 for instance, or corporate
156 Indeed, I have found no mention of the unprecedented nature of these appointments in
any publication.157 AGENCY IN CRISIS, supra note 3, at 50 ("Labor lawyers represent either management
or labor."); Miller Hearings, supra note 68, at 30-31 (Miller testimony) (stating that only a few
attorneys represent both management and labor, and that generally firms represent one side or
the other). Former Board Chair Betty Murphy is among the few to have worked for a law firm
that represented both sides. See Murphy Hearings, supra note 89, at 14 (statement of Sen. Taft)
(noting that Murphy is one of the very few lawyers who had successfully represented both
unions and management); see also supra note 89 (indicating that Murphy's firm represented
several international unions in addition to numerous management clients).158 AGENCY IN CRISIS, supra note 3, at 50 ("Let us recognize reality .... Labor
lawyers... tend to share the sentiments of their clients on labor-management issues.").159 See DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 49-50 (referring to the "lure of past and future
employment" as one of the most severe temptations of administrators).
160 In fact, the data suggests that prosecutors-turned-judges continue to be influenced by
their prosecutorial experience once on the bench. See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models
of the Voting Behavior of US. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1981) (reporting that
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lawyers, 161 the judicial analogy is wholly inapt. Federal judges have life-time
tenure and typically serve out their careers on the bench. 162 NLRB members, in
contrast, are "in-and-outers"; 163 they typically serve for only a few years, 164 and
those who come from private practice almost invariably return there. 165 Indeed,
Justices with prosecutorial experience vote much more conservatively in civil liberties cases
than do those with no such experience).
161 See supra note 48 (discussing opposition to Charles Evan Hughes's nomination to be
Chief Justice).
162 Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& ECoN. 875, 886 n.22 (1975) (stating that a federal judicial appointment "is generally a
terminal job," that most federal judges die while still on the bench, and that the average tenure
during period 1949-65 was twenty-five years). The percentage of federal judges serving out
their careers on the bench may decline a bit in future years given the tendency of some recent
Presidents, most notably Ronald Reagan, to appoint much younger men and women to the
bench than was formerly the norm. See Judy Mann, Indefensible Distinctions, WASH. POST,
Oct. 9, 1992, at E03 (noting that Reagan and Bush judicial appointees have tended to be quite
young). However, the overall tendency will likely remain the same, and given the extremely
brief terms that NLRB members serve in comparison, infra note 164, my overall point is not
affected by this phenomenon.
16 3 THE IN-AND-OurERS, supra note 102, at xiii (stating that presidential appointees are
known as "in-and-outers"-"individuals for whom government service is neither a profession
nor a career").
164 The full term of an NLRB member is five years, but an individual chosen to fill a
vacancy is appointed only for the remainder of her predecessor's unexpired term. NLRA § 3(a),
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994). Moreover, in the last twenty years reappointment of Board members
has become almost unheard of. See NLRB Member Devaney Cites Philosophical Split, Predicts
Dry Spell When Term Ends, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 219, at d24 (Nov. 16, 1994)
[hereinafter Devaney Cites Philosophical Split] (noting that tradition of reappointment by
successive Presidents that existed twenty years ago had fallen into disfavor). Thus, even when
recess appointees, see supra note 117, are excluded, the typical term served over the last twenty
or thirty years has been two to four years. See AGENCY IN CRISIS, supra note 3, at 49 &
Appendix B (chart showing terms of service, 1980-96); FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note 27, at
56 (table showing same for years 1935-95).
165 As of September 2000, fifteen individuals have come to the Board directly from the
management side: management lawyers Guy Farmer, Joseph Jenkins, Edward Miller, Peter
Walther, Marshall Babson, Mary Miller Cracraft, Clifford Oviatt, John Raudabaugh, Charles
Cohen, J. Robert Brame and Peter Hurtgen; management consultant John Van de Water, in-
house counsel Patricia Diaz Dennis, and management-side industrial relations directors
Copeland Gray and Albert Beeson. See supra Part I. I would also classify Donald Dotson, an
in-house management lawyer who served in the Department of Labor for a year and a half
before being appointed to the NLRB, as coming from a management-side background. See
supra note 102 (discussing both Dotsor's background and the classification of presidential
appointees based on their "primary occupations," i.e., "the occupations in which they had spent
more of their recent working lives than any other").
Hurtgen is still on the Board, and I have been unable to trace the post-Board career of
Copeland Gray. Of the remaining fourteen, eleven returned to the management side upon
leaving the Board. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 124 (Beeson); WHO's WHO
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IN AMERICA 1118 (52nd ed. 1998) (Dotson); Address by Former NLRB Member Peter Walther
on Future NLRB Direction, 1983 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at F-i (Feb. 4, 1983)
(Walther); Former Member Brame Joins Law Firm, Gives Up Attempt at Serving Second Term,
supra note 19 (Brame); NLRB Chairmen and General Counsels Explore Agency Role in its
50th Year, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at A-2 (July 11, 1985) (Farmer, Miller, Van
de Water); Raudabaugh Defends Republican Role in Seeking Disclosure of All NLRB
Nominees, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 225, at AA-1 (Nov. 24, 1993) (Raudabaugh);
Senate Labor Committee Expected to Consider Higgins' Nomination Before the End of April,
1988 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-7 (Apr. 14, 1988) (Babson); Written Testimony of
Charles . Cohen Before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, Hearing on TEAM
Act (S. 295), Feb. 12, 1997, reprinted in 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at E-I (Feb. 13,
1997) (Cohen); McGuire Woods Battle & Boothe LLP, Clifford R Oviatt, Jr., at
http'//www.mcguirewoods.com/lawyers/profile.aspI=253 (last visited Aug. 16, 2000) (Oviatt)
[hereinafter Ovialt Biography].
As for the other three, Mary Miller Cracraft and Patricia Diaz Dennis stayed in
government. See WHO'S WHO IN AMERIcAN LAw 206 (7th ed. 1992-93) (indicating that
Cracraft remained with the agency); White House Names NLRB Member Patricia Dennis to
Seat on Federal Communications Commission, 1986 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at A-14
(Mar. 13, 1986) (reporting that Dennis was appointed to the FCC). It appears that Joseph
Jenkins, like Cracraft, assumed another position with the agency. See General Study into the
Procedures of the NLRB and its Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, as Amended. Hearings before the House Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board
of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong. 1015 (1961) [hereinafter Pucinski Subcommittee
Hearings] (statement of Joseph Jenkins) (indicating that Jenkins is Regional Director of the
Board's Albuquerque, New Mexico office). Notably, Cracraft Dennis and Jenkins had all been
appointed to the Board at a young age and had had relatively brief careers as management
attorneys prior to serving. See supra note 131 (indicating that Cracraft had worked for the
Board for four years and been an associate in a management-side firm for five years when
appointed at age thirty-nine); supra notes 119 and 127 (indicating that Dennis had spent three
years at a law firm and seven as in-house counsel for two different corporations prior to
appointment at age thirty-six); supra note 66 (reporting that Jenkins had spent five years in
government, including three with the NLRB, and then four years as management lawyer, before
appointment to the Board); GROss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 150 (indicating that
Jenkins was thirty-eight at time of appointment).
Betty Murphy, who came to the Board from a firm that represented several international
unions as well as management clients, see supra note 89, went into management-side practice
upon the expiration of her term. See Membership of NLRB Advisory Panel, 1994 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 69, at D-1 (Apr. 12, 1994) (reporting that Murphy is with management-side
firm of Baker & Hostetler); see also NLRB Chairmen and General Counsels Explore Agency
Role in its 50th Year, supra (indicating same).
Finally, the three Board General Counsels who came directly from management-side
practice, Theophil Kammholz, Peter Nash, and Rosemary Collyer, see supra notes 57-58, 96,
and 127-28 and accompanying text, all returned there. See Oversight Hearings on the Subject
"Has Labor Law Failed": Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management
Relations of the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Manpower and Housing Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong. 217 (1984) (stating that Nash is a
partner with the management firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart); Pucinski
Subcommittee Hearings, supra, at 936 (stating that Kammholz is with Vedder, Price, Kaufinan
& Kammholz); supra note 72 (stating that Kammholz returned to management-side practice);
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for the vast majority of management lawyers appointed (there is as yet no data on
their union-side counterparts), 166 service on the Board has been but a brief hiatus
in a decades-long career on the management side. 167
This combination of past and likely future would seem near-lethal to the
prospects that a Board member will vote for any rule or policy that would
materially disadvantage his or her side of origin. Anyone who has spent the last
fifteen or twenty years as a management lawyer is highly likely on that basis
alone, it would seem, to adopt the traditional management-side view of recurring
disputed issues such as the proper scope of the employer's bargaining
obligation 168 or the line between coercive threats and lawful free speech.' 69 That
Rosemary M. Collyer, Union Access: Developments Since Jean Country, 6 LAB. LAWYER 839,
839 (1990) (stating that Collyer is a partner with the management-side law firm of Crowell &
Moring). Jerry Hunter, who was in government at the time of his appointment to the General
Counsel's position but had also spent several years as in-house counsel on the management
side, supra note 141 and accompanying text, also went into management-side practice when his
term expired. See White House Seeks Republican Input on Plans to Fill Four Vacancies at
NLRB, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 118, at AA-1 (June 19, 1997) (quoting Hunter and
identifying him as a management lawyer). I have been unable to trace the post-NLRB career of
Jerome Fenton, who also came to the General Counsel's post from another government
position, but had spent the bulk of his career handling Pan Am Airway's labor relations. See
supra note 66.
166 Margaret Browning, the sole member to come to the Board directly from union-side
practice, died in office. See Member Margaret A. Browning Dies of Cancer at Age 46, 1997
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at A-10 (Mar. 3, 1997). Members Wilma Liebman and Sarah
Fox, both of whom spent the bulk of their pre-Board careers on the union side, see supra note
151, are still serving on the Board at this time. But see supra note 19 (stating that as this article
goes to press, Member Fox's recess appointment, which followed expiration of her term, is set
to expire shortly).
167 For instance, as of the year 2000, Ed Miller had spent four years on the Board in the
course of a fifty-year career as a management lawyer, Clifford Oviatt three and a half years on
the Board in the course of a forty-year career on the management side, and Marshall Babson
three years on the Board flanked by over twenty as a management lawyer. See FIRST SIXTY
YEARS, supra note 27, at 56 (listing dates of service on Board); Edward B. Miller, Current
NLRB Decisions: Good News and Bad News for Employers, 49 LAB. L.J. 1042, 1042 (1998)
(indicating that Miller remains in management-side practice); NLRB Management Attorneys
Voice Complaints About NLRB's Pursuit of 10() Injunctions, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
52, at AA-1 (Mar. 18, 1998) (indicating that Babson remains in management practice); Oviatt
Biography, supra note 165; supra notes 68 and 130 (describing pre-Board backgrounds of
Miller and Babson, respectively).
168 Section 8(d) of the Act requires the parties to confer in good faith regarding "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1994). The Board and the courts have continually wrestled with the question of whether
various entrepreneurial decisions that have an important impact on unit employees' job security,
such as plant relocations and partial closures, are 'mandatory" subjects of bargaining within
section 8(d). See generally JuLUs G. GErMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT REiATIoNs AND
THE LAW 133-40 (2d ed. 1999); DOUGLAS E. RAY Er AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 215-
17 (1999); Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
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is, it seems extremely unlikely that someone who has spent a career arguing for a
restrictive view of the range of mandatory bargaining topics and an expansive
view of the employer's free speech rights would turn around once on the Board
and take the contrary view. When one adds to the equation a near-certain return to
management practice a few years down the road, adherence to the management
line would seem to become nearly inevitable. As one observer once said of a
member of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC):
You take [Commissioner X], he was a lawyer working for broadcasters, [and] when
he leaves, he'll work for the industry. He's not going to stick his finger in that
industry's eye. 170
Or as the AFL-CIO once stated in a resolution opposing partisan appointments to
the Board:
It would be a considerable accomplishment for men whose pasts were spent and
whose futures lie with management to achieve even-handed justice as between
management and labor. They don't."171
Indeed, the proper judicial analogy, I would argue, goes something like this.
Maintenance: The Scope ofMandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982); see, e.g., Otis
Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (indicating that four Board members applied three
different tests in determining whether an employer's decision to discontinue part of its
operations and consolidate the remainder of operations at a new facility was a mandatory
subject).
169 In drawing this line, the Board and the courts must reconcile NLRA section 8(a)(1),
which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights under the Act, with section 8(c), which provides that "[t]he expressing of
any views, argument, or opinion.... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice ... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." See
NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) & 8(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & 158(c) (1994). The line between an implied
threat and a lawful "prediction" regarding the likely or potential effects of unionization is a
particularly difficult one to draw, and hence is the subject of much litigation. See RAY ET AL.,
supra note 168, at 107-09 (noting that it is "easier to state the Court's rules than to implement
them consistently," and that the line between a prediction and a threat is "evasive," and further
stating that "[g]iven the subtlety of the distinction between predictions and threats, and the
importance of context, it is not hard to find inconsistent NLRB decisions, and inconsistent
treatment of those decisions within the circuit courts.")
170 Hugh Heclo, The In-and-Outer System: A Critical Assessment, in THE IN-AND-
OUTERS, supra note 102, at 195,212.
17 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, RESOLUTION No. 164, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRD CONSTTTONAL CONVENTION OF THE AFL-CIO 593 (1959) (complaining that "the two
Board Members... appointed by [the Eisenhower] administration whose services with the
Board have terminated have reverted promptly to their permanent status as employer attorneys
or labor relations consultants"). The Board members complained of were Guy Farmer and
Albert Beeson, respectively.
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Imagine that the Supreme Court hears nothing but criminal procedure cases, and
that Justices serve terms of only a few years. Further imagine that the norms of
the criminal law bar require criminal lawyers to choose either the prosecution or
defense side early on in their career and to stick with that side,172 and that Justices
who are former prosecutors or defense lawyers almost invariably return to their
previous line of work after a few years on the bench. Under these circumstances,
would we realistically expect career prosecutors or defense lawyers appointed to
the Court to be "unbiased" in their decision-making? I think not.
Having said all this, management and union-side lawyers are certainly not the
only potential Board members who are likely to bring a particular bias to the job.
That is, while there seems little doubt that management and union representatives
appointed to the Board are likely to be highly predisposed to the management or
union-side point of view, the real question is whether they are likely to be more
biased in favor of one side or the other than are appointees drawn from other
backgrounds-and that is a more difficult question to answer.
There are several reasons to question whether this is so, or at least to be wary
of drawing any hasty conclusions in this regard. First, as an impressionistic
matter, there seems to be no shortage of people from a variety of backgrounds
who hold rigid opinions on labor issues. As anyone who has taught labor law can
attest, any group of students invariably contains some who will rigidly adhere to a
pro- or anti-union view of every conceivable issue, regardless of the strength of
the arguments on the other side.173 Similarly, I think it is fair to say that many
academics in the field adhere to a fairly predictable line-more often than not
pro-union.174 In neither instance can this rigidity be wholly accounted for by
background; ideology appears to be a powerful driving force as well. Third and
finally, the government background that I have classified as "neutral" is hardly
monolithic,175 encompassing as it does not only career NLRB employees and
172 To the contrary, legions of criminal lawyers have begun their careers on the
prosecution side and switched over to criminal defense; nothing could be more common. See
Prosecutors Who Svitch Sides, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995, at A-20 (reporting that "[s]witching
from prosecutor to defense attorney is common" and noting, for instance, that "[t]here is a long
history of Justice Department officials and federal prosecutors leaving the public payroll to
make more money as criminal defense lawyers").
173 When I first began teaching, I worried about stating my opinions on the law too
strongly, lest my students should feel bulldozed or browbeaten. I quickly decided, however, that
students rarely change their views based on what anyone else in the classroom, myself included,
has to say-thus laying my fears to rest.
174 Here, I must confess to finding myself in agreement with the Labor Policy
Association. See AGENCY rN Csjsis, supra note 3, at 50 (stating that "labor law professors tend
to have well-stated leanings toward either management or labor, usually the latter").
175 Cf James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, and Disputed Calls: An
Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351, 410-11 (1999)
(noting that commentators have lumped together in the category of "IRS" or "govemmenf'
background various tax-related positions that are, upon analysis, very different in kind).
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those who have served on other federal agencies, but also House and Senate
staffers. While it is unclear whether or how much today's highly polarized
climate1 76 has filtered down to the staff level, at a minimum it seems reasonable
to assume that aides to the Democrats on the House or Senate Labor Committee
are likely to be relatively sympathetic to unions, and those working for the
Republicans more likely to have a management-friendly orientation.
With all of this as background, let us turn now to the data. There are two
major sources of data on the voting patterns of individual NLRB members: a
study covering the period 1955-79 conducted by economics professors Charles
DeLorme and Norman Wood,177 and an analysis of Board member voting
conducted by a management-side law firm and published in the newsletter
Employment Law Alert that began in 1985 and remains ongoing.178
Turning first to the 1955-79 study, DeLorme and Wood looked at unfair
labor practice (ULP) decisions that were highlighted in the Board's Annual
Report because they "involved novel questions or set [important] precedents.' 179
Classifying a vote to dismiss a union-filed ULP charge or to sustain an employer-
filed charge as "pro-management" and a vote to dismiss an employer-filed charge
or to sustain a union-filed charge as "pro-union,"' 180 they calculated the
percentage of pro-union and pro-management votes cast by each Board member.
I have consolidated and reordered their data181 and added information on each
176 See infra text accompanying notes 252-58 and 267-79.
177 Charles D. DeLorme, Jr. & Norman J. Wood, Presidential Labor Relations
Philosophy andthe NLRB, 12 AKRON Bus. & ECON. REv. 31 (1981).
178 See NLRB's Party-Line Split Widens, EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon Peabody
LLP), May 2000 [hereinafter May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT] available at
http://www.nhdd.com/publication (last visited Aug. 18, 2000) (newsletter on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal); see also NLRB Voting Patterns-an Update, EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT
(forthcoming Jan. 2001) [hereinafter January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy)]
(advance copy of newsletter provided to author and on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
The Employment Law Alert is edited by John D. Canoni, currently a partner in the
management-side law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP, and formerly a partner in Nixon, Hargrave,
Devans & Doyle, one of two firms which merged in July 1999 to form Nixon Peabody. See
Profile: John D. Canoni, at http://www.nhdd.com/attomeys bio.asp?ID=598 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2000); About the Firm, at http://www.nhdd.coni/offices set.asp (last visited Aug. 18,
2000); May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18. Prior to 1994, Mr. Canoni was
with the law firm of Townley & Updike, and the publication was known as TOWNLEY &
UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACTICES NEWSLErR.
179 DeLorme & Wood, supra note 177, at 31.
180 Id
181 As DeLorme & Wood were primarily interested in the extent to which Board
members' voting behavior reflected the labor relations philosophy of the President who
appointed them, see DeLorme & Wood, supra note 177, at 31, they broke member voting down
by Board; i.e., they listed data separately for the Eisenhower Board, Kennedy-Johnson Board,
Nixon-Ford Board, and Carter Board, with a President's Board defined as beginning during the
first fiscal year in which the Board majority consisted of three members of the President's party.
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Board member's background, party affiliation and the appointing President,
yielding the following table (Table 1):
Table 1: 1955-1979 (DeLorme & Wood)
Member Bkgrd. Votes Party President
1. R. Kennedy (1971-75) Govt. 79% pro-M Rep. Nixon
2. Walther (1975-77) Mgt 75% pro-M Rep. Ford
3. Miller (1971-74) Mgt. 64% pro-M Rep. Nixon
4. Beeson (Mar.-Dec. 1954) Mgt 63% pro-M Rep. Eisenhower
5. Rodgers (1953-61) Govt. 61% pro-M Rep. Eisenhower
6. Farmer (1953-55) Mgt. 56% pro-M Ind. Eisenhower
7. Leedom (1955-64) Govt. 56% pro-M Rep. Eisenhower
8. Penello (1972-79) Govt. 53% pro-M Dem. Nixon
9. Bean (1955-60) Govt. 53% pro-M Rep. Eisenhower
10. Murphy(1975-79) Mgt./Union 54% pro-U Rep. Ford
9. J. Jenkins (1957-61) Mgt. 54% pro-U Dem. Eisenhower
8. McCulloch (1961-70) Govt. 56% pro-U Dem. Kennedy
7. Zagoria (1965-70) Govt. 57% pro-U Dem. Johnson
6. H. Jenkins (1963-79) AcadJGovt. 61% pro-U Rep. Kennedy
5. Brown (1961-71) Govt. 62% pro-U Dem. Kennedy
4. Truesdale (1978-79) Govt. 63% pro-U Dem. Carter
3. Peterson (1955-56) Govt. 63% pro-U Dem. Truman
2. Fanning (1957-79) Govt. 71% pro-U Dem. Eisenhower
1. Murdock (1955-57) Govt. 71% pro-U Dem. Truman
Looking at Table 1, it is difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions about
the impact of a partisan versus a "neutral" background on Board member voting.
Of the nineteen Board members who served during this period, three of the four
with the most pro-management voting records (and four of the top six) were
former management lawyers or representatives, tending to suggest that those from
partisan backgrounds are indeed more biased than others in their decision-
making. On the other hand, however, the most pro-management member of all
during this period was a career Board employee, Ralph Kennedy.182 More
significantly, I think, it is not clear-particularly when one graphs out the data as
in Figure 1 following-that the management lawyers and representatives who
Id at 32. I have compiled aggregate voting data for members who served on more than one
Board, and ordered the aggregate voting records of all members serving between 1955 and
1979 from most pro-management record to most pro-union. Finally, I have rounded the
percentages to the nearest whole number.
182 Kennedy had been Regional Director of the Board's Los Angeles office. See GROSS,
BROKEN PROMIsE, supra note 26, at 221.
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served between 1955 and 1979 were any more predictably pro-management in
their voting than some of their governmental counterparts were predictably pro-
union.
Based on Figure 1, the members' voting records appear to fall rather neatly
into six categories: extremely pro-union, strongly pro-union, and moderately pro-
union on the one hand, and moderately pro-management, strongly pro-
management, and extremely pro-management on the other. While the
management lawyers and representatives-all of whom were appointed by
Republican Presidents-are more likely to be at least strongly pro-management
than are those from government who were appointed by Republicans (the
majority of whom are moderately pro-management), their records appear no more
skewed in favor of management than the records of the Democrat-appointed
government employees who fall into the strongly or extremely pro-union category
are skewed in favor of unions.183 And because no union lawyers or officials were
appointed to the Board during this time, there is no comparison to be made
between Democrat-appointed union representatives versus Democrat-appointed
members from government or other "neutral" backgrounds.
The Employment Law Alert data covering the period from September 1985 to
the present, however, appear to tell a much different story. In the "disputed" cases
tracked by this publication-that is, cases in which at least one Board member
filed a separate dissent 184-the voting falls out as follows (Table 2 and
Figure 2):'1 5
183 The possible exception here is Peter Walther, who, along with NLRB careerist Ralph
Kennedy, appears to be farther out on the "pro-management" spectrum than any of the
government employees are on the "pro-union" end ofthe spectrum.
184 See May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18. Excluded from the data base
are cases presenting "[p]rocedural issues that are not strictly labor-management issues." See
January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAw ALERT, supra note 121.
185 Table 2 was compiled using the cumulative data contained in an advance copy of the
January 2001 issue of the Employment Law Alert, which covers Board member voting up
through the end of July 2000. See January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy),
supra note 178. I have simply made a few changes in the format. First, I have rounded the
percentages to the nearest whole number. Second, whereas the Employment Law Alert, which is
produced by a management-side law firm, lists the percentage of pro-employer votes for each
Board member, I have instead listed the percentage of pro-union votes for those Board
members who voted for the union position in a majority of disputed cases. Finally, as with the
DeLorme & Wood data, see supra text following note 181, I have added information on each
Board member's background, political party, and the appointing President.
The "union" designation following Members Fox and Liebman and the 'management"
designation following Member Dotson are starred because, unlike the other Board members
designated as "union" or "management," these members did not come directly to the Board
from representing one side, but rather from government positions. However, as both Fox and
Liebman had spent the bulk of their careers working for unions, see supra note 151, I believe
they are properly characterized as coming from a union-side background. See discussion supra
note 102 (regarding the classification of presidential appointees by their "career" or "primary
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Table 2: 1985-present (Employment Law Alert)
Member Bkgrd. Votes Party President
1. Dotson (1983-87) Mgt.* 97% pro-M Rep. Reagan
2. Hurtgen (1997-.) Mgt. 97% pro-M Rep. Reagan
3. Brame (1997-2000) Mgt. 90% pro-M Rep. Clinton
4. Cohen (1994-96) Mgt. 88% pro-M Rep. Clinton
5. Oviatt (1990-93) Mgt. 76% pro-M Rep. Bush
6. Raudabaugh (1990-93) Mgt. 65% pro-M Rep. Bush
7. Higgins (1988-89; 1996-97) Govt. 59% pro-M Rep. Reagan/Clinton
11. Stephens (1985-95) Govt. 56% pro-U Rep. Reagan
10. Cracraft(1986-91) Mgt. 62% pro-U Dem. Reagan
9. Johansen (1985-89) Govt. 70% pro-U Rep. Reagan
8. Truesdale (1994-96; 1998-9 Govt. 72% pro-U Dem. Clinton
7. Devaney (1988-94) Govt. 73% pro-U Dem. Reagan
6. Babson (1985-88) Mgt 73% pro-U Dem. Reagan
5. Gould (1994-98) Acad. 78% pro-U Dem. Clinton
4. Dennis (1983-86) Mgt 90% pro-U Dem. Reagan
3. Fox (1995-_) Union* 91% pro-U Dem. Clinton
2. Liebman (1997- Union* 92% pro-U Dem. Clinton
1. Browning (1994-97) Union 98% pro-U Dem. Clinton
Quite clearly, the former management and union lawyers in the data set have
more one-sided voting records than do the former government attorneys. Indeed,
the six Board members with the most pro-employer records are all former
management lawyers, and the three Board members with the most pro-union
records are all former union attorneys 186 -with career union attorney Margaret
occupation"-that "in which they had spent more of their recent working lives than any other").
Similarly, I believe that Dotson, who had spent a year or two with the Department of Labor
following many years as in-house labor counsel to three different corporations, see id, is
properly characterized as coming from a management-side background. Id
186 See supra Table 2, p. 1408. The Board member with the fourth most pro-union voting
record, surprisingly, was Patricia Diaz Dennis, a young management lawyer appointed by
President Reagan to a Democratic seat. See id; supra notes 119, 127 and accompanying text
(describing Dennis's background). The votes recorded for Dennis cover only the last nine
months of her three years of Board service. See May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra
note 178 (stating that analysis of voting records began in September 1985); FIRST SrxTY YEARS,
supra note 27, at 56 (indicating that Diaz Dennis served from May 1983 to June 1986).
Moreover, her record likely appears more pro-union than it would otherwise given that she
served with Donald Dotson. Dotson was one of the most pro-employer members--if not the
most pro-employer member-ever. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (discussing
Dotson's staunch conservatism); infra note 191 (describing Dotson as "legendary" for his
conservatism and elaborating on his anti-union attitudes); January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW11
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Browning the clear leader in partisan voting over the two former union lawyers
who had undergone a "decontamination" period in government before being
appointed. 187 The government lawyers in the sample, in contrast, fall
disproportionately into the middle of the pack.188
The phenomenon of management and union-side lawyers voting in a more
one-sided fashion than their governmental counterparts during this period,
ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178 (reporting that Dotson ranked first in percentage of pro-
management votes during September 1985 through July 2000 period). Dotson also dissented in
an extraordinary number of cases-thus kicking many Dotson Board cases into the "disputed"
category tracked by Employment Law Alert. See May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra
note 178 (indicating that Dotson dissented in 161 cases during the period covered by the survey,
significantly more than any other Board member); FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note 27, at 56
(indicating that Dotson served for just slightly over two years during the period tracked by the
survey, rendering his huge number of dissents all the more impressive). Nonetheless, even in
context, Dennis's voting record indeed appears to have been decidedly pro-union; she voted for
the union position in disputed cases much more often than did her Dotson Board compatriots
from government as well as management backgrounds. See How the Board Members are
Voting on the Issues-an Update, TOWNLEY & UPDIKE'S PERSONNEL PRACnCES NEWSLEIrER,
Nov. 1986 at 4 (predecessor publication to Employment Law Alert) (reporting that from
September 1985 to Dennis's departure in August 1986, Dennis voted for the union position in
89% of disputed cases, fellow Democrat and management lawyer Marshall Babson in 71%, and
Republican ex-govenment lawyers James Stephens and Bud Johansen in 68% and 54%,
respectively; in contrast, Dotson voted for the management position in 93% of disputed cases
during that period). Perhaps for this reason, when Dennis's term expired, President Reagan did
not reappoint her to the Board, but rather appointed her to the Federal Communications
Commission. Id at 2.
187 Cf Tate, supra note 160, at 362 (reporting findings that Supreme Court Justices who
have never been prosecutors have voting records more favorable to civil rights than do former
prosecutors, and that among former prosecutors, those who also had some previous judicial
experience have voting records more favorable to civil rights than do former prosecutors who
lacked "the moderating influence of sitting on the other side of the bench"). Presumably, service
as ajudge followed that as a prosecutor, and similarly acted as a "decontamination" period.
188 Mary Miller Cracraft, the one management lawyer who falls very much into the
middle of the pack, was, like Patricia Diaz Dennis, see supra notes 119 and 127, a young
Democrat who had been in management practice for only a short time before her appointment
to the Board. See supra note 131 (stating that Cracraft had spent four years with the Board and
then five as an associate at a management-side law firm before appointment to Board). Indeed,
Cracraft had spent almost as much time at the Board as in management-side practice before her
appointment. See id
In contrast, Marshall Babson, another young management lawyer whose voting patterns
are more similar to those of ex-govenment appointees than to those of his management-side
counterparts, spent his entire pre-Board career on the management side. See supra note 130
(indicating that Babson's ten-year career had been spent entirely in management-side practice).
Babson's high percentage of pro-union votes in disputed cases is no doubt at least partially
attributable to the fact that much of his term overlapped with that of Donald Dotson, who was
both rabidly anti-union and extraordinarily prone to filing dissenting opinions. See supra note
186 (making the same point with regard to Patricia Diaz Dennis, whose entire term overlapped
with that of Dotson).
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moreover, holds true when one controls for political party. That is, while the six
most pro-management Board members are all Republicans as well as
management lawyers, these management lawyers' votes favor the employer more
than do those of Republicans from government backgrounds. Similarly, while the
eight most pro-union Board members are all Democrats, the Democrats from
union backgrounds have favored unions more often than Democrats from
governmental or other "neutral" backgrounds.
An extremely striking aspect of the Employment Law Alert data, moreover, is
just how one-sided the voting of the most recent appointees from management
and union-side practice has been. In disputed cases, Peter Hurtgen and J. Robert
Brame, the management lawyers appointed in 1997, have voted for the
employer's position 97% and 90% of the time, respectively, while Charles Cohen,
appointed from the management ranks in 1994, racked up an 88% pro-
management record. 189 Rather astonishingly, Hurtgen's record of 206-7 as this
article goes to press 190 places him in a neck-and-neck competition with the
legendary Donald Dotson, chair of the radically conservative "Reagan Board r',
for the "title" of most pro-employer member.191
At the other end of the spectrum, 1994 appointee Margaret Browning was
!89 See January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178. As
noted supra note 19, Member Brame's term expired shortly before this article went to press.
190 See January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178. Brame's
record as of July 31, 2000, a month before the expiration of his term and the most recent date
for which data is available, was 125-14. Id
191 See January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAw ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178 (noting
that Hurtgen "[currently] trails former Chairman Dotson by a minuscule [sic] half of one
percentage point," 97.2% to 96.7%, and that readers will have to "stay tuned" to see if Hurtgen
will surpass the "legendary" Dotson's pro-employer voting record by the expiration of his term
in August 2001); see also January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121 (expressing
amazement at Hurtgen's then-perfect 61-0 pro-employer record, noting that "[e]ven the
legendary Donald Dotson... cast a few votes for the union").
Prior to going on the Board, Dotson had written letters to journals asserting that collective
bargaining led to "the destruction of individual freedom" and that "unionized labor relations,
shortsighted demands, greed, and debilitating work rules" were all major reasons for the decline
of once healthy industries. See GRoss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 252; see also supra
text accompanying notes 103-04 (describing Dotson as "staunchly anti-union" and as the
proverbial "fox in the chicken coop"). Dotson's tenure was marked by a massive number of
overrulings of prior Board cases (always in a conservative direction), an apparently intentional
slow-down of case processing (which tends to harm unions), and Dotson's efforts to have a
former National Right to Work Committee lawyer assume the General Counsel's chief
functions. See WELER, supra note 126, at 19 (stating that the Reagan Board led by the highly
ideological Dotson "overturned some forty NLRB doctrines and developed a number of novel
positions of its own, almost invariably antithetical to the union position"); Moe, Interests,
Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 269 (describing the "purpose[ful]" slowdown
in decisionmaking and attempted subversion of the General Counsel, which led to
Congressional hearings).
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Hurtgen's equal in predictability; Browning, the only Board member ever to
come direct from union-side practice, voted for the union position in 98% (97 of
99) of disputed cases.192 While the ex-union lawyers appointed in 1997, Wilma
Liebman and Sarah Fox, have been a bit less partisan, voting for the union
position 92% and 91% of the time, respectively, 193 this still places them quite far
out on the spectrum. Moreover, their voting has become increasingly partisan
over time;194 indeed, Member Fox, rather remarkably, had a 173-0 pro-union
streak going through much of 1999 and 2000.195
A second striking aspect of the Employment Law Alert data is its highlighting
of the seemingly bizarre phenomenon of a President appointing Board members,
invariably from partisan backgrounds, whose positions are antithetical to his
policy preferences, as well as those whose positions reflect those preferences.
More specifically, President Clinton, who as a Democrat would be expected to
appoint at least moderately pro-union individuals to the Board, has appointed not
only the three most pro-union Board members to serve between 1985 and
today-all former union lawyers-but also three of the four most pro-
management members-all former management lawyers.
This phenomenon represents a very clear departure from the practice during
the 1955-79 period. During the earlier period, Board member voting was
extremely closely correlated with the political party of the appointing President;
with a single exception, when the members' voting records are lined up running
from most pro-management to most pro-union, the members appointed by
Republicans all fall at the top end of the list, and those appointed by Democrats at
the bottom. 196 And as for the appointment of partisans, while Republicans
192 See January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178.
193 Id As of July 31, 2000, Member Liebman had a 187-16 pro-union voting record, and
Member Fox a 250-26 pro-union record. Id.194 See id (reporting that during first seven months of 2000, Fox had a 49-1 pro-union
voting record and Liebman a 34-1 pro-union record); May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT,
supra note 178 (reporting that during the last seven months of 1999, Fox had a "perfect" 49-0
pro-union voting record, and Liebman voted for the union position in forty-five of forty-six
disputed cases); December 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 19 (reporting that
during the first five months of 1999, Fox had a 35-0 pro-union voting record, while Liebman
voted for the union position in thirty-six of thirty-seven disputed cases). Ex-management
attorney Charles Cohen, like Fox and Liebman, also began to vote on a nearly straight "party-
line" basis at some point in his term. See infra note 342 (indicating that Cohen compiled a 49-2
or 96% pro-management record during his last year on the Board).
195 See January 2001 EMPLOYmENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178
("Member Fox's amazing string of consecutive pro-union votes ended on July 24, 2000, at
173.").196 See supra Table 1, p. 1405. The exception was John Fanning. Fanning, a Democrat
who had headed the Defense Department's industrial relations department, was first appointed
by Eisenhower and subsequently reappointed by four other Presidents. See GRoss, BROKEN
PROMIsE, supra note 26, at 151-52. Eisenhower's appointment of Fanning, one of the most
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Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford put a number of management lawyers or
representatives on the Board, they most certainly did not appoint any union
lawyers, nor did the Democratic Presidents appoint any management lawyers.
To summarize the results of the above studies, the partisan representatives
appointed during the 1955-79 period-all from the management side, and all
appointed by Republican Presidents-generally favored management more often
than did Board members from government backgrounds appointed by the same
Presidents. They were not, however, necessarily any more pro-management in
their voting than some of the government employees appointed by Democratic
Presidents during this period were pro-union. In the period from 1985 to the
present, in contrast, during which there were appointees from the union as well as
the management side, both the management and union-side appointees have
generally been considerably more one-sided in their voting than their
governmental counterparts, with the most recent appointees from partisan
backgrounds compiling particularly one-sided records. Moreover, whereas Board
member voting in the 1955-79 period was closely correlated with the appointing
President's political party, that correlation has been spectacularly exploded during
the more recent period, with President Clinton, at least, appointing not only the
pro-union Board members that one would expect to see with a Democratic
President, but also Board members who have been extraordinarily pro-
management in their voting.197
One question that must be asked, of course, is whether these studies have
captured real differences between the two time periods, or whether those
differences are instead an artifact of the differing data-gathering techniques
employed. 198 1 believe that the differences are real, for a number of reasons. First,
liberal Board members ever, has been likened to his appointment of Earl Warren to the
Supreme Court. See Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case
of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1104 (1985) (stating that Fanning's appointment
"may have been a colossal mistake of Earl Warren proportions by a President who failed to
recognize a liberal-in-the making"--or may have been an attempted accommodation to the
Democratic Congress).
197 As noted previously, see supra note 186, while Reagan appointee Patricia Diaz Dennis
comes out on the extreme pro-union end of the spectrum, I attribute this largely to the
conservatism of the Board members with whom she served-most notably Donald Dotson, and
in no way consider Reagan's appointment of Dennis to be comparable to President Clinton's
appointment of hard-line management lawyers J. Robert Brame and Peter Hurtgen.
198 In comparing the two studies, one must look at two different aspects of each study: the
set of cases analyzed, and the means used to classify each Board member's vote. As explained
below, the pertinent difference in methodology lies in the respective data sets; the classification
techniques appear to be functionally identical.
The Employment Law Alert data set, as noted previously, consists of cases in which at least
one Board member dissented, excluding "[p]rocedural issues that are not strictly labor-
management issues." See supra note 184 and accompanying text. DeLorme & Wood, in
contrast, looked at unfair labor practice decisions that were highlighted in the NLRB Annual
Report because they "involved novel questions or set [important] precedents." See supra text
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almost all of the phenomena highlighted are based on relationships within each
data set: for example, I compared the voting records of management lawyers and
representatives who served between 1955 and 1979 and ex-government
employees who served during the same time period, and then made this same
comparison within the 1985-2000 time frame. Second, where I have highlighted
differences across time periods, those differences are largely qualitative rather
than quantitative; such is the case, for instance, with my observations that Board
member voting neatly tracked the appointing President's party affiliation in the
earlier period but not in the latter, and that it was only in the latter period that the
accompanying note 179. One obvious difference, then, is that DeLorme & Wood excluded
representational (i.e., election-related) cases, whereas the Employment Law Alert does not.
There is no apparent reason, however, why this would cause the marked variance in their
results.
This one difference aside, both methods of case selection are clearly aimed at filtering out
the multitude of routine cases heard by the Board and focusing in on the more important or
controversial cases. See William N. Cooke et al., The Determinates of NLRB Decision-Making
Revisited, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 237, 237 (1995) (stating that 80% of the Board's
caseload is made up of routine cases involving the application of well-established law, and 20%
of novel or complex cases in which the Board is facing a new issue or considering the revision
of an existing policy); cf James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions?
Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.L 1675,
1711-12 (1999) (analyzing, in an empirical study ofjudges' votes in labor cases, the following
two subgroups of cases in an effort to focus in on more important or controversial issues: cases
that were chosen for publication in the Federal Reporter, and cases in which at least one judge
disagreed either with the NLRB or with another member of the panel). In routine cases
involving the application of well-established law, a Board member's particular bent-i.e., pro-
management or pro-union-appears to play a fairly insignificant role. Cooke et al., supra, at
254-55. In cases involving the establishment of new law or reconsideration of existing law, in
contrast, Board member voting is strongly influenced by the member's own policy preferences.
Id These are the type of cases likely to be highlighted in the Board's annual reports, and also
those most likely to generate dissents.
As for the classification of each member's vote, DeLorme & Wood classified a vote in
favor of dismissing a union unfair labor practice complaint or upholding a management ULP
complaint as pro-management, and a vote in favor of upholding a union ULP complaint or
dismissing a management ULP complaint as pro-union. See supra text accompanying note 180.
That is, they zeroed in on the bottom line effect of the member's vote. The Employment Law
Alert, for its part, tracks whether the member's vote favored the union or management
"position." December 1999 EMILOYMENT LAW ALRT, supra note 19. Although it may initially
sound as if the latter classification system is a bit more nuanced-that members' votes might be
classified differently, for instance, if they reach the same result but advocate applying different
legal tests or standards in the pertinent area-that does not appear to be the case. The
Employment Law Alert does not separately analyze concurrences, which are particularly likely
to point up differences between the bottom line of a Board member's vote and the overall thrust
of his or her position, but rather treats a concurrence just like a straight vote for the majority
position. Thus, at the end of the day it appears that both studies look to the bottom line in
classifying each member's vote, and that the methodological difference between them lies
solely in the area of case selection.
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phenomenon of a President appointing partisans whose policy views were
diametrically opposed to his own arose.
While I do assert that the most recent partisan appointees are more one-sided
in their voting than those who served in the 1955-79 period, I believe that such a
conclusion is eminently reasonable. First, because Donald Dotson is without
question one of the most conservative Board members (if not the most
conservative member) ever to serve,199 he is a convenient and reliable
benchmark; the fact that one of President Clinton's appointees has compiled a
record essentially identical to Dotson's and another a record that is within several
percentage points of Dotson's very strongly suggests that their voting is more
partisan than that of any appointees to the Eisenhower, Nixon, or Ford Boards,
none of which is thought to have even remotely approached the Dotson Board in
conservatism. Second, at some point, res ipsa loquitur: a Board member who
votes for one side's position in 90% or 97% of disputed cases or in 173 straight
disputed cases is obviously incredibly "predisposed" to one side's viewpoint.
Thus, while it is true that one would expect the Employment Law Alert study to
yield somewhat more extreme numbers than the DeLorme & Wood study
because it automatically filters out all cases in which all participating Board
members agreed on the result,200 it is difficult to believe-particularly in light of
other factors discussed above-that the difference between a 90% or 90+% pro-
management or pro-union voting record in cases prompting a dissent and a 60-
65% or even 70% pro-management or pro-union record in cases involving a
novel question or setting an important precedent is a mere product of the
difference in data sets.
Having concluded that the differing voting patterns of Board members from
partisan backgrounds serving in the 1955-79 period and those who have served
since 1985 indeed transcend methodology, the second question that must be asked
is simply "Why?"---that is, what accounts for this pronounced difference? To that
question Part III now turns.
III. SHIFTING NORMS IN THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
Part I traced the evolution in NLRB appointment practices over the last sixty-
five years and described how the once tacitly forbidden practice of appointing
management or union-side representatives to the Board has, over time, become
commonplace. Part II analyzed the impact of the appointment of partisan
representatives on NLRB decision-making and concluded, based on two major
studies of Board member voting patterns, that it has varied considerably over
time. More specifically, it determined that Board members from partisan
199 See supra note 191.
200 DeLorme & Wood, in contrast, included such cases as long as they were sufficiently
important or high-profile to be highlighted in the Board's Annual Report.
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backgrounds appointed prior to 1980 undoubtedly tended to favor "their" side in
deciding cases, but were not, on the whole, significantly more one-sided in their
voting than were a number of their colleagues from government or other impartial
backgrounds. The management and union-side lawyers appointed during the past
fifteen years, in contrast, have unquestionably voted in a much more lop-sided
fashion than their counterparts from impartial backgrounds, with President
Clinton's appointees being particularly prone to voting a straight (or nearly so)
pro-labor or pro-management line.
This Part attempts to account for this difference in Board member voting
patterns between the two periods under study (1955-79 and 1985 to the present),
and in particular for the sharp increase in highly partisan voting by Board
members from management and union-side backgrounds in the last decade and a
half. As explained in detail below, it concludes that the difference is almost
wholly attributable to two inter-related factors: a shift in the norms governing
appointments to the NLRB, and a shift in the norms governing presidential
appointments generally.
The appointments process consists of two distinct phases:201 the selection
process that is controlled ultimately at least by the President, and the confirmation
process that is controlled largely by the relevant Senate committee.202 The
Appointments Clause provides that "[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and ... other Officers
of the United States. '203 It gives little-or really no guidance, however, as to how
the "Advice and Consent" process is to operate, and more specifically, as to the
appropriate balance of power between the President and the Senate;204 hence, the
process governing presidential appointments is entirely norm-governed.
2 0 1 See G. CALViN MACKENZIE, THE PoLrrcs OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS xiii
(1981) [hereinafter MACKENZIE, POLrTcS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS] (dividing the
process into the selection and confirmation phases).
202 See id. at 181 (stating that committees have always been the primary decision-madng
forum in the confirmation process and that floor action is rarely more than ratification of
committee action); Christopher J. Deering, Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don't: The
Senate's Role in the Appointments Process, in THE IN-AND-OTRns, supra note 102, at 100
(stating that "individual committees dominate the confirmation process"). In the case of the
NLRB, the relevant committee is of course the Senate Labor Committee. That committee
makes frequent small changes to its name, and is currently denominated the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions. See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 92, at 477-78, 485-86,
507-08 (listing standing Senate committees up through the 104th Congress); I Cong. Index
(CCI-) 12061 (1999-2000) (containing information on subsequent congresses and indicating
current name of committee).
203 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Those "other Officers," of course, include members of
administrative agencies such as the NLRB.
204 See MACKENZIE, POLmCS OF PRESIDEIAL APPOINrMENTS, supra note 201, at 94
("The ambiguity of the constitutional language and the wide range of historical practice impose
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Those norms, moreover, are notoriously subject to change over time,205 and
this general rule certainly holds true as to Labor Board appointments. As
discussed below, the pattern of interaction between the President and the Senate
pertaining to NLRB appointments has undergone a rather dramatic shift over the
last fifteen to twenty years-a shift that accounts, I believe, for much of the
temporal difference in Board member voting behavior that we have seen.
A. The "Old Rules". The 1950s through the Late 1970s
Throughout the 1950s and 60s and most of the 1970s, both the selection and
confirmation phases of the NLRB appointments process tended to proceed in a
fairly routinized manner.206 As the political scientist Terry Moe has recounted, at
the selection phase, either the business or labor community-depending upon
whether the President was a Republican or a Democrat-assumed responsibility
in the first instance for generating a list of possible nominees, with the other side
holding a limited veto power over "particularly obnoxious candidates."20 7 In
constructing these lists, however, both sides exercised a considerable measure of
restraint. This was in part because they viewed the process as a repeat game and
feared that short-term "gouging" would lead to retaliation by the other side down
the road,208 and in part a response to the moderating influence of the President209
who generally attempted to accommodate the interests of both labor and
management in making NLRB appointments, giving greater weight of course, to
the interests of the "in group."210 Under this "system," both sides, as Moe
describes it:
were looking for the same type of person[:] [a]n experienced attorney who is well
known, widely respected, and firmly anchored in the labor-management
community.... The only real [difference] is that each side also wants people who are
known to be partial to its own interests .... Thus, business tends to search for
few limits on the behavior of modem participants in the appointment process. Essentially it is
theirs to define as they wish, and as they can."); see also id at 92 ("The most noteworthy
characteristic of the appointment process shaped by the Founding Fathers is the legacy of
ambiguity it left to subsequent generations of political practitioners.").
205 See id at 94 ("[A]ny description of the relationship between the President and the
Senate in the exercise of the appointment power must always be regarded as time-bound.
Patterns of interaction or influence are rarely stable for long.").
206 See generally Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at
247-60.
207 Id at 252-53.
208 See id at 247-48.
209 Id at 255; see also id at 266 (stating that "the structure imposed by the president has
traditionally been a fundamental constraint on business and labor, producing moderate
appointments and regularized politics").
2 10 Id at 250.
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respected professionals who are moderately conservative, and labor for responsible
professionals who are moderately liberal. 2 11
Using these criteria, the "in group"-either business or labor--generated a
short list of candidates for the President's consideration. 2 12 The President then
chose from among them, usually on the basis of broader political considerations
such as the desire to gain a key legislator's support on some unrelated matter, or
perhaps racial or ethnic considerations. 2 13
At the confirmation phase, the unwritten rules governing NLRB nominations
up through the late 1970s, consonant with those governing presidential
appointments generally,2 14 were as follows:
[T]he primary rule is deference to the president: he has a right to build his own
administration as he sees fit and thus to have his appointees confirmed as long as they
are not clearly unqualified.... [As to what] counts as "unqualified" and therefore as a
legitimate reason for voting against confirmation... the basic rule is that there must
be a "smoking gun" of some sort-a serious character flaw, criminal conduct,
demonstrable bias, or obvious inability to carry out the duties of the job. A
candidate's ideology is not a legitimate basis for voting no.2 15
Of course, that did not mean that ideology was irrelevant: "[i]deology (backed by
group complaints) may prompt some senators to look high and low for the
211 Id at 259.
2 12 Id at 254.
2 13 Id See, e.g., Reagan Administration Continues Search for Replacement to Fill Jenkins
Seat at NLRB, supra note 141 (reporting that the administration's search for a candidate to
replace Member Howard Jenkins "is confirming a new maxim in Washington-that black
Republicans who practice labor law on the management side are harder to find than hen's
teeth").
2 14 See infra notes 215-16.
215 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 250-51. For a
similar description of the "traditional rules" governing presidential appointments generally, see
G. Calvin Mackenzie, Starting Over: The Presidential Appointment Process in 1997
[hereinafter Mackenzie, Starting Over], available at http://www.tcf.org/task_forces/
nominations/mackenzie/StartingOver.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2000) ("From the beginning
of the Republic an implicit notion, a norm, guided Senate responses to executive branch
appointments: the president was entitled to broad latitude in the selection of his own
subordinates."); id ("[O]n matters of ideology or policy views, even those Senators who
staunchly disagreed with a nominee would ultimately support-or at least not seek to block-
the president's right to choose the members of his administrative team."); see also Deering,
supra note 202, at 116 (stating, in a book chapter published in 1987, that no Senate committee
considers policy views, "except in the extreme, to be grounds for rejection"; "the only
consensual grounds for rejection are those dealing with a nominee's personal integrity').
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smoking gun that would give them a legitimate excuse for voting no.' 2 16 In the
absence of a smoking gun, however, "[t]he White House expects that any
qualified individual it nominates will be confirmed," and "[e]veryone else expects
the same."217
With this set of norms in place, it is relatively easy to see why the Labor
Board nominees from partisan-specifically, management-side-backgrounds
produced in the 1955-79 period were on the order of Guy Farmer and Ed Miller:
moderately or more likely strongly pro-management in their voting, but no more
so than ex-government employees like Frank McCulloch, Gerald Brown, or
Howard Jenkins were pro-union in theirs.218 People like Farmer and Miller, that
is, are the sort of Board members produced under a system in which the "in
group" exercises a measure of self-restraint in generating its short list the
President takes his pick of those listed, and the Senate confirms the President's
choice absent some glaring ethical problem or other smoking gun: a fairly reliable
vote for the side favored by the President but not so knee-jerk or extreme as to
provoke the out group into declaring all-out war against the administration and its
agenda or retaliating on the appointments front when the White House changes
hands.
B. New Norms Emerge: The Late 1970s and Early 1980s
So much for the "old rules." Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
norms governing NLRB appointments clearly began to change. At the selection
phase, more strongly ideological candidates began to be suggested by the
interested parties or selected at the President's initiative. And at the confirmation
216 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 251; see, e.g., 100
CONG. REC. S1984 (1954) (statement of Sen. Griswold) (declaring that the Senate minority
"was opposed to the [Beeson] nomination from the start, but they wanted more time in which to
find out why they were opposed"). In the context of presidential appointments generally, see
MACKENZIE, POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 201, at 177.
A nominee's policy views or his political philosophy have a way of conditioning the
environment in which his nomination is considered. If his views on important policy
issues... do not arouse any significant concern on the part of the committee..., then [it] is
unlikely to be very demanding in its expectations in other areas, like conflict of interest or
formal qualifications. IX on the other hand, a nominee's policy views are a source of concem to
some committee members, they will in all probability be very aggressive in their scrutiny of the
other criteria, looking for additional evidence to use in building a case against the nomination.
Id See, e.g., SHOGAN, supra note 103, at 112 (stating that opponents of 1969 Supreme Court
nominee Clement Haynsworth "seized upon the ethics issue because they doubted they could
defeat the nomination on grounds of philosophy. The view that the president had a
constitutional right to pick a Supreme Court nominee who conformed to his own beliefs still
held sway .... )
217 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 255.
2 18 See supra text accompanying notes 182-83; Table 1, p. 1405, and Figure 1, p. 1406.
2000) 1419
OHIO STATE LA WJOURV.AL
stage, moderate nominees of the sort who had been routinely tapped for service
and easily confirmed under the "old rules" began to encounter serious opposition
in the Senate.
To some degree, these changes were reflective of broader trends in the
presidential appointments process generally. For example, the selection of more
ideological NLRB appointees during the early Reagan years obviously mirrored
the overall trend in appointments during that administration. 219 And as for the
emergence of conflict over NLRB confirmations, it is clear that the norm of
deference that had previously governed presidential appointments across the
board began to break down, at least on a sporadic basis, sometime in the 1970s or
80s-indeed, almost certainly before220 the much-discussed and oft-cited Bork
nomination of 1987,221and perhaps as early as the early 1970s.222
2 19 See supra note 104.
220 Many date the onset to Ronald Reagan's first administration. See, e.g., Mackenzie,
Starting Over, supra note 215. In this work, written in 1998, Professor Mackenzie dates the
"[e]vidence of the weakening of this norn" of deference to the 1980s, citing in particular the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's 1981 rejection of Ernest Lefever's nomination to the
position of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, based principally on Lefever's
opposition to cutting off foreign aid to countries whose governments violate human rights. See
also Dom Bonafede, Presidential Appointees: The Human Dimension, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS,
supra note 102, at 120, 127 [hereinafter Bonafede, Presidential Appointees] (writing in 1987,
Bonafede states that "[r]ecently, the trend within the Senate has been to examine closely the
policy views and the political convictions and intentions of the nominee"); id at 128 (stating
that "ideology and political philosophy have increasingly become the critical points on which
the confirmation process turns'). Bonafede points to "several Reagan appointees [who] failed to
win confirmation because of their conservative policy views" in the early 1980s, Lefever
among them. Id Moreover, early in Reagan's second term, his nomination of William Bradford
Reynolds to the post of Associate Attorney General for Civil Rights was voted down by the
Senate Judiciary Committee, in essence because Reynolds shared the President's highly
conservative views on civil rights issues. Id at 127-28. Of course, Reagan's nominations were
somewhat atypical in that he frequently nominated individuals "whose backgrounds and
philosophy were inimical to their agency's mission." See Bonafede, The White House
Personnel Office, supra note 103, at 50 (giving several examples); see, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 103-04 (discussing Reagan's appointment of Donald Dotson to head the
NLRB).
221 As indicated in the text, there has been a tendency on the part of some-most often
Republicans--to trace the breakdown in the norm of deference to the failed Bork nomination of
1987. See Richard L. Berke & Steven A. Holmes, In Latest Confirmation Delays, a Tougher
G.O.P. Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A18 (National Edition) (quoting the political
director of the American Conservative Union as stating that Republicans learned from Bork's
defeat that 'if they [the Democrats] can go after someone for ideology, not just competence,
we're going to go after that, too'); id (noting that many Republicans claim that their
opposition to some Clinton nominees is retribution for the "rough time" the Democratic-
controlled Senate gave Reagan and Bush appointees such as Bork and John Tower); Kline,
supra note 105, at 326 (noting that Republicans imply that "gridlock" on judicial nominations
during 104th and 105th Congresses [1995-96 and 1997-98] is payback for Democratic
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Nonetheless, the transformation that took place in the NLRB appointments
process in the late 1970s and early 1980s also appears to have some quite specific
roots in developments in the labor arena during that time-and more particularly,
in the pitched battle 223 over proposed labor law reform legislation during the
Carter administration.2 24 After passing the heavily Democratic House by nearly a
hundred votes,225 the Labor Reform Act of 1977 died in the Senate following a
nineteen-day filibuster led by Utah Senator Orrin Hatch.2 26 Labor was extremely
treatment of Reagan and Bush judicial nominees, especially Bork and Clarence Thomas).
Because Bork would have been the fifth vote to overrule Roe v. Wade and the decisive
vote on other hotly contested issues such as affirmative action, see supra note 42, there is a
fairly strong argument to be made that the treatment of his nomination was not necessarily
indicative of a general trend. Indeed, the fact that Antonin Scalia, holder of views very similar
to Bork's on these and other issues, was confimned with no controversy whatsoever just the
year before, see id, suggests as much. Moreover, Supreme Court nominations have always
been treated differently than other presidential nominations. See Kline, supra note 105, at 327;
id at 327 n.258 (noting that the Senate has formally rejected twelve Supreme Court
nominations).
2 22 See MACKENZIE, POLMCS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOuNmENTs, supra note 201, at 179.
In this earlier work, written in 1981, Mackenzie points to a notable increase in the number of
nominations rejected by the Senate after 1972. Mackenzie attributes the Senate's increased
aggressiveness at this time to a large increase in Senate staff, which enabled any individual
senator troubled by a nomination to conduct his own investigation, "sunshine legislation" that
gave the public and the media much greater access to the committee decision-making process,
the growing influence of various interest groups in the appointments process, and the increased
aggressiveness ofjoumalists, who often unearthed negative information about nominees. Id at
181-85.
Mackenzie asserts that as part of this increased aggressiveness, the Senate began at this
time to intensify scrutiny of "predispositional conflicts of interest" -.i.e., issues of bias arising
from a nominee's background. Id at 105. For instance, in 1973 the Senate rejected the
nomination of Robert Morris, a longtime executive with Standard Oil of California, to the
Federal Power Commission based on his background. Id at 107.
2 23 See GRoss, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 239 (noting that the struggle over the
bill was referred to as a "holy war" and that the bill "was among the most heavily lobbied in
history").
224 See infra text accompanying notes 225-27; see also Bitterness of Debate Surrounding
NLRB Threatens Functioning of Agency, Lubbers Says, supra note 58 (reporting General
Counsel William Lubbers's comments tracing the highly partisan atmosphere surrounding
Board appointments to labor's bitterness over the fact that the labor reform bill was defeated
without ever coming to a final vote-i.e., by filibuster). This legislation would have speeded up
the Board's election processes considerably and provided for significantly tougher remedies in
unfair labor practice cases, among other things. See S. 1883, 95th Cong. (1977) (as introduced);
H.R. 8410,95th Cong. (1977) (as passed by House); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26,
at 238.
2 25 See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 238-39 (reporting that bill passed the
House by a vote of 257-163); Unions Hit the Comeback Trail in Congress, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1977, at 112 (same).
226 GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 239.
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bitter over this defeat-and over the failure of the legislation even to be put to a
vote in the Senate--and in the view of Moe and others, it was this bitterness that
caused it to insist upon an appointment to the General Counsel's position that
violated the longstanding appointment norms.227 Although unsuccessful in
blocking that appointment,2 28 the business community and Senate Republicans
retaliated by attempting--this time, with some success-to block other Carter
NLRB nominations229 that would never have been challenged under the "old
rules,' 230 and the whole appointments edifice appeared poised to crumble.
227 See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 264; GROSS,
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 243. The appointment was that of William Lubbers, who
was not only perceived as somewhat of a Wagner Act throwback, but had spent twenty years
on the staff of Board chairman John Fanning. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at
243-44. As the General Counsel is supposed to operate independently of the Board, the
business community was understandably up in arms over the appointment of someone so close
to the chairman. See id at 244; Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24,
at 264; see, e.g., GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 244 (quoting former Board chair
Ed Miller, back in management practice, who decried Lubbers nomination as akin to "'running
the judge's brother for District Attorney"'). Moreover, Lubbers and Fanning had met with top
AFL-CIO officials while the labor reform bill was being drafted and at a minimum provided
them with "technical assistance," and business feared that with Lubbers as General Counsel the
two would work together to implement elements of the defeated bill by administrative means.
See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 244-45; see also Moe, Interests, Institutions
and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 264 (noting that it was "rumor[ed] that Fanning and
Lubbers were dedicated to enacting" at least some portion of the defeated bill administratively).
228 Lubbers was ultimately confirmed following a months-long battle and a filibuster led
by Senator Hatch. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 245; see also Outgoing
General Counsel Discusses "Challenging, Terrific" Experience in Office, 1999 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 223, at C-i (Nov. 19, 1999) (discussing Lubbers appointment).
229 The nominations were those of Don Zimmerman, a political independent and aide to
Senator Jacob Javits on the Senate Labor Committee, and NLRB careerist John Truesdale, who
was being nominated for a second term. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 245-
46; Moe, Interests, Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 265-66.
230 See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 265 (noting that
Zimmerman, who "was well known and liked" as minority counsel to the Senate Labor
Committee and was being aggressively promoted by Senator Javits, was 'Just the type of
candidate that labor and Democratic Presidents traditionally settled upon to fill Republican slots
on the Board"); id (stating that Truesdale was a "moderately liberal Democrat [who] was
highly regarded and well liked by both sides," and that "business allowed in private that under
normal circumstances he would be entirely acceptable"); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
26, at 246 (noting that in "normal times," business most likely would not have tried to block
either Truesdale or Zimmerman).
Zimmerman was finally confirmed following a Republican-led filibuster that required
three cloture votes to end it See GROSS, BROKEN PROMiSE, supra note 26, at 245-46; Moe,
Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 265. The Republicans managed to
block Truesdale's reappointment to a full term, however, by stalling on the nomination until the
Senate had adjourned. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 245-46. By the time the
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The subsequent ascendancy of Ronald Reagan only added fuel to the fire, of
course, for Reagan was hardly interested in abiding by the "rules" of the
Washington establishment-as to Labor Board appointments or anything else.2 31
Thus, in his initial round of NLRB appointments Reagan simply ignored the usual
list-generating insiders,232 preferring hard-right ideologically-driven nominees
such as Donald Dotson233 to the sort of well-connected, professionally-oriented
management lawyers or moderately conservative government employees
typically put forth by the Republican in-crowd.2 34
Second-round nominations, however, tend to be of a different character than
those made at the beginning of a presidential administration,2 35 and Reagan was
no exception here. During the second half of the Reagan presidency, the selection
phase of the process began to return to normal. During his second term,236
Senate went back into session, Ronald Reagan had assumed the presidency, and chose not to
reappoint Truesdale. See id
23 1 See Moe, Interests, Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 268 (stating that
"the Reagan White House was interested in destroying established traditions, not in following
them").
232 See id at 267 (reporting that the business community followed the usual practice of
submitting a list of possible Board nominees, only to find its suggestions completely ignored-
the White House had become a "black hole" into which "[n]ames came in, but... never came
out again").
233 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (describing Dotson); see also supra text
accompanying notes 105-09 (describing early Reagan appointee Robert Hunter). These highly
ideological NLRB appointments were of a piece, of course, with Reagan's overall emphasis in
his first-term appointments on ideological purity and loyalty. See supra note 104.
2 34 See supra text accompanying note 211 (describing the type of candidates that the
business community and Republicans look for under the "traditional" rules).
2 35 See MACKENZIE, POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 201, at 7
(noting the importance of distinguishing between "in-term" nominations and those made at the
beginning of an administration).
2 36 
"Second-round" nominations of course include those made in a President's second
term as well as those made in the middle of, as opposed to at the outset of, a President's first
term. In Reagan's case, one cannot draw a distinction between "second-round" and second-
term NLRB nominations; following his initial round of appointments, completed with the
selection of Donald Dotson and Patricia Diaz Dennis, see supra text accompanying notes 101-
20, he did not have the opportunity to make further appointments to the Board until his second
term in office.
In any event, it appears that the type of changes that are likely to occur in a President's
second-term appointments are in the same direction as those that tend to occur in in-term as
opposed to "outset of the administration" appointments. Compare MACKENZIE, PoLmos OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 201, at 8 (noting that factors such as the need to pay
off electoral debts and symbolic considerations fade in importance once the initial round of
appointments is completed), with Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note
24, at 248 (stating that "although there are still promises to be kept, [electoral concerns, i.e.,
those relating to desire to retain office] declinel- in [the President's] second term," during which
govemance concerns predominate).
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President Reagan continued to circumvent the traditional channels in making
some of his appointments to the NLRB.2 37 At the same time, however, he
avoided the sort of highly ideological appointments that had been the hallmark of
his first term in office.2 38 Moreover, a number of his later nominations not only
conformed to the norm of "professionalism" traditionally at work in this area 2 39
but involved the selection of precisely the sort of insiders, including government
"bureaucrats,"240 that the firebrands in charge of "Reagan r' nominations
appeared so scoMful of.2 41
At the confirmation phase, however, Reagan's second term saw the re-
emergence of trouble clouds on the horizon.2 42 In an example of the pronounced
237 For instance, management lawyers Marshall Babson and Mary Miller Cracraf
appointed in 1985 and 1986 respectively, were both young and essentially unknown to the
larger labor-management community. See supra text accompanying notes 130-131 (describing
their respective backgrounds); see also White House Names Johansen and Babson to Fill Two
Vacancies at Labor Boarag supra note 130 (quoting an AFL spokesperson as stating with
regard to Babson, '"we know nothing of [him] except he is ajunior management attorney").
23 8 Reagan's second-term NLRB appointees were Wilford Johansen, Marshall Babson,
James Stephens, Mary Miller Cracraft, Dennis Devaney and John Higgins (who served only a
recess appointment due to his confirmation being blocked). See FIRST SIXTY YEARS, supra note
27, at 56; infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (regarding Higgins). Not one of these can
be characterized as an ideologue.
23 9 See Moe, Interests, Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 257 (noting that
traditionally, Board appointees are first and foremost labor relations attorneys, not ideologues or
politicians, and that their approach to policy-making is structured by the standards and norms of
their professional community); id at 271 (stating that the appointments process is "oriented
around professionalism"); see also id at 269-70 (describing further the norm of
"professionalism"); JAMES Q. WSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOvERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY DO IT 60 (1989) (defining "professional" in similar manner).
240 For instance, during his second term Reagan nominated two career Board employees,
Wilford Johansen and John Higgins, as well as Dennis Devaney, who had been General
Counsel to the Federal Labor Relations Authority and a former member of the Merit Systems
Protection Board. See FLRA General Counsel Devaney Tapped for Fifih Seat at NLRB, 1988
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 200, at A-7 (Oct. 17, 1988); infra notes 243-44 and accompanying
text (discussing Higgins); supra note 130 (discussing Johansen).
241 Of course, once "Reagan Board I" had in essence turned NLRB law upside down,
Reagan needed only to appoint "conservative in the true sense," status quo-type individuals to
keep the law in a very conservative state. See GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 271
(noting that although "Reagan Board II" was perceived as middle of the road, it neither reversed
nor seriously modified most of Dotson Board's major decisions); Douglas E. Ray, The
1986-87 Labor Board: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 29 B.C. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1987) (stating
that the new Board has tempered its position somewhat, but still relies on precedent created by
original Reagan Board). In this sense, the appointment of career government employees, who
are likely to exhibit a marked respect for institutional values such as maintaining stability in the
law, may have served Reagan's purpose very well.
242 That is, a re-emergence of the phenomenon that had first surfaced during the late
Carter years, in which well-qualified nominees who would have been easily confirmed under
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swing toward moderation that characterized his second round of appointments, in
1988 Reagan nominated NLRB careerist John Higgins to replace the ultra-
conservative and highly ideological Donald Dotson. 243 Although Higgins was
precisely the sort of well-known, well-respected moderate that Presidents from
both parties had been appointing to the Board for years--or even decades-under
the traditional rules,244 his nomination was blocked by the one-note and highly
the "old rules" encountered serious opposition, or even defeat, in the Senate. See supra notes
229-30 and accompanying text (discussing the battle over Carter nominees John Truesdale and
Don Zimmerman). During President Reagan's first term, there were protracted confirmation
battles over two of his appointments, those of John Van de Water to the Board and Rosemary
Collyer to the General Counsel's position, and the Van de Water nomination was ultimately
defeated. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (Van de Water); supra notes 132-35
and accompanying text (Collyer). However, as discussed earlier, neither Van de Water nor
ColIyer met the traditional criteria for high Board office--Van de Water because of his
extensive involvement in anti-union campaigns, and Collyer because of her lack of experience.
See supra notes 101, 110-12 and 135 and accompanying text. Thus, I do not view the serious
opposition that those nominations encountered as symptomatic of a larger breakdown in the
norm of deference to the President. Moreover, other first-term Reagan nominees who might
legitimately have attracted at least some opposition even under the "old rules" were easily
confirmed. See supra text accompanying notes 102-09 and 118-22 (discussing background and
nominations of Donald Dotson and Robert Hunter). Thus, I do not believe that real trouble
signs at the confirmation phase appeared until the second Reagan administration.
2 43 See President Names Higgins to Fill Vacancy at Boara 1988 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 28, at A-13 (Feb. 11, 1988) (describing Higgins's career); White House Seeks Candidate to
Fill Vacancy at Labor Boara 1987 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at A-7 (Dec. 7, 1987)
(making clear that the slot to which Higgins was subsequently named was that formerly
occupied by Dotson); see also supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (discussing
Dotson); supra note 191 (same).
In addition to nominating the moderate Higgins to replace the right-wing ideologue
Dotson, in filling the other Republican seat, President Reagan chose the moderate James
Stephens to replace the extremely conservative Robert Hunter. Compare supra text
accompanying notes 105-09 (describing Hunter) and supra notes 122-25 and accompanying
text (describing the AFL's bitter complaints about the Hunter appointment), with AFL-CIO
Legislative Chief Denison Says Labor Wave of Issues on Capitol Hill, 1985 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 198, at C-I (Oct. 11, 1985) (indicating that the AFL-CIO took a neutral position on
the Stephens appointment). Moreover, he subsequently named Stephens to replace Dotson as
Board chair. White House Names Member Stephens to Succeed Dotson as Board Chairman,
1988 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at A-8 (Jan. 8, 1988). As to the trend marked by Higgins's
nomination and Stephens's elevation to the chairmanship, see President Names Higgins to Fill
Vacancy at Boar4 supra (reporting comment of an AFL spokesperson that Higgins's
nomination and Stephens's promotion to Board chair "'bode[s] for a brighter future"' for labor
at the Board).
244 See, e.g., Senate Labor Committee Expected to Consider Higgins' Nomination Before
the End of April, supra note 165 (reporting former General Counsel John Irving's praise of
Higgins as .'experienced, knowledgeable, and... the kind of person from whom no one can
expect favors'); White House Selects John E. Higgins to Fill NLRB Vacancy As Recess
Appointee, supra note 149, at A-10 (stating that Higgins started with the agency in 1964, was
Deputy General Counsel from 1976-88, and is "well-known to labor relations attorneys").
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aggressive National Right to Work Committee,2 45 with help from its senatorial
allies such as North Carolina's Jesse Helms.246
The Bush years marked a continuation of the pattern that emerged in the
latter half of the Reagan administration: a return to "normalization" of the
selection process accompanied by continued destabilization at the confirmation
stage. For example, in a return to a Board tradition that had fallen into neglect
under Reagan, President Bush reappointed (or attempted to reappoint) a number
of the "holdover" Reagan Board members.2 47 Two of these would-be
reappointments, however, one of a moderate Democrat and the other of a
moderate Republican, were blocked-both at the behest of the National Right to
Work Committee. 48 What we got a glimpse of at the tail end of the Reagan
245 Senate Labor Committee Expected to Consider Higgins' Nomination Before the End
ofApril, supra note 165 (reporting that the only opposition to Higgins's nomination is from the
National Right to Work Committee, but that the Committee is aiming an intensive effort at
members of the Senate Labor Committee); White House Selects John E. Higgins to Fill NLRB
Vacancy As Recess Appointee, supra note 149, at A-10 (noting that Higgins had served as
recess appointee in 1988, but that opposition of the National Right to Work Committee had
blocked a vote on his confirmation to a full term). The Right to Work Committee had also dealt
the decisive blow to the earlier nomination of John Van de Water. GRoss, BROKEN PROMfISE,
supra note 26, at 250; supra note 116.
246 See Right-Wing Opposition Clouds Prospect for Confirmation of Higgins to NLRB
Seat, 1988 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 115, at A-10 (June 15, 1988) (stating that Helms had
placed a hold on the nomination, which was opposed by the National Right to Work
Committee). Also aiding in the effort was South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond. Id.
2 47 Dennis Devaney and James Stephens were successfully reappointed. President Taps
Raudabaughfor NLRB Seat; Chairman Stephens Nominatedfor Second Term, supra note 138;
White House Announces Reappointment of Devaney to Five-Year Term at NLRB, 1989 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at A-9 (Oct. 2, 1989). The unsuccessful attempts are discussed infra
note 248 and accompanying text.
2 48 The Democrat was Mary Miller Cracraft, and the Republican was John Higgins.
President Bush formally nominated Cracraft for a second term, but a vote on the nomination
was blocked by a senatorial "hold" placed on the nomination in response to pressure from the
Right to Work Comnmittee. See White House Will Not Renominate Cracraftfor Second Term on
NLRB, Washington Insider (BNA), Nov. 21, 1991, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. President
Bush then elected not to resubmit the nomination following the Senate's return from its recess,
due to the Committee's opposition. Id
Higgins, for his part, had received a recess appointment from President Reagan after the
Right to Work Committee had blocked Reagan's attempt to appoint Higgins to the Board. See
supra note 245. Although President Bush never formally submitted Higgins's name to the
Senate, it appears that he had hoped to reappoint Higgins, and ultimately chose not to do so
only because of the adamant opposition of the Right to Work Committee and Senator Helms.
See Bush Administration Gathers Prospects for Post of Labor Board General Counsel, supra
note 58, at A-10 (stating that the National Right to Work Committee had made the selection of
a new General Counsel and the removal from the Board of Higgins, who was currently serving
as recess appointee, its "litmus test for the new Bush administration"); Bush Administration
Expected to Name Diane Burldey to Seat on Labor Board, supra note 142 (stating that the "key
unanswered question" was whether the administration would bend to Senator Helms and drop
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administration, and more than a glimpse of during the Bush years, then, was a
shift in the balance of power over the appointments process-a shift in the
direction of greater senatorial control over the process at the expense of the
President. Under the traditional rules, the President was viewed as having the
right to shape the NLRB as he wished, and thus to have his nominees confirmed
by the Senate as long as they were not clearly unqualified. 249 The late 1980s and
early 1990s, in contrast, witnessed the willingness of some members of the
Senate, acting in response to intense interest-group lobbying,2 50 to block
nominees who easily met the traditional criteria for membership on the NLRB-
and their colleagues' willingness to go along with such maneuvers. 251
During the Clinton years, the Senate has arrogated even further power to
itself. As it did during the Bush and second Reagan administrations, at the
confirmation stage it has denied the President his traditional prerogative of
staffing the Board with any reasonably well-qualified individuals of his choosing.
It has done this in either of two ways: by simply refusing to act on nominations
that would have been routinely confirmed under the "old rules,"252 or by making
Higgins from the Board); supra note 145 (reporting the subsequent approval of a package of
Bush nominees which did not include Higgins).
24 9 See supra text accompanying notes 214-17.
250 In particular, that of the National Right to Work Committee. See supra notes 243-48
and accompanying text.
251 See infra text accompanying notes 293-95 (discussing the mechanisms by which
individual senators cede some measure of influence over a large number of issues in return for
an extraordinarily large measure of influence over those issues of greatest electoral concern to
themselves).252 For instance, at the outset of the Clinton administration, the Senate simply refused, for
nine months, to schedule a vote on the nomination of Stanford law professor William Gould, a
well-known and well-regarded figure in the labor law world. Gottesman & Seidl, supra note 46,
at 750 (noting that nomination was stalled for nine months); Steven Greenhouse, Parting Shots
by Labor Board Chief, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A22 (referring to Gould as "one of the
nation's foremost authorities on labor law"); Flynn, supra note 91, at 481-83 (describing
Gould's extremely impressive credentials). While Gould was ultimately confirmed, matters
certainly did not improve with time; when President Clinton nominated John Truesdale, the
consummate NLRB careerist; to replace Gould, the Senate Labor Committee took no action on
the nomination for over a year. See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text. Truesdale, who
would have been eminently confirmable under the "old rules," had also, ironically enough, been
caught in the crossfire and blocked by the Senate during the tumultuous final months of the
Carter administration. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Senate refused to act on two separate nominations, first Laurence Cohen and
then Leonard Page, to the General Counsel's position. See supra notes 152-54. While Cohen
and Page are both union attorneys, and the appointment of a union-side lawyer to the General
Counsel's position was historically unprecedented, a number of management-side attorneys had
served as General Counsel under Republican administrations. See supra note 154 (Rosemary
Collyer and Jerry Hunter); supra text accompanying notes 57-58 (Theophil Kammholz); supra
note 96 (Pete Nash); supra note 66 (Jerome Fenton). Hence, I think that either of these
appointments would have passed muster under the "old rules.' Cohen, in particular, is
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it clear even before such nominations were made that the nominee was
"unconfirmable," 253 thus forcing the President to begin his search anew.2 54
Even more significantly, however, during the past several years the Senate-
or rather, certain Senate power brokers and the interest groups with whom they
are allied-has begun to take significant control over the selection phase of the
process as well. When the traditional rules held sway, groups such as the AFL-
CIO and the Chamber of Commerce indeed played a significant role at that stage,
extremely well-known and well-regarded in the labor-management community. See Tallent,
Cohen Possible Nominees for Upcoming Vacancies at Labor Board 1995 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 159, at A-8 (Aug. 17, 1995) (commenting on the proposed packaged appointments
of Cohen and management attorney Stephen Tallent to the Board, high-profile management
attorney and former Nixon General Counsel John Irving "praised both as experienced
practitioners of the highest integrity who are highly regarded by their colleagues," and stated, in
reference to Cohen's union-side background, that as a Board member Cohen "would be
'capable of rising above his instincts'); see also Clinton Nominates Union Attorney, supra note
152 (noting Irving's statement that he has 'the very highest regard for [Cohen]').
253 See, e.g., Senate and White House Continue Talks on Filling Vacancies at Labor
Boara 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at AA-1 (Jan. 7, 1994) (reporting that the White
House had submitted names to Senate Republicans to fill the remaining vacancy on the Board,
but the Republicans "ha[d] rejected the White House candidates and insisted instead" on the
appointment of their candidate, Eastman Kodak's Mary Harrington, who was "'the unanimous
choice of the business community"'); infra note 318 and accompanying text (discussing how
various names were floated by the White House but rejected by Senate Republicans in 1993-94
as administration sought to break the logjam over Gould); Sen. Kassebaum: A Moderate
Reformer Charts New Course for Labor Committee, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at C-
1, C-2 (Jan. 10, 1995) (quoting the chair of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
as stating that it will be 'very rough sledding to get confirmation"' if the administration follows
through on its plans to nominate Kennedy aide Sarah Fox to the Board); White House Gives
Sarah Fox Recess Appointment to Labor Boarg supra note 151 (reporting that Clinton gave
Fox a recess appointment in order to "[c]ircumvent[ ] a possible bitter confirmation fight");
White House Seeks Republican Input on Plans to Fill Four Vacancies at NLRB, supra note 165
(reporting that proposed plan called for the appointment, inter alig of NLRB careerist John
Higgins to the Republican seat, but that former Bush-appointed General Counsel Jerry Hunter
emphasized that any nominee must meet with the Republicans' approval and questioned
whether a careerist as opposed to a management attorney would be acceptable to them); Senate
Confirms Sarah Fox, Robert Brame, Peter Hurtgen, Wilma Liebman, as NLRB Members,
NLRB Press Release R-2265, at 1 (Nov. 10, 1997) (indicating that the deal finally concluded
provided for management attorneys in both Republican seats and that Higgins, who had been
serving as recess appointee, had stepped down); see also Acting NLRB General Counsel
Feinstein Withdraws His Name From Consideratio, supra note 152 (reporting that Senate
Labor Committee chair James Jeffords had "told the White House he did not think [General
Counsel Fred] Feinstein could be confirmed" to a second term, and that Feinstein subsequently
withdrew his name from consideration, citing Senate opposition to his appointment).
254 Both of these mechanisms were at work in the second Reagan administration and the
Bush administration as well. See supra note 248 (stating that Reagan's nomination of John
Higgins and Bush's attempted renomination of Mary Miller Cracraft were blocked by
senatorial holds, and that President Bush had then elected not to resubmit the Cracraft
nomination and not to nominate Higgins due to the heated opposition to those nominations).
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either by generating a short list of potential nominees when they were the "in
group," or, when they were not, through the potential exercise of a limited veto
power over the other side's candidates.255 At the same time, however, both sides
were strongly influenced by the President's typical preference for a moderate
nominee in generating their short list, and the President's right to choose freely
from among the names ultimately put forward was completely unquestioned.256
All that has now changed, however. Throughout the Clinton presidency, the
Senate has not only frequently blocked the President's nominees or would-be
nominees2 57 but has insisted that the President acquiesce to certain of its
choices-or more specifically, those of key Senate Republicans-as the price of
getting any of his Board nominees confirmed.258 The mechanism that it has used
to enforce this "bargain" is an insistence on "packaged" nominations.
Up until the mid-1980s, each NLRB nominee had been given individual
consideration by the Senate Labor Committee and by the Senate as a whole. That
is, even when the President made more than one Board appointment at a
particular time, the nominees typically received individualized hearings before the
committee, and the nominations were voted on separately both in committee and
on the Senate floor.259 This practice began to fall by the wayside in the mid-260 to
255 See supra text accompanying note 207.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 208-17.
257 See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
258 SeeWhite House Appointment of Cohen to NLRB is Expected to Bring Board to Full
Strength, supra note 148 (noting that the nominations of William Gould and Margaret
Browning to the Board and Fred Feinstein to the General Counsel's position had "languished
for several months in the Senate" due to opposition to Gould and the Republican's insistence on
an "acceptable candidate" for the GOP seat on the Board); infra notes 329-30 and
accompanying text (indicating that the appointment of Charles Cohen eventually broke the
logjam); infra notes 261-66 and accompanying text (discussing the practice of "packaging"
nominations).
259 See, e.g., Denham/MurdocklGray Hearings, supra note 26 (indicating that Robert
Denham, nominated as General Counsel, and Abe Murdock and Copeland Gray, both
nominated to the Board, appeared separately before the Senate Labor Committee to make
statements and answer questions); GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 26, at 24 (indicating
that separate committee votes were taken on each of these three nominees); Walther/lIrving
Hearings, supra note 96, at 10-21 (indicating that Walther and Irving appeared separately to
give statements and answer questions).
260 The nominations marking the transition from individualized treatment to "packaging"
were those of Wilford Johansen and Marshall Babson in 1985. While each man submitted a
brief statement to the Senate Labor Committee, see Babson and Johansen Statements, supra
note 130, they appeared jointly before the committee, and the nominations were voted on
together rather than separately. Marshall B. Babson, of Connecticut, and Wilford W. Johansen,
of California; to be Members of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearing before the
Senate Comm on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 9-14 (1986) [hereinafter
Babson/Johansen Hearings] (indicating joint appearance before committee); 131 CONG. REC.
S13578 (May 23, 1985) (indicating that nominations were confirmed together in voice vote);
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late 1980S, 261 however, and by the time of the Clinton administration, the practice
of packaging nominations had become completely routine. Recess appointments
aside,2 62 with a single exception 263 President Clinton's appointments to the Board
have consisted entirely of two separate package deals: an initial round of
appointments in 1993-94264 and a second round in 1997.265 The packaging of
see also Senate Labor Committee Clears Nominations of Johansen and Babson to Vacant
NLRB Seats, supra note 136 (reporting approval of nominations by telephone poll of
committee).
261 In 1989, the nominations of three Board members and the General Counsel were
treated as a package. All four nominations were approved by a joint voice vote (and without
hearings) in committee. Senate Labor Panel Clears NLRB Nominees, DOL Nominees,
Approves Increased Pension and OSHA Penalties, supra note 138 (reporting that the
nominations of Dennis Devaney, Clifford Oviatt and Donald Rodgers to Board seats and Jerry
Hunter to the General Counsel's position were approved by ajoint voice vote, and that Senator
Kennedy had acknowledged that this "en bloc process" was a departure from the past practice
of holding individualized hearings). After allegations of impropriety on the part of one of the
Board nominees arose, see supra text accompanying note 146, the nomination to the General
Counsel's position-a solo position which must be filled if the agency is to function-went
forward separately and was approved by the Senate. See 135 CONG. REC. S31740 (Nov. 21,
1989) (reporting Senate's approval of the nomination of Jerry Hunter as General Counsel); see
also Cohen Withdraws from Consideration for General Counsel, Citing GOP Opposition, 1999
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at A-9 (Jan. 19, 1999) (noting that the Board cannot function
without a General Counsel, who oversees the thirty-three regional offices). A substitution was
made in the original package, and the three Board nominations were then confirmed by the
Senate. President Taps Raudabaughfor NLRB Seat; Chairman Stephens Nominatedfor Second
Term, supra note 138 (indicating that John Raudabaugh replaced Donald Rodgers in the
package); Senate Approves Nominees to NLRB, NMB, Inspector General at Labor, supra note
142 (reporting Senate's approval of the nominations of Oviatt, Devaney, and John Raudabaugh
to the NLRB); 136 CONG. REc. S22950 (Aug. 3, 1990) (indicating that the three nominations
were confirmed on the same day).
262 There were many such appointments during the Clinton years. Administration Faces
Possibility of Four Vacancies, No Quorum at NLRB, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at
A-8 (Oct. 20, 1997) (noting that Clinton had had to make a number of recess appointments
simply to keep the agency functioning). Rather remarkably, career Board employee John
Truesdale received three separate recess appointments during the Clinton years. Clinton Intends
to Nominate Truesdale to Fill Seat Left Open by Gould's Departure, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 199, at A-5 (Oct. 15, 1998) (stating that Truesdale had served from January 1994
through March 1994 and from December 1994 through January 1996 as recess appointee);
Clinton Names Truesdale NLRB Chairman to Succeed Gould in Recess Appointment, 1998
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 234, at A-9 (Dec. 7, 1998) (reporting Truesdale's third recess
appointment).
263 That exception was the eleventh-hour confirmation of John Truesdale in December
1999, after Truesdale's nomination had been languishing in the Labor Committee for over a
year. See infra text accompanying notes 319-20 (discussing Tmesdale's nomination, the
committee's failure to act, and Truesdale's eventual confirmation).
264 See Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen and Browning
Also Approve 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at AA-1 (Mar. 3, 1994) (reporting that,
after Republicans had insisted that the vacancies be treated as a package, the Senate had
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confirmed Stanford law professor William Gould by a 58-38 vote, and then confirmed the
nominations of Margaret Browning and Charles Cohen to the Board and Fred Feinstein as
General Counsel by a unanimous voice vote).
During his first year in office, President Clinton had an unprecedented opportunity to
reshape the NLRB; three of the five Board seats, plus the General Counsel's position, needed to
be filled. Vacancies on NLRB Will Allow Clinton to Create 'More Activist' Boarg Devaney
Says, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-16 (Jan. 25, 1993). The President began by
making a single appointment-that of Stanford law professor William Gould to the Board.
White House Names Professor Gould of Stanford University to Labor Board 1993 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 123, at A-4 (June 29, 1993). The Senate, however-or at least its forty-four
Republicans-refused to move on Gould's nomination until the complete lineup had been
revealed and agreed upon, and the President ultimately acquiesced in order to avoid a filibuster.
Gould Nomination Reaches Senate Roaablock Labor Board Set to Lose Quorum of Three
Members, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 224, at A-10 (Nov. 23, 1993) (reporting that the
Gould nomination was stalled in the Senate as the Republicans had refused to act until "the
White House disclose[d] its complete package of nominees," including a Republican to the fifth
seat); Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen and Browning Also
Approveg supra (recounting this "wrangling" over the Gould nomination and indicating that
there were forty-four Republicans in the Senate at this point); White House Seeks to Avert
Senate Shoivdown; Circulates Namesfor NLRB Republican Seat, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 226, at A-6, A-7 (Nov. 26, 1993) (describing how the White House had originally resisted
treating the nominations as a package and had told the Republicans that it would confer
regarding the appointment to the fifth seat only after the Senate had voted on Gould, but had
later abandoned this position in order to avoid risking a filibuster on Gould's nomination); see
also supra note 253 (discussing further the attempts to put together a package that would be
acceptable to the Republicans).
265 Senate Confirms Four Clinton Nominees Giving Labor Board Five-Member
Complement, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 218, at A-1 (Nov. 12, 1997) (reporting
confirmation of Peter Hurtgen, J. Robert Brame, Wilma Liebman, and Sarah Fox by voice vote
in the Senate); Senate Confirms Sarah Fox, Robert Brame, Peter Hurtgen, Wilma Liebman, as
NLRB Members, supra note 253; see also infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
After the Senate Republicans had successfully forced President Clinton into a package
deal once, see supra note 264, it came to be assumed on all sides that the President could not get
any Democratic nominee through without pairing his selection with a Republican-approved-
or even Republican-selected--counterweight. See NLRB Member Devaney Cites Philosophical
Split, supra note 164 (reporting outgoing Democratic Board Member Dennis Devaney's
suggestion that in order to "get [the] Republicans to go along" with its choice to fill his seat, the
administration might package this appointment with the reappointment of Republican Member
James Stephens, whose term was set to expire in the upcoming year); NLRB Faces Increased
Scrutiny in Wake of GOP Takeover, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at S-35, S-37
(Jan. 30, 1995) (reporting Senator Kassebaum's suggestion that the appointment of a "good
Republican" to the seat held by Stephens would be necessary to achieve any movement on the
expected nomination of Democrat Sarah Fox, a long-time aide to Senator Edward Kennedy, to
the Democratic seat vacated by Devaney--i.e., that the nomination of a Democrat and a "good
Republican" should be "twinned").
A group of well-connected labor attorneys subsequently coalesced around a package deal
involving the pairing of two well-known labor lawyers, one from each side of the fence (or
table). Tallent, Cohen Possible Nominees for Upcoming Vacancies at Labor Board, supra note
252 (reporting that a group of prominent lawyers, including former General Counsel John
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these appointments, it bears emphasizing, was hardly a matter of the President's
choice, but rather was forced upon him by the Senate266 as a means of expanding
and consolidating its power over NLRB appointments.
The NLRB, of course, does not exist in a political vacuum, and much of what
has taken place in the realm of Labor Board appointments during the Clinton
years tracks developments in the appointments process generally. The
phenomenon of the Senate refusing to grant the President the traditional
presumption in favor of his nominees, for instance, has hardly been confined to
the labor arena.2 67 To the contrary, during the past few years significant
controversy has emerged over nominations that would have been routinely
approved in earlier times268-the nominations of Bill Lann Lee to the position of
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights269 and William Weld to that of
Irving, were pushing for the appointment of management lawyer Stephen Tallent to the
Republican seat and union lawyer Laurence Cohen to the Democratic seat). No deal on those
two seats was ever struck, however, and the Board limped along on recess appointments until
late 1997, by which time four seats rather than two were open. See Administration Faces
Possibility of Four Vacancies, No Quorum, at NLRB, supra note 262. At that point the deal
between Senators Lott and Kennedy described infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text was
struck.
The President also found it essentially impossible to get a General Counsel confirmed once
the term of Fred Feinstein, who had taken office as part of a package deal, expired. See supra
note 264 (discussing the package deal consisting of Feinstein and three Board nominees); supra
notes 152-54 and accompanying text (describing the President's unsuccessful attempts to get
General Counsel nominees confirmed); NLRB Heads Into 2000 With Improved Budget, Full
Boar New General Counsel, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at S-5 (Jan. 10, 2000)
(suggesting that Senate Republicans, who hope to regain the White House in the upcoming
election, simply will not confirm a Democratic General Counsel to a full term at this point).
2 66 See supra notes 264-65 (describing the origin and evolution of the two "package
deals" under Clinton).
267 See Berke & Holmes, supra note 221 (stating that the Senate Republicans were even
less inclined in late 1997 than early in the Clinton presidency to recognize the presumption in
favor of the President's nominees); James Bennet 225 Clinton Nominees Wait, and Some Will
Wait Forever, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1998, at A18 (reporting that 225 Clinton nominees still
awaited confirmation as the Senate prepared to adjourn in October 1998, as policy fights and
ideology had stalled the nominations).
26 8 See, e.g., Berke & Holmes, supra note 221 (citing as examples the disputes over the
confirmation of Bill Lann Lee to the top civil rights position and that of David Satcher to the
Surgeon General's position); see also Eric Schmitt, Nomination for FD.A. Post Nears
Approval in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at A20 (reporting that conservative senators
had held up the nomination of Dr. Jane Henney to hiead the Food and Drug Administration
"[d]espite [her] seemingly unblemished record," citing their concern that she might assume
advocacy positions on issues such as abortion and tobacco).
269 Berke & Holmes, supra note 221 (reporting that Lee appeared to be "the ideal
candidate: a well qualified, level-headed litigator, not a legal theorist," but that his nomination
had run aground after the conservative Institute for Justice launched a campaign against him).
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Ambassador to Mexico270 being two prime examples-and a large number of
President Clinton's judicial nominees have been blocked by Senate
Republicans.271 Moreover, as with NLRB nominations, these appointments have
not been formally voted down either in committee or by the full Senate, but have
simply not seen the light of day due to committee inaction2 72 or senatorial
holds.273
The Lee nomination is particularly illustrative of the overall change in
norms. 274 Lee is a career civil rights attomey275 whose nomination was endorsed
270 President Clinton's nomination of Weld was blocked by Jesse Helms, chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Katharine Q. Seelye, With Iron Gavel, Helms Rejects
Vote on Weld N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1997, at 1. Helms objected to Weld's "lax approach"
towards drug policy. Katharine Q. Seelye, Weld Ends Fight Over Nomination by Withdrawing
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1997, at 1. Helms refused to hold a hearing on the nomination, and
Governor Weld subsequently withdrew his name from consideration after a five-month
stalemate. Id
271 See Kline, supra note 105, at 247-55 (documenting this phenomenon in great detail);
Neil A. Lewis, Hatch Defends Senate Action on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1998, at Al
(reporting that the struggle between President Clinton and the Republican-controlled Senate
over the appointment of federal judges had left many vacancies, prompting Chief Justice
Rehnquist to criticize the Senate for its slow pace of confirmations and to comment that "delays
were eroding the quality ofjustice"); John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils Judicial System,
Rehnquist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al (reporting that Chief Justice Rehnquist had
noted that the Senate had confirmed only 17judges in 1996 and 36 in 1997, as compared to 101
in 1994); id (reporting statement of Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont that of
seventy-eight judicial nominees presented to the 105th Congress as of the end of 1997, the
Senate had confirmed only thirty-six nominations, and had left eight nominations pending on
the Senate floor and thirty-four nominations pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee). See,
e.g., Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1999, at Al (reporting that Senator Helms has blocked President Clinton's choices for two seats
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). But see Lewis, Hatch Defends
Senate Action on Judgeships, supra (noting that of seventy-eight vacancies as of December 1,
1997, no nomination had been made in thirty-seven cases).
272 See Kline, supra note 105, at 250-51 (discussing judicial nominations); supra note
270 (discussing Weld nomination); infra notes 274-79 and accompanying text (discussing Lee
nomination); see also Dan Carney, Indicting the Courts: Congress' Feud with Judges, C.Q.
WEEKLY, June 20, 1998, at 1660, 1665 (noting that Senate Republicans' main strategy visa vis
judicial nominations has been to prevent them from even coming up for a floor vote and that
"[i]f and when nominations do reach the floor ... they usually pass with relative ease").
273 See, e.g., Kline, supra note 105, at 307-14 (discussing holds placed on numerous
judicial nominations); supra notes 246 and 248 (discussing holds placed on NLRB
nominations). The use of holds to block NLRB nominations is discussed further infra at text
accompanying notes 308-17.
274 See infra text accompanying notes 275-79. But see infra note 279 (discussing the
Republicans' contention that their blocking of the Lee nomination was no different than
Democrats' treatment of certain Justice Department nominations during the Reagan
administration).
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by five former heads of the Civil Rights Division, including two Republicans,276
and whose views fall well within the Democratic mainstream. Nonetheless, the
Republican-led Judiciary Committee refused either to vote on the nomination or
to forward it to the full Senate2 77 largely, it appeared, for the simple reason that
275 Lee worked for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF Fund) in New
York from 1974 to 1982, was supervising attorney for civil rights litigation at the Center for
Law in the Public Interest in Los Angeles from 1983-88, and from 1989 until the time of his
nomination was the LDF Fund's Western Regional Counsel. President Clinton Appoints Lee as
Acting Head of Civil Rights, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at A-3, A-4 (Dec. 16,
1997).
276 Senate Panel to Vote on Lee Nomination, but Opponents Likely to Win Committee
Vote, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 219, at A-6, A-7 (Nov. 13, 1997). President Bush's
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights described Lee as 'superbly qualified' for the
position. Id
277 John M. Broder, 'Problems' Vowed on Rights Appointment, N.Y. TWEs, Dec. 13,
1997, at A9 (reporting that the Senate Judiciary Committee led by Senator Hatch declined
either to take a formal vote on Lee's nomination or to send it to the Senate floor for a vote by
the full Senate). The President first threatened to give Lee a recess appointment prompting
Senator Hatch to wam that the President would face .'all kinds of problems' if he made such
an appointment Id Instead, Clinton then named Lee "Acting" Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Civil Rights Division. President Clinton Appoints Lee as Acting Head of Civil
Rights, supra note 275, at A-3. Subsequently, he twice resubmitted Lee's nomination to the
Senate. White House Resubmits Lee, Igasaki Nominations to Senate, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at A-11 (Feb. 2, 1998) (reporting resubmission of nomination); 145 CONG. REC.
S2379 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1999) (same). Thus far, the Senate has taken no action on Lee, and he
remains in place in an "acting" capacity. See Nichole M. Christian, Domino's Reaches Deal on
Accusations ofBias, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,2000, at A28 (indicating that Lee continues to serve in
acting capacity).
The President's grant of an "acting" appointment to Lee of course parallels his designation
of Fred Feinstein as Acting General Counsel after it became apparent that Feinstein was
unlikely to gain Senate confirmation to a second term. See supra note 152. The legality of both
these "acting" appointments has been challenged. See Steven J. Duffield and James C. Ho, The
Illegal Appointment of Bill Lann Lee, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 335, 338 (1998) (concluding that
the designation of Lee as "Acting" Assistant Attorney General violates the Vacancies Act);
Employers Ask Reno to Seek Court Writ, Question Validity of Feinstein Appointment, 1998
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 178, at A-12 (Sept. 15, 1998) (reporting that two employers with
ULP charges pending against them asked Attorney General to file a quo waranto suit alleging
that Feinstein was unlawfully holding a federal public office). Indeed, the Congressional
Research Service concluded that Lee's "acting" appointment violated the Vacancies Act, a
statute that is intended to prevent Presidents from circumventing the confirmation process.
Clinton Justice Appointment Was Violation, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at A23.
Nonetheless, as of September 2000, Lee had been serving for over two and a half years in an
"acting" capacity, and Feinstein served for an additional twenty months beyond his initial term,
seven months in an "acting" capacity followed by an additional thirteen months as a recess
appointee. See President Clinton Appoints Lee as Acting Head of Civil Rights, supra note 275,
at A-3 (noting that Lee had assumed acting status in mid-December 1997); Christian, supra
(noting Lee's continuing service in acting capacity as of June 2000); supra note 152 (noting that
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Lee shares the views of the President on issues such as affirmative action278-
views that are contrary to those of the Republican majority in the Senate.2 79
Just as the increased contentiousness over confirmation of NLRB appointees
in recent years mirrors the overall trend in the appointments process, so too with
the rise of packaged appointments. During the last several years,280 appointments
Feinstein had been appointed Acting General Counsel in March 1998, was given recess
appointment in October 1998, and served through November 1999).
278 This was certainly the Clinton administration's party line on the nomination. See
Berke & Holmes, supra note 221 (reporting that the President had urged the Judiciary
Committee to approve the nomination, stating that "'[i]t is wrong to deny this man that job
because he agrees with the policies of his President on [the affirmative action] issue"); White
House Wavers Over Bill Lee as Hatch Blasts Idea of Recess Posting, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 236, at A-5, A-6 (Dec. 9, 1997) (reporting that Attomey General Janet Reno, in
urging confirmation, stated that some are attempting to block the nomination because Lee
shares the views of the President on affirmative action). Presidential Press Secretary Mike
McCurry noted that Lee shared the President's views on civil rights and commented that, "'[If
Chairman Hatch believes that someone should follow the politics that he wishes to pronounce
in the area of civil ights... then [he] should resign from the Senate, run for President, and he
can name his own Assistant Attorney General for civil rights."' Steven A. Holmes, Senator
Deals Serious Setback to Clinton Choice for Rights Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A16.
279 Judiciary Democrats Block Vote on Lee for Justice Rights Position, 1997 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 220, at AA-1 (Nov. 14, 1997) (stating that the Republicans oppose Lee
because of his views on affirmative action); White House Wavers Over Bill Lee as Hatch Blasts
Idea of Recess Posting, supra note 278 (reporting that the nomination was blocked when a
majority of Republicans on the Judiciary Committee expressed opposition because of Lee's
support of affirmative action); see also Holmes, Senator Deals Serious Setback to Clinton
Choice for Rights Job, supra note 278 (reporting that the Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Orrin Hatch, stated that he had "'the highest personal regard' for Lee, but had
"'deep philosophical differences' with him on affirmative action).
The Republicans, however, argued that the Democrats had done precisely the same thing
when they blocked President Reagan's nominations of William Lucas to the same position and
that of William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General. See White House Wavers
Over Bill Lee as Hatch Blasts Idea of Recess Posting supra note 278 (reporting Senator
Hatch's comments regarding the defeat of the Lucas and Reynolds nominations in the
Democratic-controlled committee); see also Judiciary Democrats Block Vote on Lee for Justice
Rights Position, supra (describing Hatch's response to the Democrats' call for the committee to
forward the nomination to the fill Senate without recommendation, in which Hatch states that
the Democrats had blocked a Republican-supported attempt to do the same with the Lucas and
Reynolds nominations).
280 President Clinton has obviously had more than his share of difficulties with the
appointments process. See Kline, supra note 105, at 323 ("Court watchers believe this gridlock
[on judicial nominations during the Clinton years] is unique.'); Bennet, supra note 267
(reporting that 225 Clinton nominees still awaited confirmation as the Senate prepared to
adjourn); Gottesman & Seidl, supra note 46, at 750 n.8 (discussing the ill-fated nominations of
Zoe Baird and Kimba Wood to the Attorney General position and that of Lani Guinier to be
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights). Some degree of difficulty was certainly to be
expected, given that Clinton has faced Republican majorities in the Senate since the November
1994 elections. See Kline, supra note 105, at 248 n.4 (noting that Republicans held a 54-46
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to agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)281
and the FCC282 have followed much the same pattern as those to the Labor
Board. Solo appointments are increasingly rare; instead, multiple vacancies have
been allowed to accrue, at which point the slots have been filled through
packaged nominations.283 Indeed, the packaging concept has even been
introduced into the judicial nomination process; in May 1998, for instance,
President Clinton let Republican Senator Slade Gorton select a nominee for the
Ninth Circuit in exchange for the confirmation of a Clinton-chosen appointee
whose nomination was being blocked by Gorton.2 84
edge in the 104th Congress of 1995-96, and have held a 55-45 majority in the 105th and 106th
Congresses, covering 1997-98 and 1999-2000, respectively).
Nonetheless, some of Clinton's problems in getting his nominees confirmed are most
likely of his own making. See id at 315-16 ("The Clinton Administration routinely failed to
react in a visible manner to much of the confirmation gridlock, quietly acquiescing to the
Senate's stripping of the President's appointment privileges."); id at 318-20 (recounting
commentators' criticism of the President's failure to assert himself in the area of judicial
nominations); id at 319 (recounting the comment of Bruce Fein, the Reagan Administration
official in charge of judicial appointments, that the Senate was stalling .'[b]ecause President
Clinton himself has displayed gross disinterest in the judicial nomination process.... And if the
President doesn't push, it's pretty easy to stop what's goin' on."').
281 See Women's Bureau Director Castro Heads Toward Expected Confirmation as
EEOC Chair, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-1 (Sept. 24, 1998) (reporting that the
Castro nomination and the renomination of two sitting EEOC members were approved in a
voice vote by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee); Clinton to Name Incumbent
Miller to New Term as EEOC Commissioner, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at A-9
(May 21, 1999) (indicating that these three nominations were approved by the Senate at the
same time); see also Clinton Will Name Paul Miller to Second Term as Commissioner, 1998
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 121, at A-12 (June 24, 1998) (explaining that acting chair Paul
Igasaki was currently serving as a recess appointee because his nomination to a full term had
never been acted upon since it was tied to a potential nomination to a Republican seat that had
ultimately failed).
282See Seth Schiesel, At FC.C. Confirmation Hearings, Emphasis Will Be on
Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at DI (reporting that four pending nominations to the
FCC should be easily confirmed because the "essential politicking" had occurred before the
nominations were even announced-one Republican nominee had been chosen by Republican
Senator Trent Lott, the Majority Leader, and another by Republican Senator John McCain,
chair of the Commerce Committee); Senate Panel Endorses F.C.C. Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1997, at D21 (reporting that the four nominations were approved by the Senate
Commerce Committee on a voice vote).283 See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
284 Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Agrees to G.O.P. Deal on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMs, May 5,
1998, at Al (noting Clinton's agreement to nominate Barbara Durham, a "prominent
conservative" chosen by Republican Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, in return for the
Republicans' agreement to act on the nomination of Charles Fletcher, a friend of Clinton's,
which had been blocked for more than three years); see also Kline, supra note 105, at 302-04
(describing this "deal" in somewhat more elaborate terms). Rather ironically, after the deal had
been struck and President Clinton's choice quickly confirmed, the Gorton-sponsored nominee,
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Packaging, of course, represents but one aspect of the shift toward greater
senatorial control over the NLRB appointments process that I have traced out at
some length above-a shift that has taken hold of the overall presidential
appointments process with a vengeance in the last few years.28 5 This shift in the
balance of power in the appointments process in favor of the Senate, I believe,
necessarily leads to more extreme and more partisan nominees, for at least two
reasons. The first has to do with the differing incentives of the President and any
individual senator, and the second with the internal structure and rules of the
Senate.
Presidents, much more so than individual senators, have a strong incentive to
be moderate when it comes to NLRB appointments-as well as many other
matters-regardless of party affiliation. Republican Presidents of course have a
strong incentive to reward their core electoral supporters, the business
Barbara Durham, withdrew from consideration due to her husband's health problems. Neil A.
Lewis, A Nomination Is Withdrawn, and a Deal Is Threatenea N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1999, at
A18.
The result of such packaging, as with NLRB nominations, see supra text accompanying
note 196, has been the nomination of some judges whose views are actually antithetical to that
of the President See, e.g., Lewis, Clinton Agrees to G.O.P. Deal On Judgeships, supra
(reporting a comment made by a lawyer familiar with Durham's record that, .'[t]his is not
someone you would think could ever be named to a Federal appeals court seat by a Democratic
President'); Kline, supra note 105, at 303 (describing Durham as "'the anchor of the
conservative faction' on the Washington Supreme Court) (internal citation omitted); Neil A.
Lewis, Environment and Politics Enter Debate on Judgeship, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1999, at 16
(reporting that in order to get Senator Hatch to lift block on other judicial nominations, the
President is contemplating nominating arch-conservative Ted Stewart to a district court seat
even though Stewart is a "harsh critic of the President's land-use policies and politics" who has
been described by the Natural Resources Defense Council as "Utah's version of James Watt,"
President Reagan's radically conservative Secretary of the Interior); 145 CoNG. REC. S 11919-
20 (daily ed. Oct 5, 1999) (reporting Stewart's confirmation); cf Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore
Says Clinton Choice for Election Panel is 'Unfit'for Office, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2000, at A21
(reporting that to get Republicans to advance his judicial nominees, President Clinton has
nominated Bradley Smith-whom Vice President, and presidential candidate, Gore opposes on
the ground that 'he is completely and totally opposed to the campaign finance laws' that he
would be required to uphold"--to a Republican seat on the Federal Election Commission);
Lizette Alvarez, Senate Ends Logam, Confirming Election Official and Judges, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 25, 2000, at A19 (reporting that Democrats agreed to confirm Smith in exchange for the
Republicans' agreement to approve sixteen long-pending judicial nominations, prompting
Senator McCain, co-author of campaign finance legislation, to complain that given Smith's
advocacy of a repeal of campaign finance limits, "[s]ending Brad Smith to the F.E.C. is akin to
confirming a conscientious objector to be secretary of defense").
285 See Mackenzie, Starting Over, supra note 215 (stating that the appointments process is
now "Senate-driven," and commenting that it cannot accurately be called the presidential
appointments process "[w]hen a senator can say of a nominee, 'he's not my kind of nominee,'
and then decline even to permit a committee review of the president's choice"). Mackenzie
calls 1997 "the single most significant year in the evolution of the modem appointment
process." Id
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community, with pro-business appointments. 28 6 Less obviously, however, they
are also well-advised to take the interests of organized labor into account to at
least some degree. The AFL-CIO remains a powerful force in national politics,287
and the President can accomplish more of his overall agenda if the AFL is kept-
if not exactly happy, at least sufficiently neutralized to forego mounting all-out
opposition to the administration's every initiative.2 88
Democratic Presidents, conversely, will want to reward their supporters in the
labor community with pro-union Board appointments, but they also have an
incentive to take the business community's interests into account to some
extent.289 Labor Board appointments are only "a small part of the grand political
game,"' 290 and a Democratic President can make more headway with his
legislative agenda if he tosses an occasional bone to powerful business groups
like the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers,
or at least manages to placate them sufficiently to avoid continual warfare on the
many other fronts on which the administration is proceeding.
Senators, in comparison, have much less incentive to be moderate than does
the President. This is in part a function of the difference in their respective
constituencies. Whereas the President has a national constituency that is usually
relatively heterogeneous, senators are tied to the narrower interests of their
states.291 This, in turn, tends to make them highly responsive to the appeals of
special interest groups,2 92 and in particular, to those interest groups that are
especially powerful forces within their state or region.
Compounding the polarizing effect of senators' narrower constituencies and
their resulting responsiveness to special interest groups are the Senate's internal
structure and rules. The Senate operates in such a way as to cede an extraordinary
286 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 249.
287 See Steven Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton Worked Hard for A.F.L.-
C..0. 's Support of Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at A28 (emphasizing importance of
AFL's endorsement in light of its thirteen million members and its ability to mobilize union
members politically); see also Steven Greenhouse, Unions Deny Stand Over Trade Policy is
Protectionist, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2000, at Al (characterizing the AFL-CIO, with its sixty-
eight member unions, as "by far the most powerful voice" on trade issues, and recounting some
of its successes in this area-such as blocking, for three years in a row, "fast-track" legislation
that would have made it easier for the President to negotiate NAFTA-type free trade treaties
with other nations).
288 Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 249 (stating that
Republican Presidents know that it will be easier to pass their legislative programs "if prime
movers in the labor movement, particularly the AFL-CIO, can somehow be co-opted or at least
persuaded not to engage in active disruption.").
289 See id
29 0 Id
291 Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 213,236-37 (1990) [hereinafter Moe, Political Institutions].
292 Id
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degree of control over a wide range of issues-including nominations-to a
relatively small number of senators, or even to an individual senator. Two means
by which it does so, the committee system and the practice of senatorial "holds,"
are particularly pertinent to the appointments process. Both these means, as we
shall see below, have played a significant role in producing the more extreme
Labor Board nominees of recent years.
The committee system is the rather ingenious mechanism that has evolved to
enable each senator to reap the maximum possible political benefit (read "number
of votes in the next election") from his or her legislative activities.293 Just as every
representative has a strong incentive to "vote his district,"294 so every senator has
a strong incentive to vote the interests of his or her state. Those interests (and the
corresponding interest groups whose mission it is to advance and protect them)
vary tremendously from state to state, of course. Playing off this crucial fact, the
committee system "allocates influence over policymaking in a manner that makes
all legislators better off."295 It does so in the following way. 296
Committees have "near-monopoly jurisdiction" over a small set of issues.297
Senators are assigned to committees based at least in part on their preferences,298
2 93 See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765,
771 (1983), reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 30, 35 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PUBLIC CHOICE
AND REGULATION] (characterizing the committee system in this way); see also Terry M. Moe &
Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1994, at 1, 15 (to similar effect).
294 See Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION, supra note 293, at 35. See generally Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and
Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181 (1984).
295 Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION, supra note 293, at 35.
296 The following discussion is based largely on the analysis of Barry Weingast and Mark
Moran. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771-74, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION, supra note 293, at 34-35. But see infra note 298 (discussing disagreement
between Weingast and Moran and others over the degree to which "self-selection" actually
drives committee assignments). Both their work and the other studies of the committee system
discussed herein analyze that system in the context of the House of Representatives. See sources
cited supra notes 293-94; infra note 298. 1 have transposed the analysis to the Senate context.
297 Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION, supra note 293, at 35.
298 There is some debate as to how much "self-selection" -i.e., the preferences of the
member or senator--drives committee assignments. Weingast and Moran and others firmly
believe that such "self-selection" drives the assignment process. Weingast & Moran, supra note
293, at 771, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION, supra note 293, at 35 (stating
unequivocally that "members are assigned to committees on the basis of self-selection");
KENNETH A. SHEPsLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE AsSIGNMENTS IN
THE MODERN HOUSE 248 (1978) (to similar effect); see also Barry R. Weingast & William J.
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and they are likely to seek assignments to those committees withjurisdiction over
the issues most relevant to their constituents and key interest group supporters3 99
In this way, each senator "gains greater leverage over precisely those issues
relevant for his own political support and hence for re-election." 300 He does so, of
course, by giving up influence over a whole host of issues that are of lesser
concern to him but are of paramount concern to other members of the Senate,
who naturally seek appointment to the committees with jurisdiction over those
issues. In sum, "the committee system enforces the following trade: each
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not
Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 150 (1988) (stating that according to their data,
"overall... the pattern of committee assignments looks remarkably like an optimization
process that maps members into those committees they value the most"). Gary Cox and
Matthew McCubbins, however, conclude that the empirical evidence in support of this thesis is
weak. GARY W. Cox & MATiHEw D. MCCUBBINs, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GovERNmENT N THE HOUSE 24 (1993) (stating that while there is "substantial anecdotal
evidence that members of Congress ... seek committee assignments pertinent to their
constituents' interests. .. [and] good theoretical reasons to expect that they might," statistical
evidence in support of the "interest-seeking hypothesis" is relatively weak). In particular, Cox
and McCubbins assert that "[t]he accommodation hypothesis-that members' assignment
requests are routinely granted-seems hard to maintain with the evidence at hand," and that the
self-selection hypothesis overlooks the influence that the desires of party leaders play in
committee assignments. Id at 20, 43. As noted, the studies cited all focus on the House of
Representatives as opposed to the Senate. See supra note 296. In contrast, there does not seem
to be any comparable recent work focusing on the Senate.
299 See supra note 298 (describing literature on "self-selection" and the "interest-seeking
hypothesis"). While there is no data on the Senate Labor Committee, as to the House Education
and Labor Committee, one study found that "interested" representatives-those whose
constituencies might influence them to take a special interest in the issues before the
committee-requested assignment to the committee over four times as often as did
"indifferents"--representatives whose constituencies were unlikely to influence them in this
direction. Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra note 298, at 24-25 (describing 1973 study by Rohde and
Shepsle). But see id at 26 n.7 (concluding that, overall, the evidence as to whether constituency
characteristics drive member requests for assignment to this committee is "mixed").
300 Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771, reprinted in PUBuc CHOICE AND
REGULATON, supra note 293, at 35; see also Moe & Wilson, supra note 293, at 15 (stating that
the committee system "enable[s] members to have disproportionate influence over issues of
relevance to their own districts... and thus to realize gains from trade with their colleagues-
all in the interest of reelection"); see also, e.g., Joel Brinkley, Surveying the Results, 20 Years
and Millions of Dollars Later, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1999, at C4 (noting that Charles Schumer
of New York-the nation's banking and financial capital-was on the Banking Committee
while in the House and is now on the Senate Banking Committee, and that in 1997 and 1998,
Schumer received more money from the securities industry, which stood to be profoundly
affected by recently-passed legislation under the committee's jurisdiction, than anyone else now
in the Senate).
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legislator gives up some influence over many areas of policy in return for a much
greater influence over the one that, for him, counts the most."30 1
A second senatorial practice302 that enables an individual senator to exercise
a disproportionate share of power over an issue--or nomination-that she or her
constituency cares deeply about is that of the senatorial "hold": a request to the
Senate leadership to delay action on a particular matter, often backed up by a
threat to mount a filibuster if the matter is allowed to go forward.303 Holds, which
are secret,304 permit a single senator to block any action or nomination that she
opposes for an indefinite period of time.305 To an even greater degree than the
operation of the committee system, then, the Senate's acquiescence in the use of
holds evidences its "willingness... to mortgage its collective judgment to the
whims of strongly motivated individual members."306
The above analysis of senatorial incentives and of the Senate's internal
structure and rules goes a long way, I think, toward explaining why the Labor
Board nominees produced by the increasingly Senate-driven appointments
process of the last decade and a half-and in particular those from partisan
backgrounds-have been significantly more extreme than those produced in the
earlier, more presidentially-driven appointments era.
Turning first to the confirmation phase, the combination of senators'
incentives to cater to special interest groups that wield significant power within
their state or region and the Senate's increased willingness, in Calvin
Mackenzie's words, to "mortgage its collective judgment to the whims of
strongly motivated individual members,"30 7 rather neatly explains the blocking of
301 Weingast & Moran, supra note 293, at 771, reprinted in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION, supra note 293, at 35.
302 "Holds" are not authorized by either law or formal Senate rule; they are "an informal
procedure that has grown through accumulated practice." Mackenzie, Starting Over, supra note
215.
303 See id
304 That is, the identity of the senator placing the hold is kept secret unless the senator
chooses to reveal herself. Id See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Roadblock to Holbrooke's U.N.
Nomination Is Apparently Lott, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at A3 (noting that in accord with
Senate practice, the Majority Leader had refused to identify the senators placing a hold on the
nomination of Richard Holbrooke as ambassador to the United Nations). Senators Ron Wyden
of Oregon and Charles Grassley of Iowa introduced legislation prohibiting secret holds in 1998.
See A Challenge to Senate Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1998, at A10; Mackenzie, Starting
Over, supra note 215. That legislation was actually passed by the Senate, but "died a silent
death in conference." Id
3 05 Mackenzie, Starting Over, supra note 215.
3 06 1d (discussing the nomination of William Weld to be ambassador to Mexico, see
supra note 270 and accompanying text, which was defeated almost single-handedly by Senator
Jesse Helms).3 07 See supra text accompanying note 306.
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more than one moderate nominee in the late 1980s who would have been easily
confirmed under the previous, highly deferential confirmation norm.
Both Presidents Reagan and Bush, for instance, attempted to place moderate
Republican and career Board employee John Higgins on the Board, only to be
thwarted by Senator Helms of North Carolina, doing the bidding of the National
Right to Work Committee3 08 While the Committee is too focused on a single
issue and too right-wing to exert significant influence even over a conservative
Republican President-Reagan included 309-it is a powerful force to reckon with
in a strongly anti-union textile state like North Carolina 310 and in the anti-
union/"right-to-work" states of the South and West generally.31' Thus, when the
Committee went on a rampage against Higgins, citing his "atrocious" record on
"right to work" issues,3 12 Senator Helms was only too happy to oblige by first
30 8 See supra notes 243-46, 248 and accompanying text. While the Committee was
virulently opposed to Higgins due to his "'atrocious' record on "right to work" issues, the
National Association of Manufacturers had no apparent complaints about Higgins, and former
Nixon General Counsel and prominent management lawyer John Irving blasted the Committee
for opposing an "'experienced [and] knowledgeable' nominee who is "'all that anyone should
want" in a Board member. Senate Labor Committee Expected to Consider Higgins'
Nomination Before the End of April, supra note 165, at A-2.
3 09 The Committee is interested in a single issue: ensuring that employees in unionized
bargaining units who choose not to join the union are not compelled to support the union
financially-or at least that any such compelled contributions are kept to a minimum. This
constellation of issues is referred to as "union-security" or "Beck" issues, with the latter term
stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in Communications Workers ofAmerica v. Beck
487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that objecting non-members cannot be compelled, over their
objections, to support the "non-representational" activities of their union). Because of its single-
minded focus, the Committee will oppose even the most conservative of nominees if their
views on union-security issues are not to its liking. See supra note 116 (discussing how the
Committee's opposition effectively blocked the nomination of John Van de Water, a leader of
well over a hundred anti-union campaigns during his pre-Board management consultant days,
to a full term).
3 10 See Moe, Interests, Institutions and Positive Theory, supra note 24, at 252 (noting that
the most anti-union group within the business community is nonunionized small business,
which is "led most vociferously by the textile industry"); David Firestone, Union Victory at
Plant in South Is Labor Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1999, at A16 (stating that the textile
industry is centered in the states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia).
3 11 See Moe, Interests, Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 273 (noting that
the South and West are the most anti-union parts of the country). The states with "right to
work" laws-i.e., laws prohibiting "union-security" arrangements between employers and
unions that require all bargaining unit employees to support the union financially-are:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Right
to Work States, 1999 at http://www.nrtw.orgrtws.htm (last visited Aug. 16,2000).
3 12 See supra note 308.
[Vol. 61:13611442
QUIETREVOLUTIONAT THE LABOR BOARD
placing a hold on the nomination,3 13 which had already been approved by the
Senate Labor Committee,3 14 in 1988,3 15 and then by making it clear when
President Bush assumed office that any attempt to revive Higgins's candidacy
would be futile.3 16 Similarly, President Bush's attempted renomination of Mary
Miller Cracraft-a moderate Democrat who, like Higgins, had already been
approved by the Senate Labor Committee-was blocked when Senator Wallop of
Wyoming, also acting at the behest of the Right to Work Committee, placed a
hold on the nomination and then simply ran out the clock.317 Thus, acting solely
on behalf of one right-wing interest group that has considerable power and
influence in their respective home states and regions, Helms and Wallop were
able, through the use of a "hold," to single-handedly block perfectly moderate
nominees who had won the approval of the committee with jurisdiction over the
matter, and who would have sailed through the Senate in earlier times.
In recent years, however, it is the committee system rather than the use of
holds that has been the major "culprit" in producing more extreme Labor Board
nominees. At the confirmation phase, during the Clinton administration the
Senate Labor Committee has become a virtual black hole for Labor Board
nominations, however unobjectionable the nominee might have been under the
"old rules." Indeed, the more moderate the nominee (and hence the less
objectionable under those rules), the greater has been the chance that the
committee would either refuse to act on the nomination, or simply make clear in
advance that the candidate was unacceptable.
3 13 Right-Wing Opposition Clouds Prospect for Confirmation of Higgins to NLRB Seat,
supra note 246 (stating that Helms had placed a hold on the nomination, which was opposed by
the National Right to Work Committee). Senator Thurmond of South Carolina-another
strongly anti-union textile state-also indicated that he had "concerns [about the nomination]
that will be explored further." Id
3 14 Senate Labor Panel Approves Higgins' Nomination to NLRB, 1988 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 105, at A-8 (June 1, 1988).
3 15 Following the hold, the Senate never voted on the nomination, effectively killing it.
See Johansen Announces Intention to Resign from NLRB by June 16, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 61, at A-9 (Mar. 31, 1989) (indicating that the Senate had failed to act on the
Higgins nomination).
3 1 6 See supra note 248.
317 See Karen Riley, Wallop Scuttles Cracraft for Another NLRB Term, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1991, at Cl; White House Will Not Renominate Cracraft for Second Term on NLRB,
supra note 248. That is, Wallop kept the hold in place until the Senate had adjourned. Id At that
point, the President would have had to resubmit the nomination in order to keep it alive, which
he elected not to do. Id
Cracraft had earned the Right to Work Committee's eternal enmity by supporting the
Board's submission in the Beck case, see supra note 309, of an amicus brief opposing a
mandated rebate of dues used for "non-representational" purposes to objecting non-members
covered by a union-security agreement. Riley, supra.
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For instance, in 1993 and 1994 it informally rejected a series of moderate
candidates proposed by the White House to fill a Republican seat on the Board,
including an arbitrator and law professor who had served on New York's Public
Employee Labor Relations Board, and the chief counsel to the Republicans on the
Senate Judiciary Committee.3 18 More recently, the committee simply sat for over
a year on the 1998 nomination of John Truesdale, an exceedingly well-respected
moderate and former Board member who had served the agency in a variety of
capacities for more than forty years,319 to a Democratic seat on the Board-
approving and forwarding the nomination only when Truesdale indicated that he
would step down upon the election of a new President and when it further
became clear that the alternative to Truesdale was the recess appointment of
someone far more liberal. 320
The Labor Committee's de facto refusal to confirm moderate Labor Board
nominees, either by sitting on the nominations or informally vetoing them before
318 White House Names Professor Gould of Stanford University to Labor Board supra
note 264, at A-5 (stating that "[t]he [open] Republican seat is expected to go to Eric J.
Schmertz," an arbitrator and labor law professor at Hofstra University who had served as a
member of the New York State Public Employee Relations Board and as New York City's
Commissioner of Labor Relations); Raudabaugh Faults Critics of Gould Nomination NLRB
Speea Effectiveness, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-8 (Nov. 1, 1993) (reporting
outgoing Board Member Raudabaugh's statement that those under consideration for the
Republican seat were Schmertz; Sharon Prost, minority chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary
Committee; and Mary Harrington, director of labor relations for Eastman Kodak); Senate and
White House Continue Talks on Filling Vacancies at Labor Board, supra note 253 (reporting
that the White House had submitted names to Senate Republicans to fill the remaining vacancy
on the Board, but that the Republicans "ha[d] rejected the White House candidates and insisted
instead" on the appointment of their candidate, Eastman Kodak's Mary Harrington, who was
'the unanimous choice of the business community'). The seat ultimately went to Charles
Cohen. See supra note 258.
3 19 Board Officials Face Turning Points Regarding Continued Tenure in Office, 1999
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at C-1 (Oct. 28, 1999) (noting that Truesdale, a "veteran board
official who ha[d] served the agency for more than 40 years in a variety of positions," had been
serving as a recess appointee because the committee had taken no action on his nomination,
made over a year before); Outgoing General Counsel Discusses 'Challenging, Terrfic'
Experience in Office, supra note 228, at C-2 (recounting outgoing General Counsel Fred
Feinstein's lament over the Senate's failure to act on Truesdale's nomination: "'Who could be a
more reasonable, acceptable kind of nominee?'). See Cindy Skrzycki, For NLRB, an
Improvement in Its Own Relations, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1998, at B9 (reporting that
spokesperson for the employer-side Labor Policy Association, which had been highly critical of
outgoing Board chair William Gould, stated upon Truesdale's recess appointment and
designation as chair that the Association had 'nothing but nice things to say about
Truesdale"'); May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (stating that Truesdale's
voting record during his previous terms on the Board "shines a beacon of reason above [the
currently] partisan waters" at the Board).
320 See Senate Confirms Truesdale as Member in Last-Minute Action Before
Adjournment, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 225, at A-1 (Nov. 23, 1999).
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they are even made, has obviously played a role in the production of more
extreme Labor Board members. Even more critical in this regard, however, has
been its intrusion in recent years into the selection phase of the process-an
intrusion that has been accomplished by conditioning the approval of any Board
nominee on the President's agreement to let the leaders of the committee, or of
the Senate majority, select one or more other individuals for service on the Board.
That is, if the committee were simply blocking the President's first choice
and forcing him to go to the second or third name on his "short list," the impact
on the kind of person selected for service on the NLRB would not necessarily be
all that profound. The White House presumably has several people in mind for
any given appointment (to the Labor Board or anything else), and the difference
between the President's first and third choices is likely to lie more in political
considerations that have nothing to do with the NLRB than in any difference in
the candidates' approaches to NLRA issues or likely voting records. 321 By
holding all nominations hostage unless and until the committee or the Senate
leadership is allowed to designate one or more appointees to complete a
"package" of nominations, however, the committee virtually guarantees the
appointment of Labor Board members who are likely to be considerably more
one-sided in their voting than those appointed when the "old rules" held sway.
Under the old rules, as we have seen,322 both sides played at least some role
in the selection of any given Labor Board nominee; thus, each nominee was a
person who-while by no means necessarily someone the "out group" would
have chosen themselves-was at least someone they could live with. Moreover,
the President played the dominant role in the selection process, both directly-by
deciding who among those on the in group's short list would be elevated to the
NLRB, and indirectly-by influencing the "in group" to refrain from loading up
that list with excessively pro-labor or pro-management candidates.
Under the new regime, in contrast, and in particular during the Clinton years,
the President has receded into the background, and a "you pick two, we pick two"
mentality has taken over, instead of all concerned agreeing upon--or at a
minimum acquiescing in---the appointment of a particular individual, the rival
camps have simply divided up the pie between them: the President and/or key
Senate Democrats pick one or more nominees, and key Senate Republicans pick
one or more others.323
321 See supra text accompanying notes 212-13 (describing how under the traditional
"rules," the President made his choice from among the names on the short list based on factors
such as the desire to gain a particular senator's support on some unrelated issue or perhaps
racial or ethnic considerations).
322 See supra text accompanying notes 207-13.
323 See supra note 258 and infra note 329 (stating that Cohen was picked at the insistence
of Senate Republicans); infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text (describing how, in the
1997 package, Majority Leader Trent Lott selected the nominees to the Republican seats and
Senator Kennedy secured a seat for his former aide Sarah Fox).
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This new "system," such as it is, represents the triumph of the following
view, advanced by the spokesman for a prominent employer-side organization:324
Let us recognize reality. Labor law is a dichotomous world. Labor lawyers
represent either management or labor, and they tend to share the sentiments of their
clients on labor-management issues.... If the Board is to be filled with individuals
who have expertise in the labor laws, there is no avoiding the necessity to draw from
pools of individuals who have views on the law which can generally be classified [as]
pro-labor or pro-management.
The current system ignores this reality .... [I]t pretends to seek candidates who
are "acceptable to all sides." Of course, as soon as someone is drawn from either the
labor or the management pool, that individual is almost by definition unacceptable to
the other side ....
A healthier approach may be to acknowledge that Board members can only be
drawn from the two camps and let each camp suggest its own candidate.... [W]ith a
Democrat in the White House, the labor camp will get three picks and, with [a]
Republicani [president], management gets three. 325
The type of nominee likely to emerge-and that has emerged-from such a
process is obviously very different than the type of person likely to emerge, and
that did emerge, under the pre-1980 rules of the game. Indeed, this practice of
"packaging" nominations, and of permitting each side to choose "its" Board-
member(s)-to-be with little or no regard for the wishes or preferences of the other
side is, in my view, the one factor more responsible than any other for the
emergence of the "new breed" of highly partisan management and union-side
Board appointees that we have seen in recent years.
On a purely theoretical level, it seems clear that once the two sides abandon
any effort to reach some sort of agreement on any given Labor Board nominee
and simply apportion the number of slots to be filled between them, the result be
will the selection of Board members who tilt strongly toward one side or the
other. Instead of the "in group" looking for a "respected professional[ ]" who is
"moderately conservative" (when the Republicans hold the White House) or
"moderately liberal" (when the Democrats and organized labor are doing the
choosing)326 and who will pass muster both with the other side and with the
President packaging gives each side an incentive to search for someone who can
be counted on to vote in their favor and to cancel out the vote of whomever the
opposition chooses. Board members chosen under such a system, moreover,
having been hand-picked by one side or the other, can hardly help but view
324 That organization is the Labor Policy Association, which represents the interests of
240 major corporations. AGENCY IN CRisIs, supra note 3, at 2.
3 2 5 Id at 50.
326 See supra text accompanying note 211.
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themselves as having a constituency-as being representatives not of the general
public, 32 7 but of either the labor or management-side community.32 8
And indeed, the theory has been borne out in practice. No one, I think it is
fair to say, had any illusions about the "impartiality" of a number of Board
members chosen to fill particular slots in the Clinton-sanctioned packages of
recent years; the management lawyer chosen by Senator Kassebaum to fill a
Republican seat in 1994329 was pronounced "an ideal candidate" by the Chamber
of Commerce,330 and the two "GOP hard-liners" hand-picked by Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott in 1997331 were happily deemed "very pro-management" by
another major employer group.332 While the Democrats may not (perhaps
32 7 See Hearings on S. 1958, supra note 10, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HIsT. OF THE
NLRA, supra note 10, at 1617, 1677 (indicating that consensus emerged during the drafting of
the NLRA that all Board members should represent the general public).
328 Interestingly, Member Peter Hurtgen, who had spent over thirty years on the
management side before being appointed to the Board as part of the 1997 package, recently
made a reference to the various Board members' "constituents." See NLRB Heads into 2000
with Improved Budget, Full Board New General Counsel, supra note 265, at S-8 (stating that
the longer the current Board members get to work together, "'the better the results are going to
be for our constituents').329 See White House Appointment of Cohen to NLRB is Expected to Bring Board to Full
Strengt, supra note 148 (describing how Kassebaum, the ranking Republican on the Senate
Labor and Human Resources Committee, led the drive to find a candidate acceptable to the
Republicans, and lauded ultimate nominee Charles Cohen as "'a fine choice"); see also supra
note 41 (explaining the custom that a fully-staffed Board be made up of three members of the
President's party and two from the other party).
330 White House Appointment of Cohen to NLRB is Expected to Bring Board to Full
Strength, supra note 148; see also The Voting Records of the Members of the National Labor
Relations Board EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle LLP) Dec.
1995 at 7 [hereinafter December 1995 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT] (newsletter on file with the
Ohio State Law Journal) (noting that"Member Cohen, as expected, is solidly on the side of the
employer").
331 Bernstein, How Business is Winning its War with the NLRB, supra note 93 (reporting
that Lott struck a deal with the White House and Senator Edward Kennedy in which Loft got
"two GOP-hard-liners" on the Board, while Kennedy's support was secured by an agreement to
appoint former Kennedy aide Sarah Fox.)
332 Id (recounting comments of a spokesperson for the American Trucking Association).
It was not only the Republican opposition and its constituent interest groups that were insisting
upon particular candidates during the Clinton years; Democratic power brokers, such as Senator
Edward Kennedy, made their own demands on the President See id (stating that the 1997
package deal received the support of Senator Kennedy only after the Republicans had agreed to
the nomination of former Kennedy aide Sarah Fox). As a result, the nomination process at times
appeared so Senate-driven as to make the President--his article II power notwithstanding-
appear a mere spectator to the whole affair. Id (reporting that the "White House went along"
with the deal brokered by Majority Leader Trent Lott and Senator Kennedy).
2000] 1447
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
counter-intuitively, given their hold on the White House)3 33 have made out quite
as well, certainly the management side expected few votes in their favor from
former union attorney and Kennedy aide Sarah Fox, for instance; however, secure
in the knowledge that the votes of "their" two picks would cancel out those of
Fox and former union attorney Wilma Liebman, they acquiesced in Fox's
inclusion in the 1997 package. 34
3 33 But see Kline, supra note 105, at 247-55 (noting President Clinton's weakness in the
appointments process vis-a-vis the Republican-controlled Senate).
3 34 The Republicans appeared staunchly opposed to Fox's appointment when her name
was originally floated for a Board seat in late 1994/early 1995. See Sen. Kassebaum: A
Moderate Reformer Charts New Course for Labor Committee, supra note 253 (reporting that
Senator Kassebaum, chair of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, predicted
"very rough sledding to get confirmation" for Fox, should she be formally nominated); White
House Gives Sarah Fox Recess Appointment to Labor Board, supra note 151 (reporting that the
President gave Fox a recess appointment in order to "[c]ircumvent[] a possible bitter
confirmation fight"); NLRB Member Cohen Plans to Leave Aug. 27, Administration Seeks
Republican to Fill Seat, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 120, at A-10 (June 21, 1996)
(reporting that the recess appointment of Fox was made over the "strong opposition of business
groups").
However, organized labor and the Clinton administration persisted in making Fox's
appointment to a full term a "key priority," and the business community ultimately acquiesced
in her inclusion in the package of four appointments in late 1997. White House Seeks
Republican Input on Plans to Fill Four Vacancies at NLRB, supra note 165 (reporting that
Fox's appointment to a full term was a "key priority" and the "linchpin" of any deal); Bernstein,
How Business is Winning its War with the NLRB, supra note 93 (stating that Fox's appointment
was the "big concession to the Democrats" in the 1997 package).
As to whether the business community's initial fear or adamant opposition to a Fox
appointment was warranted, when Fox was a recess appointee awaiting confirmation to a full
term, her voting record was reasonably moderate-much more so, for instance, than former
union attorney Margaret Browning's had been. April 1998 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra
note 18 (indicating that as of November 8, 1997, just prior to her confirmation to a full term,
Fox's voting record in disputed cases was 29-11, or 73%, in favor of the union position, and
commenting that Fox "ha[d] quietly compiled a much more moderate voting record than the
late Margaret Browning"). This pattern more or less held during the first several months
following Fox's confirmation to a full term, but from that point on she voted the pro-union line
in nearly every single disputed case; quite remarkably, during the last two years tracked by the
Employment Law Alert, she has compiled a 174-1 pro-union voting record in disputed cases.
Compare January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121 (reporting that Fox's record
from her confirmation to full term in November 1997 through late August 1998 was 47-14 or
77% pro-union in disputed cases), with May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18
(reporting that Fox compiled a 41-0 pro-union voting record from August 27 through
December 31, 1998), December 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 19 (reporting that
Fox had a 35-0 pro-union voting record in disputed cases during the first five months of 1999),
May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 178 (reporting that Fox voted for the union
position in 49 of 49 disputed cases during the last seven months of 1999), and January 2001
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178 (reporting that Fox had compiled a
49-1 pro-union record during the first seven months of 2000, and noting that her "amazing
string" of 173 straight pro-union votes had come to an end on July 24, 2000).
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The voting records of these package-produced Board members, moreover,
has been very much what one would expect. As the Employment Law Alert
stated, speaking of the products of the 1997 package, "[1]t should be no surprise"
that ex-management lawyers Hurtgen and Brame are near the top (for the period
1985 onward) in the percentage of votes cast for the employer position and ex-
union lawyers Fox and Liebman are near the bottom, given that they are the
products of a system in which "employers and unions are both demanding that
each side's partisans be appointed to the Board."335 Indeed, one increasingly
begins to feel that these four members may as well simply call their votes in;
Member Hurtgen had a "perfect" 61-0 pro-management record during the tenure
of Chairman William Gould,336 while Member Fox, as noted previously, at one
point had a 173-0 pro-union streak going.337 Matters have reached such a pass
that the Employment Law Alert recently stated: "When we referred to a 'partisan'
NLRB, we were not kidding. The votes for the 'other' side's position are so few
and far between, we will list them for avid Board-watchers." 338
And while the products of the most recent package deal have, as a group,
been the most egregiously partisan of all,339 they have certainly had some
335 January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121; see also April 1998
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (noting that "recent [Board] appointees [have begun]
to act and vote like the interest groups that sponsored their appointments... resulting in an
unprecedented polarization of views").
336 January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121; see also May 1999
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (noting that "Hurtgen's perfect record of never
voting for the union [had gone] by the boards" when he cast one vote for the union position-as
against thirty-two for the management position-in the four-month period following Gould's
departure).
337 See supra text accompanying note 195. As noted supra note 19, as this article goes to
press Member Brame's term had recently expired, and the recess appointment that Member
Fox had received upon the expiration of her term was set to expire shortly.
338 December 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 19. In the five-month period
tracked in that issue, Member Hurtgen had a 29-1 pro-management voting record, Member
Brame had a 22-3 pro-management record, and Members Liebman and Fox had 36-1 and 35-
0 pro-union records, respectively. Id Only Chairman John Truesdale showed any sign of
objectivity, voting for the union position in nine cases, and for the management position in five.
Id
This pattern only continued. In the following seven-month period, Member Hurtgen had a
47-1 pro-management record, Member Brame a 38-4 pro-management record, and Members
Liebman and Fox had 45-1 and 49-0 pro-union records, respectively. May 2000 EMPLOYMENT
LAW ALERT, supra note 178 (reporting these "astonishing results"). Chairman Truesdale, for
his part, compiled a 43-8 pro-union record during this period. Id Finally, in the last seven-
month period tracked, Member Hurtgen compiled a 37-4 pro-management record, Member
Brame a 26-4 pro-management record, and Members Liebman and Fox 34-1 and 49-1 pro-
union records, respectively, while Chairman Truesdae had a 16-5 pro-union record. See
January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178.
339 May 2000 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 178 (characterizing the partisan
differences among the current Board members as "unprecedented"); May 1999 EMPLoYMENT
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competition in this respect from some of their predecessors, most notably ex-
union attorney Margaret Browning and former management lawyer Charles
Cohen, both part of the 1993-94 package of appointments.3 40 In disputed cases,
"Member Browning's vote ... invariably favored the union and Member Cohen's
the employer,"341 and Browning takes the prize for the most pro-union Board
member overall, having voted for the union's position 98% of the time.342
LAW ALERT, supra note 18 ("The Board has never witnessed such extreme partisanship
between the two opposing political camps as now exists."); see also January 1999
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121 (referring to the "sharp partisan differences" on the
Board staffed by these four members and chaired by Stanford law professor WiUi am Gould);
April 1998 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (referring to the "unprecedented
polarization of views" on the Hurtgen/Brame/Fox/Liebman/Gould Board).
340 See supra note 264.
341 The Voting Records of the Members of the NLRB, EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (Nixon,
Hargrave, Devans & Doyle LLP) Mar. 1997 [hereinafter March 1997 EMPLOYMENT LAW
ALERT] (newsletter on file with the Ohio State Law Journa); see also id (stating that "[t]he
Cohen-Browning disparity is so pronounced that the solitary vote cast by Member Cohen for
the 'other side' [during an eight-month period in which Cohen compiled a 27-1 pro-employer
voting record and Browning a 30-0 pro-union record] must be mentioned").
342 January 2001 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178 (indicating
that Browning's percentage of pro-union votes, 98%, was the highest in the fifteen-year period
covered by the survey); see also January 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 121
(stating that "Browning, an avid union partisan before and during her Board term, voted for the
employer's position [only] twice" in her entire term); December 1995 EMPLOYMENT LAW
ALERT, supra note 330, at 6-7 (noting Browning's "party-line voting record," which has caused
"[s]ome commentators [to] claim [that] Browning follows a strict AFL-CIO agenda!).
A year and a half into Browning's term, the Employment Law Alert noted her "amazingly
consistent pro-union voting record" and stated that: 'Member Browning has actually cast more
pro-union votes than the legendary Donald Dotson cast for employers. No one would have
dreamed that was possible." December 1995 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 330, at 7;
see also March 1997 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 341 (noting with similar
amazement that Browning's percentage of pro-union votes [98%] "actually exceeds the pro-
employer voting record compiled by former Board Chair Donald Dotson). Browning
maintained her "amazing[ ] consisten[cy]" to the very end of her Board service, finishing with a
97-2, or 98%, pro-union voting record. April 1998 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18.
Member Cohen's overall voting record was at least slightly less partisan; he finished with
an 88% (86-12) pro-management record. See March 1997 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra
note 341. Interestingly, however, much as Member Fox had cast at least a modest number of
votes for the employer position during the several months both preceding and following her
confirmation to a full term before turning into a completely unabashed union partisan, Cohen
compiled a solid, but not remarkable, pro-management record during his first eighteen months
on the Board, but turned into a complete "party-line" voter after that point Compare December
1995 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 330, at 7 (reporting that Cohen had a 37-10 pro-
employer record [79%] as of August 1995), with March 1997 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra
note 341 (reporting that Cohen finished his term in August 1996 with an 86-12 pro-
management record, indicating that he voted for the management position in 49 out of 51, or
96%, of disputed cases during his last year on the Board); see also supra note 334 (noting that
Fox had voted for the union position 73% of the time in the period preceding her confirmation
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Finally, as a purely statistical matter, five of the six most pro-management Board
members covered by the Employment Law Alert study were products of a
package deal, as were all three of the most pro-union members.
43
Not surprisingly, moreover, these five exceedingly pro-management Board
members were all former management lawyers, and the three extreme union
partisans all former union attorneys.34 If, after all, one is looking for a reliable
vote in favor of either the union or management-side position-someone who can
be counted on to vote the party line and cancel out the vote of the opposition's
designee-where better to turn than to a long-time representative of labor or of
management?
Of course, in the pre-1980 period, as I have discussed at some length,345 the
management lawyers selected (there were no representatives from the union side)
were typically strongly pro-management in their voting, but they were hardly so
completely predictable in the way that the recent appointees from the
management and union sides have been. Thus, the selection of individuals who
have worked one side of the fence or the other does not inevitably, it seems, have
to result in utterly unabashed partisan voting-at least when the President is doing
the choosing, and both sides have some say in the selection of any given Board
member.
Given the change in appointment norms over the past fifteen to twenty years,
however, and in particular the significant shift toward greater senatorial control of
that process in recent years, such "phone-it-in," party-line voting by the union and
management-side lawyers chosen for service on the Board becomes, if not wholly
inevitable, entirely unsurprising. Once we have senators, with their narrower
constituencies and greater responsiveness to interest group pressures, in control of
the selection process-and once the two sides decide simply to divide up the
available Board seats between them--the logical outcome is the selection not of
"moderately conservative" or "moderately liberal" lawyers,346 whether from
government or private practice-but of de facto representatives of the Chamber of
and 77% of the time in the several months following her confirnation, but in the last two years
tracked had voted for the union position in 174 out of 175 cases).
343 See supra Table 2, p. 1408 (indicating that the most pro-management members, in
order, are Dotson, Hurtgen, Brame, Cohen, Oviatt, and Raudabaugh, and that the most pro-
union members, in order, are Browning, Liebman, and Fox); supra notes 261 and 264-65 and
accompanying text (indicating that all except Dotson were products of package deals). The one
exception here-Donald Dotson-was the highly ideological chairman of the infamous Reagan
Board 1. See supra notes 103-04, 191 and accompanying text.
344 See supra Table 2, p. 1408 (indicating that Hurtgen, Brame, Cohen, Oviatt, and
Raudabaugh are all former management lawyers, while Browning, Liebman, and Fox are all
former union lawyers).
345 See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
346 See Moe, Interests, Institutions andPositive Theory, supra note 24, at 259.
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Commerce3 47 or AFL-CIO 348 point of view, who are most likely to be found
working their chosen side of the fence.
To return to my version of the judicial analogy set forth earlier,349 it is as
if the members of a Supreme Court that hears only criminal procedure cases
were all hand-picked, not by the President in consultation with both the
criminal defense and the prosecutors' bar, but by the members of those bars
and their respective legislative allies, with one side getting five picks and the
other side four.350 In such a world, both the defense and prosecution sides are
highly likely not only to turn to members of their own club as opposed to
lower-court judges or government officials, but to utterly and completely
reliable members-to those who can be counted upon to support the defense
or prosecution party line come hell or high water. And so it is with the NLRB
today.
CODA: A RETURN TO THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
In the wake of the numerous partisan appointments of recent years, the
National Labor Relations Board has now come 180 degrees from its origins.
At the close of the twentieth century, the Board was split between two ex-
management lawyers on the one hand and two former union lawyers on the
other, flanking first former law professor William Gould 351 and then career
Board employee John Truesdale 352 as chair and swing vote. To the extent
347 See supra text accompanying note 330 (reporting that Board-member designate and
long-time management lawyer Charles Cohen had been pronounced "an ideal candidate" by the
Chamber).
34 8 See supra note 342 (reporting that Board Member Margaret Browning, a career union
attorney, is said to vote the AFL-CIO "party line").
349 See supra text accompanying note 172.3 50 Cf AGENCY IN CRIsIs, supra note 3, at 50 ("[W]ith a Democrat in the White House,
the labor camp will get three picks, and with [a] Republican[ ] [president], management gets
three.").
351 See May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 19 (reporting that in 1997-98,
Stanford law professor William Gould presided over a Board "split down the middle" between
ex-management lawyers J. Robert Brame and Peter Hurtgen and former union attorneys Sarah
Fox and Wilma Liebman); April 1998 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 18 (stating that
Gould was bound to be the deciding vote, given the sharp split between the other four Board
members); supra Table 2, p. 1408 (indicating that Gould's voting record falls between the
extremely pro-management records of Hurtgen and Brame and the extremely pro-union records
of Fox and Liebman).
352 See May 1999 EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT, supra note 19 (stating that "[t]he Board has
never witnessed such extreme partisanship between the two opposing political camps as now
exists," and that Truesdale will be the "pivotal swing vote[ ]"); December 1999 EMPLOYMENT
LAW ALERT, supra note 19 (stating that Truesdale presides over a "fractured agency" that is
"split down the middle on partisan lines" between ex-management lawyers Hurtgen and Brame
on the one hand and ex-union lawyers Fox and Liebman on the other); see also January 2001
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that such a Board looks very much like a body composed of two members
"designated as representatives of employers, two as representatives of
employees, and [one] as representative[] of the general public," 353 it is, of
course, precisely the type of tripartite agency that the Congress that brought
the Board into being quite consciously elected not to create.354
As contrary as the current incarnation of the NLRB is to the body of
impartials that the Wagner Act Congress had in mind, however, I would not go so
far as to suggest that the Board as presently constituted is statutorily invalid.
Much has changed since 1935--not least our degree of faith in (or even belief in
the concept of) "neutral experts"--and as a practical matter, the appointment of
an individual who at least swears to represent the public interest and no other
while on the NLRB-however unlikely or unrealistic that may appear in light of
the nominee's background-is presumably enough to satisfy the statute.
Nor do I harbor all that much hope of a "voluntary" (i.e., norm-driven) return
to an earlier, "purer" era of NLRB appointments. Certainly the practice of
appointing management and union-side representatives to the Board has become
so well-entrenched as to make any reversion to the impartiality standard of the
Act's early years all but inconceivable. As to the prospects of an abandonment, at
least, of the "you pick two, we pick two" mentality that has done so much to
produce near-party line voting at the Board in recent years and of a return to the
days of less blatantly biased or one-sided NLRB nominees, I am more equivocal.
The changes that have overtaken the NLRB appointments process over the last
decade and a half largely mirror those that have taken place in the presidential
appointments process generally. The likelihood of a return to prior norms,
EMPLOYMENT LAW ALERT (advance copy), supra note 178 (verifying Truesdale's "swing vote"
status, exemplified by the fact that Truesdale has been in the majority in 98 of 100 cases in
which at least one Board member dissented); see also supra note 338 (indicating that in the last
nineteen months tracked, Members Hurtgen and Brame had compiled 113-6 and 86-11 pro-
management voting records, respectively, and Members Liebman and Fox had compiled 115-3
and 133-1 pro-union records, respectively, whereas Truesdale had a more balanced record of
68-18 pro-union).
As this article goes to press, the term of one of the management lawyers had recently
expired, and the recess appointment granted to one of the union lawyers following expiration of
her term was set to expire shortly. See supra note 19. Thus, absent relatively quick action, the
century could end with careerist Truesdale chairing and acting as swing vote on a three-member
Board split between a single ex-management lawyer and a single ex-union lawyer.
353 S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 201 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OFTHENLRA, supra note
1, at 4 (setting forth text of the original bill introduced by Senator Wagner); see also supra text
accompanying note 7 (same). Senator Wagner's original legislation obviously equated the
interests of employees with those of unions. See S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 201 (1934), reprinted in
I LEG. HIST. OF THE NLRA, supra note 1, at 4.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 5-12 (recounting how the Wagner Act Congress
rejected a tripartite model of the agency, represented by the predecessor body to the NLRB and
proposed in the original legislation, and instead determined that all Board members should be
impartial and represent the public interest only).
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therefore, appears to depend chiefly on larger political trends-the directions of
which only a fool would attempt to predict.
APPENDIX
The Members of the National Labor Relations Board, 1935-2000355
Name
Edwin Smith (1935-41)
Warren Madden (1935-40)
John Carmody (1935-36)
Donald Smith (1936-39)
William Leiserson (1939-43)
Harry Millis (1940-45)
Gerard Reilly (1941-46)
John Houston (1943-53)
Paul Herzog (1945-53)
James Reynolds (1946-51)
Abe Murdock (1947-57)
Copeland Gray (1947-49)
Paul Styles (1950-53)
Ivar Peterson (1952-56)
Guy Farmer (1953-55)
Philip Ray Rodgers (1953-55)
Albert Beeson (Mar.-Dec. 1954)
Boyd Leedom (1955-64)
Stephen Bean (1955-60)
Joseph Jenkins (1957-61)
John Fanning (1957-82)
Arthur Kimball (1960-61)
Background
Government
Academia
Government
Law (Gen'l)
Academia
Academia
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Mgt. IR)
Government
Government
Mgt Lawyer
Government
Mgt (IR)
Government
Government
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Government
Appointed By
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Roosevelt
Truman
Truman
Truman
Truman
Truman
Truman
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
355 Key: IR = Industrial Relations; * = "repeat" appointee. As a general matter, the
background listed for each Board member is the member's "primary occupation" before
appointment to the Board-i.e., the occupation in which the Board member had spent more of
his or her recent working life than any other. See supra note 102 (distinguishing between
"primary occupation" and "prior occupation"-i.e., occupation just prior to appointment). The
designations for three members, however, merit brief explanations. First, I have listed Howard
Jenkins (1963-83) as "Academic/Government" because his pre-Board career was split nearly
evenly between the two. See Flynn, supra note 91, at 529-30 n256 (describing Jenkins's
career). Second, the "Management/Union Lawyer" designation for Betty Murphy (1975-79)
refers to the fact that Murphy worked for an unusual law firm that represented several
international unions as well as numerous management clients. See supra note 89. Third and
finally, Copeland Gray (1947-49) is designated as "Management (Industrial Relations)" as he
indeed came from such a background See supra note 26. However, I have not listed Gray in
bold-face, as I did with the other management-side representatives to highlight the partisan
character of those appointments, for the following reason: Gray was so ignorant of the new
Taft-Hartley amendments as to arouse suspicion that President Truman had appointed him in
order to thwart effective enforcement of those amendments, which of course were favored by
management. Id; see also supra note 147. Hence, I would not classify Gray as a "partisan"
appointment.
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Frank McCulloch (1961-70)
Gerald Brown (1961-71)
Howard Jenkins (1963-83)
Sam Zagoria (1965-69)
Edward Miller (1970-74)
Ralph Kennedy (1970-75)
John Penello (1972-81)
Betty Murphy (1975-79)
Peter Walther (1975-77)
John Truesdale (1977-81)
Don Zimmerman (1980-84)
Robert Hunter (1981-85)
John Van de Water (1981-82)
John Miller (1982-83)
Donald Dotson (1983-87)
Patricia Diaz Dennis (1983-86)
Wilford Johansen (1985-89)
Marshall Babson (1985-88)
James Stephens (1985-95)
Mary Cracraft (1986-91)
John Higgins (1988-89)
Dennis Devaney (1988-94)
Clifford Oviatt (1990-93)
John Raudabaugh (1990-93)
John Truesdale* (Jan.-Mar. 1994)
William Gould (1994-98)
Margaret Browning (1994-97)
Charles Cohen (1994-96)
John Truesdale* (1994-96)
John Higgins* (1996-97)
Sarah Fox (1995-)
Wilma Liebman (1997-_
J. Robert Brame (1997-2000)
Peter Hurtgen (1997-__)
John Truesdale* (1998- )
Government
Government
AcadiGovt.
Government
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Government
Mgt/U Lawyer
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Government
Government
Mgt. Consultant
Government
Mgt. (in-house)
Mgt. (in-house)
Government
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Mgt Lawyer
Government
Government
Mgt. Lawyer
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Academia
Union Lawyer
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Government
Union Lawyer
Union Lawyer
Mgt. Lawyer
Mgt. Lawyer
Government
Kennedy
Kennedy
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Ford
Ford
Carter
Carter
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Reagan
Bush
Bush
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
Clinton
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